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I. Introduction 
In the past two years, bankruptcy theory has taken on an almost 
apocalyptic tone as scholars debate whether the corporate reorganization 
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provisions set forth in Chapter 11 of the current Bankruptcy Code should 
be dramatically altered or even abolished. 1 One by one, almost everyone 
who has contributed to the bankruptcy literature in recent years seems to 
have weighed in on the issue of what should be done with Chapter 11.2 
In the midst of the academic fervor, Congress has been considering 
legislation that would effect the most significant changes in bankruptcy law 
since the enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978.3 As fre-
quently is the case, the proposed legislation falls far short of the complete 
transformation of corporate reorganization that has been advocated in some 
of the academic literature. And yet, the proposed legislation would estab-
lish a bankruptcy commission charged with conducting a full investigation 
of the current bankruptcy regime. 4 The calls for the abolition of Chapter 
11 have received so much attention, both in law reviews and in the popular 
media/ that we can be sure that the advocates of this step would, at the 
very least, have their say before the commission. 
1. A recent article drew public attention to the debate about Chapter 11. See Michael Bradley & 
Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1079 (1992) (question-
ing the efficiency of Chapter II based on an empirical analysis and proposing "contingent equity" as 
an alternative). Other important articles in recent literature include: Barry E . Adler, Financial and 
Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312 (1993) (arguing that 
bankruptcy law could be replaced by contractual alternatives and proposing a "Chameleon Equity" reg-
ime); Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 633 (1993) (discussing 
the likely costs and benefits of a mandatory auction regime); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: 
A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51 (1992) (arguing that investors should 
be allowed to select from a menu of bankruptcy options at the time a corporation is formed) ; and Alan 
Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J . L. & ECON. 595 (1993) (a rguing that the 
costs involved in protracted bankruptcy proceedings could be avoided by private workout offer clauses 
in contracts). For a survey and extensive critical analysis of these cu rrent proposals, see David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New Wnrld of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WiS. L. REV. 465. 
2. Many of these articles have commented critically on Bradley & Rosenzweig's proposal. See 
Lynn M. LoPucki, Srrange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 79 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11 , 102 
YALE L.J. 437 (1992); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagash ira, Should We Abolish Chapter 
11? The Evidence from Japan (Mar. 30, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law 
Review) (suggesting that we should rethink proposals to abolish or reform Chapter 11) . James Bowers 
has recently challenged LoPucki's and Warren's critiques of Bradley & Rosenzweig. See James W. 
Bowers, T7te Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost School of Bankruptcy T7zeory: A 
Comment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1773 (1993). 
3 . Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 
11 U.S .C. § § I 01-1330 (1988)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978]. The bankruptcy legisla-
tion considered by Congress in 1992, seeS. 1985, I 02d Cong., I st Sess. (1991), ultimately died in the 
House. For a brief overview and chronology of this legislation, see David F . Bantleon & Kathy L. 
Kresch, A Bankruptcy Law for the '90s, Bus. L. TODAY, Jan .-Feb. 1993, at 25. After reintroduction 
in 1993, the legislation has suffered a similar fate under almost the same circumstances. SeeS. 540, 
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
4. S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 402-403 (1993). 
5. See, e.g., Peter Passel!, Critics of Bankruptcy Law See Inefficiency and Waste, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. ! 2, 1993, at A 1. For examples of some of the earlier articles in the popular media , see Skeel, 
supra note l, at 472 n.23 . 
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All of the excited debate in academic circles and in Congress has 
focused on a single question: What should be done with the current corpo-
rate reorganization regime? To date, no one has as ked the equally, and 
perhaps even more, important question of who-that is, what political insti-
tution-should be deciding which changes should or should not be made. 
The absence of discussion concerning who should regulate corporate 
bankruptcy is somewhat surprising for at least two reasons . First, for 
twenty years corporate law scholars have been debating whether some or 
all of corporate law should be federalized (or, on the other hand , whether 
Congress should relinquish control over those areas, such as securities law, 
that it already regulates). 6 Given that corporate bankruptcy is an extension 
of general corporation law, the question of whether Congress or the states 
should regulate corporate bankruptcy would seem to be an obvious corol-
lary to the charter competition debate among corporate law scholars. 
Second, whether Congress or the states are the appropriate decision-
makers has been a particularly important question as a historical matter. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the controversy concerning control of corpo-
rate bankruptcy became the single most pressing issue under discussion as 
lawmakers considered proposed legislation that eventually became the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1841. Only at the end of the century did the debate 
finally begin to fade. 
The principal theme of this Article is that It IS time to reopen the 
debate as to whether Congress or the states should regulate corporate bank-
ruptcy. The artificial separation of state corporate law and federal corpo-
rate bankruptcy has undermined both areas of the law. In the state corpo-
rate law context, state lawmakers fail to consider fully insolvency-related 
issues because corporate bankruptcy is regulated by Congress rather than 
the states; yet federal bankruptcy courts frequently look to state law for 
guidance on precisely those corporate governance issues where state law 
is likely to be inefficient or inapplicable. I refer to these perverse effects 
of the federalization of corporate bankruptcy as a "vestigialization"7 
6. The debate is usually traced to a 1974 article by William Cary that argued that states' efforts 
to attract corporate charters have led to a "race-for-the-bottom," with states enacting increasingly 
management-friendly laws at the expense of shareholders because managers o rdinarily choose a firm's 
state of incorporatio n. See William L. Cary , Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Cary's race-for-the-bottom thesis was di sputed by Ralph Winter, 
who contended that market forces would impel state lawmakers to enact laws tha t benefit both managers 
and shareholders. Ralph K. Winter , State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Th eory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) . Winter's view has become know n as Lhe " race-for-the-
top " position. These views , and the continuing debate as to the effects of charter competition, are 
discussed in detail later in this Article. See infra Part IV . 
7. "Vestigialization " refers to the fact that after the separation of sta te corpo rate law and federal 
corporate bankruptcy, the interaction between these two area s of law is based upon the remnants of 
what might other:vise have been a cohesive, integrated policy . After Congress fed eralized corporate 
bankruptcy, states continued to provide their own collectivized insolvency procedures but lost much 
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problem. In light of the inefficiencies caused by vestigialization and-
ultimately more importantly-by Congress's shortcomings in regulating 
corporate bankruptcy, I argue that lawmaking authority over corporate 
bankruptcy should be shifted back to the states. 
It is important to emphasize from the outset that this Article does not 
call for the de-federalization of the entire bankruptcy framework. The sys-
tematic cognitive difficulties that undermine the financial decisions made 
by individuals and that underlie the "fresh start" policy embodied in Ch ap-
ter 13 bankruptcies are arguably best addressed through a single, national 
framework regulated and administered at the federal level. 8 Moreover, the 
personal bankruptcy context lacks the charter competition that shapes state 
lawmaking in the corporate law context and that makes states better sui ted 
than Congress to regulate both general corporate law and corporate bank-
ruptcy. 9 On the contrary, states would be worse, or at least no better, 
than Congress as regulators of personal bankruptcy. In light of this, my 
analysis suggests that while authority over corporate bankmptcy should be 
shifted to the states, 1° Congress should continue to regulate personal 
bankruptcy. 11 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I discuss the nineteenth-
century debate over whether the states or Congress should regulate corpo-
rate bankruptcy. The analysis shows that the current regime-and its 
separation of state corporate law and federal bankruptcy-is in no way 
inevitable. In fact, opponents of federalizing corporate bankruptcy held 
sway through much of the nineteenth century and might plausibly have pre-
vailed if the constitutionality of federal regulation of corporate bankruptcy 
had been tested in the Supreme Court early on. 
of their incentive to focus either on these procedures or on tl1e implications of financi al distress for 
those corporations that had not yet invoked a collectivized insolvency procedure . As a result, when 
federal bankruptcy law employs state law in an insolvency issue, it is likely to find only a vestige of 
a whoily integrated policy decision. See infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text for a more complete 
discussion of vestigialization. 
8. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Swrr Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 
1437-3 8 ( 1985) (arguing that federalization of personal bankruptcy law is desirable due to the pervasive 
effects of impulsive behavior, incomplete heuristics, and externalities on personal financial decisions). 
9. See infra subpart TV(A) . 
I 0. One potential concern about a decision by Congress to shift corporate bankruptcy to the states 
while retaining control over personal bankn1ptcy involves coordination problems . An obvious example 
is the situation where both an individual and her solely-owned corporation file for bankruptcy. While 
coordination costs would be increased under a regime in which the former case were federal and the 
latter case were state, the costs should not be exaggerated. The federal and state courts often would 
be in the same location, and most issues in the cases would lend themselves to separate treatment. 
11. Under the current Bankruptcy Code, Congress also regulates municipal bankruptcy. 11 U .S.C. 
§§ 901-946 (1988) . The arguments for state regulation of corporate bankruptcy would also seem 
applicable in the municipal bankruptcy context, although the case for limited federal control to prevent 
opportunistic amendment of state law, see infra subpart TV(B), arguably would be stronger with respect 
to muni cipal bankruptcy. 
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In Part III, I discuss the consequences of federalizing corporate bank-
ruptcy. I focus on the vestigialization effect that the artificial separation 
between corporate law and corporate bankruptcy has produced in three par-
ticular areas: state regulation of preferential transfers, derivative litigation 
in bankruptcy, and corporate voting in bankruptcy. 
After considering several possible responses to the perverse effects 
caused by the gap between state corporate law and federal corporate bank-
ruptcy, I argue in Part IV that Congress should shift authority over corpo-
rate bankruptcy back to the states. Not only would state control over all 
corporate law eliminate the vestigialization problem, but state lawmakers 
would also be more effective in regulating corporate bankruptcy than Con-
gress has been. State lawmaking is suspect in several areas, however. I 
therefore argue that rather than relinquishing control altogether, Congress 
should continue to regulate limited aspects of corporate bankruptcy, such 
as the applicable disclosure requirements. 
In Part V, I consider several potential obstacles to state regulation of 
corporate bankruptcy, including Contracts Clause limitations and state 
courts' limited abilities to assert jurisdiction over out-of-state persons and 
property. None of these obstacles is insuperable but assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over out-of-state creditors could require special adjustments in 
some cases. 
II. A Brief History of the Federalization of Corporate Bankruptcy 
In order to appreciate the origins and significance of the current divi-
sion between state corporation law and federal bankruptcy law, this Article 
begins by examining the source of Congress's bankruptcy powers and the 
history of how these powers have been interpreted. Congress derives its 
bankruptcy authority from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which 
states that "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o establish ... uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States. "12 The 
language of the Bankruptcy Clause is noteworthy in at least two respects. 
First, while the clause appears to give Congress a clear grant of authority 
to make bankruptcy law, the question of what precisely is or is not a 
"bankruptcy" law has at various times been the subject of great contro-
versy.13 Second, the Bankruptcy Clause merely vests Congress with the 
power to regulate bankruptcy, thus leaving open the possibility that 
Congress might dec! ine to exercise its authority over some or even all 
aspects of insolvency. 
12. U.S . CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. I & 4. 
13 . See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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For the past fifty years, the parameters of Congress's bankruptcy 
powers have been considered so clearly settled in the area of corporate 
bankruptcy that the subject has not generated any serious discussion. 
Whatever else they may say about Chapter 11, both courts and commenta-
tors uniformly assume that Congress's power to regulate corporate bank-
ruptcy is beyond question and that Congress should in fact exercise its 
authority under the Bankruptcy Clause. 14 Few seem to doubt that Con-
gress, rather than the states, should and will determine the contours of 
corporate bankrupto;, just as it does with personal bankruptcy. 
Yet the role of federal leg islation was not always taken for granted. 
To the contrary, for the first seventy-five years of our nation's history, 
commentators fiercely debated whether Congress had any business regulat-
ing corporate bankruptcy or whether this facet of insolvency law belonged 
uniquely to the states. ts This Part reviews the nineteenth -century debate 
over the federalization of corporate bankruptcy in some detail. My analy-
sis not only shows the duration and intensity of the debate-an aspect of 
bankruptcy history that will undoubtedly prove surprising to most contem-
porary observersl6-but also suggests that if the debate had been resolved 
earlier or later than it was, the outcome might have been different. 
A. lhe &rliest Bankruptcy Clause Debates 
Federal bankruptcy did not become a permanent part of the legislative 
landscape until the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.17 Rather 
than a single, enduring bankruptcy statute, Congress passed a series of 
laws-in 1800,18 1841 ,19 and 186720-in response to financial cnses; 
14 . See, e.g., Perez v. Campb ell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (invalidating a state statute that frustrated 
Congress 's attempts to enact unifo rm bankruptcy laws); Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S . 
502 (1938) (expanding congressional power by read ing the general powers of the Necessa ry and Proper 
C lau se into the Bankruptcy Clause); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note I , at I 078-79 (p roposing a 
federal Jaw repea ling Chapter ll and replacing it with a "contingent equity" regime); Joseph E. 
Conley, Jr. , Bankruptcy, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982,43 LA. L. REV . 327 ( 1982) (d iscussing 
Congress's constitutional authority to enact uniform laws). 
15. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. 
16. One of the few recent articles that evidences an appreciation of the historical debates over th e 
federalization of corporate bankruptcy is Donald R . Korobkin , Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence 
of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 746 n.115 (1991). In contrast to the present Article, 
Korobkin appears to assume that the federalization of corporate bankruptcy was inevitable and 
necessary. See id. at 745-46 (describing the transition to federal regulation of corporate bankruptcy) . 
17. Ac t of July I, !898, ch. 541,30 Stat. 544 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act of 1898], repealed by 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, supra note 3, § 401(a), 92 Stat. at 2682. 
18. ActofApr.4, l800 ,ch. l 9,2Stat.19[hereinafterBankruptcyActof 1800],repeaiedbyAct 
of Dec . 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248. 
19 . Act of Aug. 19 , 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act of 184 1], repealed by 
Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. 
20. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch . 176, 14 Stat. 5 17 [hereinafter Bankrup tcy Act of 1867], repealed 
by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99. 
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each of these laws was repealed almost as soon as the particular crisis had 
passed. 21 Unlike the bankruptcy laws themselves, however, the debate 
about whether there should be any federal bankruptcy law, and if so what 
it should look 1 ike, was near! y constant. 22 
Much of the early debate centered on disagreements concerning the 
scope of Congress's authority under the Bankruptcy Clause. To the 
twentieth-century observer, the power to make "bankruptcy" laws seems 
to give Congress an all-encompass ing source of authority in the context of 
financial distress. But to many eighteenth-century legal minds, the term 
"bankruptcy" carried a far different meaning. England had long distin-
guished bankruptcy la,.vs, which applied only to merchants and traders and 
could be invoked only by creditors, from the insolvency23 laws that were 
passed to protect debtors and operated at their request. 24 Based on this 
distinction, opponents of expansive federal legislation insisted , both before 
and after Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, that Congress's 
authority under the Bankruptcy Clause extended only to bankruptcy 
laws. 25 Thus, Congress could not enact legislation covering debtors other 
than merchants and traders, and its mandate was limited to involuntary 
21. F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 131 -32, 143, 156 (1918); CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED 
STATES HISTORY 19, 85, 127 (1935). Both the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 and the Bankruptcy Act of 
1841 were viewed as temporary legislation from the beginning; the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was the 
first American bankruptcy law that purported to be permanent. !d. at 109. However, the law quickly 
became unpopular and, as a resu lt, met the same fate as the earlier acts. !d. at 109, 127. 
22. See NOEL, supra note 21, at 124-30 . For a brief overview of the distinct characterist ics of 
each of the nineteenth-century bankruptcy acts, see infra Appendix A. 
23. In the discussion that fo llows, the term "insolvency" is used, as the text indicates, to describe 
a particular kind of early regulation of financially troubled debtors. Except in connection with this 
limi ted discu ssion of the debate about whether Congress's bankruptcy powers comprehend the enact-
ment of what historically had been viewed as insolvency laws, I use the terms "bankruptcy" and " insol-
vency" in the much broader, lay person's sense. I also assume for the sake of simplicity that firms that 
file bankruptcy are insolvent. Cf Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's 
Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 
140-42 (1990) (finding that a substa ntial majority of publicly held corpora tions that filed bankruptcy 
were insolvent). However, it should be noted that cu rrent Chapter 11 does not require a showing of 
insolvency as a prerequisite to Chapter 11 relief. See Edward 1. DeBartolo Corp. v . Child World, Inc. 
(111 re Child World, Inc.), 146 B.R. 89, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Keniston, 85 B.R. 202, 214 
(Bankr. D.N .H. 1988). 
24. WARREN, supra note 21, at 7. Bankruptcy laws, which were designed to prevent debtors from 
frau du lently withholding assets from their creditors, provided a mechanism for gathering assets and 
distributing them to creditors. NOEL, supra note 21, at 96-97; WARREN, supra note 2 1, at 7. 
Insolvency laws enabled debtors, among other things, to petition for release from debtors' prison on 
a showing they had delivered all of their assets to their c reditors . NOEL, supra note 21, at 96-97 ; 
WARREN, supra note 21, at 7. 
25. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 461 (1840) (remarks of Sen. Wall) 
(arguing that the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was unconstitutional because it was an insolvency 
law and thus beyond the scope of congressional power). 
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bankruptcy-laws that creditors rather than the debtor invoked . 26 
Unfortunately, the Framers' discussions in connection with the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 shed very little light on the intended scope 
of this congressional power grant. The Bankruptcy Clause was not includ-
ed in the early drafts of the Constitution, and its appearance in later drafts 
seems to have provoked very little discussion.27 The Bankruptcy Act of 
1800 applied only to merchants and was involuntary in nature . 28 As a re-
sult, the debate between the states' rights advocates, who argued for a 
narrow, historical construction of bankruptcy, and those who supported far 
more sweeping federal control remained unsettled well into the nineteenth 
century. 29 
Somewhat surprisingly, given the controversy that ultimately devel-
oped, corporations played almost no part in the first three decades of Bank-
ruptcy Clause debate . When lawmakers debated the scope of the Bankrupt-
cy Clause during these years, both sides assumed that the bankruptcy 
debtors they were fighting about were individual debtors. Not until 1820 
did lawmakers shift their attention to corporations and begin to consider 
whether the Bankruptcy Clause comprehended corporate debtors. 30 
26. NOEL, supra note 21, at 96-97; WARREN, supra note 21, at 7-8. 
27. NOEL, supra note 21, at 78-80; WARREN, supra note 21, at 4-5. The only discussion of the 
Bankruptcy Clause on record consists of an exchange between Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who 
feared that Congress might repeat England 's practice of making some bankruptcies punishable by death, 
and Gouverneur Morris, who believed that such fears were misplaced. NOEL, supra note 21 , at 80. 
The Bankruptcy Clause is also discussed briefly in The Federalist, where Madison describes it as 
"intimately connected with the regulation of commerce" and considers it as a means of "prevent[ing j 
so many frauds where the parties or thei r property may lie or be removed into different States." THE 
FEDERALIST No. 42, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also WARREN, supra 
note 21, at 7 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra, at 271 (James Madison)); Kurt H. Nadel mann, 
On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, I AM. J. LEGAL HIST . 215 (1957) (d iscussing brief references 
to the Bankruptcy Clause in Madison's notes) . 
28. Bankruptcy Act of 1800 § I . 
29. The first important Supreme Court decision addressing the scope of Congress's au thority under 
the Bankruptcy Clause is Sturges v. Crowninshield , 17 U .S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). Chief Justice Mar-
shall' s opinion rejected the contention that the Bankruptcy Clause limits Congress to bankruptcy laws, 
as distinguished from insolvency laws. /d. at 194-96. "Th[e] difficulty of discriminating with any 
accuracy between insolvent and bankrupt laws," he reasoned, "would lead to the opinion, that a bank-
rupt law may contain ... insolvent laws; and that an insolvent law may contain those which are 
common to a bankrupt law ." !d. at 195. Yet Sturges was not a tota l Joss for states' righ ts advocates. 
Marshall concluded that the Bankruptcy Clause does not wrest bankruptcy completely out of the hands 
of the states. He ruled that to the extent that Congress has not acted, the states may fill the void with 
laws of their own, so long as the state regulation does not offend other constitutiona l strictures such 
as the Contracts Clause. /d . at 196-97. Moreover, lawmakers not only continued a political debate 
over the issues Marshall had purported to resolve as a constitutional matter, but they also persisted in 
treating these issues as open constitutional questions. See NOEL, supra note 21, at 140-41 (describing 
Senator John C. Calhoun's insistence that the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was an insolvency law and, as 
such , exceeded Congress's powers under the Bankruptcy Clause). 
30. A bankruptcy bill that Congress introduced in 1820 stirred what appears to have been the first 
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The debate continued to simmer thereafter,31 and finally came to a 
head in the discussions that culminated in the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. By 
the late 1830s, whether Congress could, or should, regulate corporate 
bankruptcy arguably had become the single most important issue under dis-
cussion. 
Why, in contrast to the battles over Congress's authority to enact an 
insolvency law or legislation that extended to debtors other than merchants 
and traders, did the fight over Congress's authority to regulate corporate 
bankruptcy take so long to develop? The short answer is that corporations 
simply were not an important economic factor in the early years of the 
debate. Only in the middie decades of the nineteenth century did corpora-
tions emerge as an integral component of the nation's expanding econo-
my. 32 By this time, the merchants and traders, or more accurately the 
manufacturers and miners, increasingly operated as corporations rather than 
individual business people . 33 Lawmakers therefore could no longer afford 
to ignore them. 
The opposing factions in the corporate bankruptcy debates divided 
along much the same lines as lawmakers had in disputing the other issues 
relating to the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause (and in much the same way 
as might be the case if the debate were reopened today). 34 Those law-
makers who favored inclusion of corporations saw federal bankruptcy legis-
lation as necessary to eliminate the problem of varied and inconsistent state 
regulation and contended that corporations were sufficiently integral to 
commerce that Congress could not effectively regulate bankruptcy unless 
extensive debate over the inclusion of corporations in a fed eral bankruptcy act. Opponents of inclusion 
contended that because states charter and otherwise regu late ongoing corporations, Congress could not 
possibly have the power to break them up. PETER J. COLEMAN , DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN 
AMERICA 22 (1974). Th ese policy makers, many of whom were Southerners , also decried the proposal 
as a ploy by Northern banks to crush Southern and Western banks. !d. Those who favored inclusion, 
on the other hand, insisted that co rpo rations were so inextrica~ ly intertwined with commerce that a 
bankruptcy law that did not apply to corporations would hardly be worth enacting. /d. The 1820 bill 
fail ed to pass, WARREN , supra note 21 , at 27-28, as did a proposal in 1827 to amend a bankruptcy bill 
under consideration to include corporations. !d. at 57. 
31. In 1837, President Van Buren suggested in a special message th at Congress should enact 
bankruptcy legislation that wou ld only apply to banks. WARREN, supra note 21 , at 56. Those who 
opposed his request insisted, among o ther things, that Cong ress did not have constitutional authority 
to enact a bankruptcy law that regulated corpo rations. See id. at 57 (desc ribing five sources of 
opposi tion to Van Buren's proposa l, including those who believed a bankruptcy bill app licable to 
corporations would be unconstitutional) . Congress failed to act on Van Buren 's request. WARREN, 
supra note 21, at 56-57; see also NOEL, supra note 21, at 136-37 (noting that Daniel Webster, the 
opposition leader, successfully controverted Van Buren's request to include banks and corporati ons in 
the bankruptcy law). 
32. See LAWRENCE M . FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 190 (2d ed. 1985). 
33. !d. at 189-90. 
34 . See supra note 30. 
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it inc! uded corporations in any bankruptcy legislation it passed. 35 These 
lawmakers insisted that there was no valid reason to treat corporations dif-
ferently than individuals for the purposes of a bankruptcy acf6 and pro-
phesied that a failure to extend federal legislation to corporations would 
serve as an invitation to fraud. 37 
Tne lawmakers who insisted that Congress could not, and should not, 
regulate corporate bankruptcy countered with an argument whose power 
has been largely forgotten today: Because states charter and regulate every 
other facet of a corporation's existence, they must also be the ones to 
address the bankruptcy of corporations.38 In the words of Senator Henry 
Clay of Kentucky: 
Corporations are artificial beings, created by the States 
[The States] know when it is best to make or abolish them. 
. . . I think that their control and management, and the 
distribution of their funds, can be far better effected by the respective 
States which have created them than by the legislation of the Federal 
Government. 39 
In striking contrast to the current assumption of many courts and 
commentators that Congress always has and always will regulate corporate 
bankruptcy, these debates make clear that nineteenth-century lawmakers 
viewed the proper domain of corporate bankruptcy as an open issue. 
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the debate was framed in 
constitutional as well as political terms. The constitutional argument-
35. See Judith S. Koftler, Tize Bankruptcy Cwuse and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the 
Doctrine of Geographic Unifonnity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 54-55 (1983) (advancing the theory 
originally put forth by Joseph Story that the Bankruptcy Clause was designed to prevent inconsistent 
state laws that might hamper interstate commerce). 
36. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 25, app. at 463 (remarks of Sen. Wall). Senator Garrett B. 
Wall went even further, contending that the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause compelled 
Congress to treat corporations the same as individuals. /d. In his view, a law that included 
individuals, but did not govern corporations engaging in the same business, would violate this 
requirement. /d. This interpretation of the uniformity requirement was eventually rejected by the 
Supreme Court. See Hanover Nat'! Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (stating that the 
Bankruptcy Clause requires only geographical, not personal, uniformity). 
37. Advocates of federalization insisted both that state lawmakers could not be trusted to draft 
appropriate bankruptcy legislation, see supra note 35, and that exclusion of corporations from the bill 
would encourage individuals to engage in fraudulent behavior. Senator Wall, for instance, predicted 
that unscrupulous business people would incorporate their businesses as a means of evading the 
oversight of a federal bankruptcy regime if corporations were exempted: Would not "corporations and 
associations ... become the asylum of fraud, the hiding-place of dishonesty, and the rogue's last 
refuge?" CONG. GLOBE, supra note 25, app. at 463. 
38. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 25, app. at 848 (remarks of Sen. Clay) ("[T]he States 
themselves are much more competent than Congress is to exercise all necessary and proper jurisdiction 
over corporations .... "). 
39. !d. 
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whatever lawmakers might think about the policy issues at stake, Congress 
simply did not have the constitutional authority to involve itself in 
corporate bankruptcy-was taken extraordinarily seriously. Even Joseph 
Story, a consistent supporter of federalization , had second thoughts. "Is 
it quite certain," he wrote to Daniel Webster, " that State Rights as to the 
creation and dissolution of corporations are not thus virtually infringed? 
I confess that I feel no small doubt whether Congress can regulate State 
corporations by any other laws than State law. " 4D 
The opponents of extending the proposed leg islation to corporations 
did not simply raise doubts about the inclusion of corporations . In this 
most hotly contested of all the debates over the status of corporate bank-
ruptcy, their view eventually won out. Just as they had in 1820, opponents 
thwarted efforts to extend the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 to corporations.41 
Why was it that, as late as 1841 , when corporations had become an 
important part of the economy and Congress's role in regulating commerce 
was increasingly recognized, opponents of federalizing corporate bank-
ruptcy still held the winning hand? The explanation for the persistent 
success of those who thought corporate bankruptcy should be left to the 
states lies in the remarkably close relationship between states and corpo-
rations throughout the nation's history. The following subpart examines 
the basis for and development of this relationship. 
B. State Regulation and the Origins of the Modem Corporation 
To better appreciate the power of the argument that only the states can 
and should regulate corporate bankruptcy and to understand how the argu-
ment continued to garner substantial support well into the nineteenth cen-
tury, it is necessary to consider briefly the role states have historically 
played in corporation law. The overview also will help to explain why 
Congress finally did federalize this area of bankruptcy and will set the 
stage for a brief analysis of the significance of these nineteenth-century 
developments in corporation law and corporate bankruptcy. 
In England and elsewhere in Europe, the power to grant corporate 
charters (and the special privileges that often attended a charter) had long 
been seen as one of the attributes of sovereignty.42 During the colonial 
40. 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 330 (Bosto n, Little & Brown 1851), quoted in 
WARREN, supra note 21 , at 68. 
41. See Bankruptcy Act o f 1841 § I (defining eligible bankrupts as a ll persons ow ing debts and 
furth e r elaborating that "all persons" includes "merchants ... , all retaile rs ... , and all bankers, 
fa ctors, brokers, underwriters, or marine insurers"); id . § 14 (extending the scope of the Act to cover 
partnerships but not corporations). 
42. See JAMES W . HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1780-1970, at 3 (1970) ("By the eighteenth century the accepted English doctrine was 
that only the king in Parliament might create a corporation."); see also 2 JOSEPHS. DAVIS, Eighteenth 
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era, the British crown controlled the granting of corporate charters in the 
colonies, just as it did in England.~3 The colonies, however, did not 
always wait for royal approval of a given charter request. Rather, colonial 
assemblies sometimes short-circuited the process, even before the Revolu-
tionary War, by purporting to authorize charters themselves. 44 Following 
the expulsion of England, and in the absence of an overarching national 
government, it was therefore a simple and natural step for each of the 
individual states to assume full authority in this area. 45 Thus began the 
unique relationship between corporations and state government. 
The states' early role as gatekeepers with respect to corporate charters 
went much further than the ministerial process that we are familiar with 
today. The role of a state went much further than simply granting char-
ters. Not only did each charter application require special approval by the 
state (the general incorporation statutes that dramatically reduced the 
difficulty of obtaining a charter did not become prevalent until well into the 
nineteenth century46), but a high percentage of the early charters were for 
businesses that performed quasi-public functions such as building turnpikes 
or bridges or installing municipal aqueducts. 47 Many early corporations 
were, in a very real sense, simply arms of the state. To encourage entre-
preneurs to engage in much needed activities, states frequently gave them 
monopoly rights, together with other special privileges ranging from the 
power of eminent domain and freedom from taxation to exemption from 
the militia for those involved in the corporate enterprise.48 
Century Business Corporations in the United States, in EssAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATIONS 3, 8 (Russell & Russell 1965) (1917) [hereinafter EssAYS] ("The power of granting 
corporate privileges, long recognized as an attribute of sovereignty, was assumed by the [American! 
statE' governments as the British control was thrown off, and the granting of charters became a function 
of the law-making body."). 
43 . See I JosEPHS. DAVIS, Corporations in the American Colonies, in EssAYS, supra note 42, 
at 3, 6-7; see also id. at 17 ("[T]he acts of the assemblies could not become laws until approved by 
the representatives of the proprietary or the Crown, and they were further subject to annulment by these 
authorities."). 
44. I id. at 18-20. 
45. 2 DAVIS, supra note 42, at 8-9. 
46. The shift toward general incorporation began when Louisiana abolished special charters 
altogether in 1845. LA. CONST. of 1845, tit. VI, art. 123. A number of other states developed e dual 
system of both special and general incorporation between 1845 and 1875. Henry N . Butler, Nine ranch-
Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 1. LEGAL STUD. 129, 
143-46 (1985); see, e.g., ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XI, § I; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. Vlll, § I; WIS. 
C ONST. art . XI, § I (adopted 1848). General incorporation statutes finally displaced special 
incorporation altogether in the 1870s and 1880s. HURST, supra note 42 , at 33; see Butler, supra, at 
153, 152-54 (Table 1: Chronology of Pre-1875 State Constitutional Provisions that Ab solutely 
Prohibited Special Acts of Incorporation). 
47. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 188-89 (describing the quasi-public nature of corporations 
in the colonial and early statehood eras); see also 2 DAVIS, supra note 42, at 21-33 (detailing the 
purposes for which early state charters were granted). 
48. See M ORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 114, 
118 (1977) (discussing the propensity for corporations engaged in public activities to demand monopoly 
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Nor did the role of the state in corporate life end with the issuance of 
a charter. To ensure the continued viability of the corporations they had 
chartered (and completion of the public projects undertaken), state govern-
ments routinely loaned money to the corporations, authorized them to set 
up lotteries as a means of raising money, and adjusted tolls to the extent 
necessary to offset any decline in profits .49 Toget.h.er with the states' 
pervasive involvement came an implicit authority over the terms of a cor-
poration's charter. Just as many corporations assumed that they could rely 
on assistance from the state if they ran into trouble, it was also widely 
accepted that a state could alter the charter of an ongoing business and even 
terminate its existence if a state so chose. 50 On more than one occasion , 
a state invoked these powers to alter or repeal a charter it had previously 
granted. 51 
C. The Last Stand and Eventual Denouement of the Fight Against 
Federalization of Corporate Bankruptcy 
The close relationship between states and early corporations sheds 
important light on the question of why opponents of federalization suc-
ceeded in preventing Congress from including corporations in federal 
bankruptcy legislation even as late as 1841, when Congress passed its 
second major bankruptcy act. 52 To early lawmakers, all of whom were 
fully aware of the states' pervasive role in the life of a corporation and of 
the state functions performed by many corporations, the argument that only 
the states can and should regulate the bankruptcy of corporations would 
have made (and obviously did make) perfect sense. 
But the nineteenth century brought important changes in the relation-
ship between states and the corporations they chartered. As the century 
rights, powers of eminent domain, and tax-exempt status); see also 2 DAVIS, supra note 42, at 326-27 
(discussing state favors to business corporations that included lotterJ privileges, tax exemptions, loans, 
and subscriptions). In a sense, corporations acted as agencies of the state that incorporated them and 
can be seen as a predecessor to the contemporary administrative state. 
49. See Oscar Handlin& Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. 
ECON . HIST. I, 16 (1945) (noting that many corporations took such benefits for granted). 
50. 2 DAVIS, supra note 42, at 310-16. 
51. Pennsylvania, for instance, exercised its authority on several occasions, summarily altering 
the charter of a college in Philadelphia in 1779 and repealing the Pennsylvania charter of the Bank of 
North America six years later. /d. at 310. While the repeal of the Bank of North America evoked 
furious protest, the bank eventually gave up its challenge to the repealing act and accepted a new, 
substantially narrower charter. /d. at 313. North Carolina also appears to have revoked one of its 
charters. /d. at 31~. Not until Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Trustees of Dartmouth Co llege v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), and its characterization of a charter as a constitutionally 
protected contract, did it become clear that states could no longer alter charters at will . /d . at 627-54 . 
See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 49, at 17-18 (commenting that Dartmouth College acted as a 
bulwark against legislative interference). 
52. Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § 1; see supra note 41. 
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advanced, the explosion of commercial activity transformed both the nature 
of corporations and their relationship with the states that chartered 
them-and ultimately weakened the case against federal corporate bankrupt-
cy legislation in several respects. 53 First, quasi-public activitr played 
a much less central role in the economy as opportunities to make money 
in mining, manufacturing, and other areas proliferated.55 Second, the 
burgeoning number of applications for corporate charters made it impos-
sible for states to review the applications on an individu alized basis.56 
Although many states resisted the pressure to abandon special incorporation 
in favor of general incorporation statutes until the iast decades of the 
century, the character of the incorporation process had already changed for 
good. 57 Third, many of the privileges states had used to stimulate econo-
mic development-including exclusive licenses and the power of eminent 
domain-tended to hinder competition. 58 In a rapidly expanding economy 
where investors no longer needed to be coaxed into entrepreneurship, these 
privileges came to seem not only unnecessary, but even counterproduc-
tive. 59 
By the 1840s, the increasingly distant relationship between states and 
corporations and the explosion of economic growth made the argument 
favoring a uniform national insolvency regime more persuasive than ever 
before. By this time, corporations' traditional function as arms of state 
government was becoming more a historical than an actual fact. In a 
53. Vast improvements in transportlltion played a particularly importllnt role in the burgeoning of 
interstate commerce as the development of railroads and canals linked areas that previously had been 
geographically isolated. GEORGE R. TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATI ON REVOLUTI ON, 1815-1860, at 74 
(1962). 
54. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
55. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 189 (noting the increased use of th e corporate charter for 
general commercial goals); HURST, supra note 42, at 18 (suggesting that increased use of corporate 
charters extended the range of ordinary business activities). 
56. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 190. 
57. Whereas Friedman suggests that the volume of demand for special charters forced states to 
enact general incorporation statutes, id., Butler contends that exogenous factors such as the increasing 
development of interstate commerce and charter competition among states led to the decline of the 
special charter. Butler, supra note 46, at 153-54. Charter competition developed after the Supreme 
Court's decision in Paul v. Virginia , which made it difficult for states to exclude out-of-state 
businesses. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 182 (1868) (holding that a state's chartering 
of a corporation opens the door to all out-of-state corporations wishing to pursue the same business). 
In Butler's view, state legislators might otherwise have preserved the special chartering system, despite 
its burden on legislative time, because the system was a source of significant rents . Butler, supra note 
46, at 130-33 . 
58. HORWITZ, supra note 48, at 114. 
59. See id. at 130-34 (suggesting that the granting of monopoly privileges was no longer required 
to promote adequate investments and observing that the economic entrenchment resulting from the lack 
of competition hindered expanded productivity and technological development). The chilling effect of 
a monopoly was particularly problematic when the corporation holding the monopoly proved unable 
to keep pace with the growing demand for its service. /d. 
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sense, then, the debates leading up to the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 were the 
last great rallying point for the advocates of state dominion in corporate 
matters. By the time Congress enacted another bankruptcy act in 1867, op-
ponents of the federalization of corporate bankruptcy no longer held the 
upper hand. The expansion of interstate commerce had continued, strength-
ening the case of the lawmakers who called for blanket national legisla-
tion. 60 Further, with the increased mobility of business, some lawmakers 
began to argue that states could not effectively regulate bankruptcies that 
crossed state lines because of their inability to adjudicate the interests of 
out-of-state creditors and property. 61 States managed to overcome these 
limitations with the development of equity receiverships at the end of the 
century, 62 but Congress's greater jurisdictional reach offered an additional 
argument for federalizing corporate bankruptcy. 
Nonetheless, the debate persisted, and some lawmakers continued to 
argue stridently that Congress could not and should not regulate corporate 
bankruptcy. 63 But by the time the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was signed 
into law, proponents of federal regulation of corporate bankruptcy had 
successfully included corporations in a federal bankruptcy law for the first 
60. As noted earlier, a key premise of all of the arguments for federal bankruptcy legislation was 
that a uniform national law was needed to prevent states from enacting inconsistent and arbitrary 
bankruptcy legislation of the sort that eristed in the early years of the nation. See supra notes 35-37 
and accompanying text; see also NOEL, supra note 21, at 111-23 (detailing the inconsistencies of the 
state systems). It is interesting to note that the experience with state regulation of other aspects of 
corporate law suggests that , at least in the corporate bankruptcy context, concerns about inconsistent 
and arbitrary corporate laws may have been unfounded. This observation is discussed later in more 
detail. See infra section fV(B)(2). 
61. WARREN, supra note 21, at I 04-05. The difficulty was one of both personal 
jurisdiction-states could not assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state creditors-and subject matter 
jurisdiction-which imposed comparable limitations on a state's authority over foreign property. See 
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 368-69 (1827) (holding a state bankruptcy law invalid 
as applied to an out-of-state creditor because of a lack of personal jurisdiction). 
62. See 8 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF 
THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION 
COMMITTEES 30 (1940) [hereinafter SEC REPORT] (noting that separate state receiverships were set up 
in each of the states where bankrupt companies had property). 
63. Senator William A. Howard of Michigan may have been the most vigorous opponent of 
federalizing corporate bankruptcy in the debates leading up to the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. In support 
of his motion that language providing for the inclusion of corporations be stricken, Senator Howard 
argued: 
Corporations in the States draw their being from the statutes of the States, which statutes 
are called their charters. Their existence, all their attributes, all their liabilities, all 
penalties imposed upon them, LIJe very life and being, the very soul and essence of a 
corporation is derived from the State statutes. The States have full and complete control 
over corporations erected or created by their laws; and I have yet to learn that it is within 
the constitutional competency of Congress to interfere in any way whatever with the 
functions or operations of State corporations. 
CONG . GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 987 (1867). 
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time. 64 Corporations once again were included in federal bankruptcy leg-
islation in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,65 and corporate bankruptcy has 
been a permanent part of federal bankruptcy law ever since. 66 
D. Summary and Implications 
As this historical analysis illustrates, lawmakers did not always see the 
bankruptcy of corporations as a natural and inevitable component of fed eral 
bankruptcy legislation. For much of the first century of the nation's exis -
tence, most lawmakers assumed that states rather than Congress would re-
gulate co rporate bankruptcy, just as the states regulated near ly every other 
facet of a corporation's existence. In fact, one might credibly conclud e 
from the analysis that history could easily have unfold ed differently. 
To appreciate this possibility, notice that the question of whether the 
Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress the power to federali ze corporate bank · 
ruptcy was ultimately decided at a political level. Because Congress did 
not attempt to include corporations in either of the early bankruptcy 
64. See WARREN, supra note 21, at 109 . 
65. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 initially provided for involuntary bankruptcy only for 
corporations. Only in 1910, when Congress amended the Act to include voluntary corporate 
bankruptcy , was the federalization of corporate bankruptcy complete . See Bankruptcy Act Amendment 
of 1910, ch. 412, § 4(a), 36 Stat. 838, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, tit. IV, § 40l(a), 92 Stat. 2549,2682. 
66. The suggestion that federalization of corporate bankruptcy was not inevitable casts an 
interesting light on the securities reforms of the 1930s. As it was, Congress federalized a significant 
portion of state corporation law with the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, and at the same time 
completely overhauled the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See Securities Act of 1933 , ch. 38 , tit. I, 48 Stat. 
74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 a-bbbb (1988)); Securities Exchange Act o f 1934, ch. 404, 
48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U .S.C. §§ 78 a-kk (1988)); Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 
Stat. 1467 (repealed 1978); Act of Mar. 24, 1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798 (repealed 1978); Act of June 
7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911 (repealed 1978) (all three amending the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). 
Congress also made sweeping reforms in related areas. See, e.g., Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 
1933 , ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12 U.S .C. (1988)) (separating 
commercial from investment bankers and protecting depositors by restricting the securities business of 
commercial banks); Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as 
amended at 15 U .S.C. §§ 80a-1 to b-21 (1988)) (regulating stock brokers and investment advi sors) . 
But what might have happened if all of corporation law-both general corporation law and corporate 
bankruptcy-were still governed by the states when Congress embarked on its Depression-era refo rms? 
It is plausible that Congress might have created a regime somewhat like the state-regulated o ne 
I propose in Part IV. To be sure, given the extent of the regulatory zeal of the time, Congr~ss 
probably would have federalized substantially more of corporate bankruptcy than I argue for. But 
rather than wholly federalizing an entire segment of corporation law-corporate bankruptcy-it is at 
least possible that Congress might simply have focused on those issues that the states appeared to be 
regulating ineffectively. For example, Congress could have satisfied its concerns that investors be 
given adequate information by enacting comprehensive federal disclosure requirements that dealt both 
with healthy corporations and with those that had filed for bankruptcy. Whether Congress would have 
deemed this sufficient is less clear, given the Securities and Exchange Commission's belief that a trustee 
should be appointed in lieu of management in every large case . 8 SEC REPORT, supra note 62 , at I 07-
10. Such a framework would have avoided the kinds of problems I discuss in the following Part . 
488 Texas Law Review [Vol. 72:471 
acts, 67 the question never made its way to the courts. 68 But consider 
what might have happened if, for example, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 had 
purported to regulate bankruptcies involving corporations and was there-
after challenged as unconstitutional. Given the close identification of 
corporations wiLl-} the states in that era, the Supreme Court quite possibly 
would have concluded that the Framers of the Constitution never intended 
Congress to interfere with state sovereignty in this fashion. They might 
well have held that the Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress broad authority 
to establish uniform federal bankruptcy laws, but that the clause could not 
have been designed to disrupt so integral a function of state government as 
the regulation of a state-sponsored corporation. 69 
To be sure , subsequent events might have undermined the basis for 
such a decision. While Congress's authority to regulate commerce under 
the Commerce Clause was initially seen as relatively limited in scope, the 
Supreme Court construed this power in increasingly expansive terms as in-
terstate commerce mushroomed in the latter half of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 70 Precedent holding that Congress could not regulate 
corporate bankruptcies might have become problematic, given the impor-
tance of corporations to the modern economy and the uncertain ability of 
67. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 applied to "any merchant, or other person, residing within the 
United States, actually using the trade of merchandise ." Bankruptcy Act of 1800 § I. The Bankruptcy 
Act of 1841 covered "[a]ll persons whatsoever, residing in any State, District or Territory of the United 
States ... being merchants, or using the trade of merchandise, all retailers of merchandise, and all 
bankers, factors, brokers , underwriters , or marine insurers." Bankruptcy Act of 1841 § I. "Persons" 
in each case was seen as comprehending only natural persons, not corporations. NOEL, supra note 21, 
at 138. 
68. Another aspect of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841-the Act's provision for voluntary as well as 
involuntary bankruptcy- was also perceived to be constitutionally suspect, but it too was never tested 
in the Supreme Court. WARREN, supra note 21, at 86. 
69. The Supreme Court's treatment of insurance law offers a fascinating parallel in this respect. 
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U .S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) , it was 
widely assumed that the sale of insurance did not constitute interstate commerce, and as a result, 
Congress had no authority to regulate insurance. See id. at 183 (holding that a state statute requiring 
out-of-state insurance companies to obtain licenses in order to conduct business within the state did not 
violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution). In consequence, state lawmakers exercised sole 
authority over both general insurance law and insurance insolvency throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the 
Court held that insurance regulation did in fact come within the parameters of the Commerce Clause. 
/d. at 553. But Congress responded by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act shortly thereafter, thus 
assuring that the states would continue to regulate both insurance law and insurance insolvency. See 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S .C. §§ 1011 - 1015 
(1988)). As suggested in the text, events could easily have developed similarly in the corporate 
bankruptcy context, resulting in states being given the same authority over corporate bankruptcy that 
they have with respect to general corporation law. 
70. Thus, by 1877 the Supreme Court had held that a wire transmission between two adjoining 
states constituted interstate commerce, Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. I, 9-10 
(1877), and in 1903 the Court also held that the interstate movement of lottery tickets was interstate 
commerce. See Championv. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321,354 (1903). 
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the states to exercise jurisdiction over all of the necessary parties and 
property in bankruptcy. 71 
And yet, if the states had developed bankruptcy provisions as part of 
their corporation laws, and had the provisions kept pace with changes in 
corporations and the economy, the courts might well have left the prece-
dent largely undisturbed. 72 Bankruptcy might simply have become a 
historical exception to Congress's ever-expanding role and an established 
component of state corporation law. 73 
The ultimate point here is not to defend the plausibility of this 
alternative scenario, but to further reinforce that it is not at all inevitable 
that co rporate bankruptcy be regulated at the federal level. The Bankrupt-
cy Clause does not compel Congress to assert authority in L1is area, nor 
was it always clear that Congress even could do so. The observations of 
this Part therefore raise an important question: What are the consequences 
of Congress's decision to federalize corporate bankruptcy? And from this 
question comes another: In I ight of these consequences, is it possible that 
the federalization of corporate bankruptcy may have been a mistake? 
III. Confusion in the Gap: The Vestigialization Caused by the Separation 
Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy 
The previous Part sought to explain from a historical perspective why 
Congress regulates corporate bankruptcy while authority over other aspects 
of corporate law is vested in the states. I asked at the end of the Part 
whether it has mattered that corporate law and bankruptcy are subject to 
different masters. My purpose in this Part is to show that, rather than 
simpiy being a historical curiosity, the separation has produced unfortunate 
consequences in legal doctrine. 
I argue, in particular, that the separation between corporate law and 
bankruptcy is responsible for what I will refer to as "vestigialization" -that 
71. As noted above, the states solved these jurisdictional problems in the equity receivership 
context with the use of ancillary proceedtngs . See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
72. An interesting question raised by this analysis is why, given that Congress did not federalize 
corporate bankruptcy until 1867, the states did not enact significant corporate bankruptcy legislation 
in the interim. Several answers are possible. First, and perhaps most importantly, early corporations 
rart:ly failed, both because many were established to achieve specific, limited objectives, and because 
the state tended to step in to forestall any potential disaster. See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 49, 
at 16-17 (discussing the low-risk undertakings for which early corporations were formed). Thus, the 
possibility of corporate insolvency was addressed on an ad hoc basis, rather than through legislation, 
in the ea rly years. Second, even after the Supreme Court upheld states' right to enact bankruptcy 
iegislation in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 196-97 (!819), the scope of state 
authority to regu late corporate bankruptcy was subject to doubt. 
73. In addition to the jurisdictional questions alluded to here, several other obstacles might limit 
the ability of the states to enact effective bankroptcy laws. I discuss these obstacles in more detail later 
in this Article. See infra Part V. 
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is , the systematic neglect (by state or federal lawmakers, or both) of issues 
that fall in the gap between general corporation law and corporate bank-
ruptcy. 74 These effects seem to stem from two different phenomena. 
First, states have insufficient reason or opportunity to focus (in connection 
with either the legislative or judicial process) on corporate governance 
issues as they relate to insolvent corporations75 because insolvent corpora-
tions that are unable to resolve their financial distress through private 
workout, and whose difficulties continue, usually wind up in bankruptcy, 
where they are subject to federal bankruptcy laws and federal court prece-
dents. 76 Due to the existence of an overarching federal bankruptcy re-
gime, states have paid little attention to their own collectivized insolvency 
procedures77 and, with a few sporadic exceptions, have largely ignored 
the implications of inso lvency in developing their general corporation 
law. 78 
74. It is imp ortllnt to emphasize that the analysis which follows does not suggest that 
vestigialization will occur whenever state and federal law govern the same area. Rather, vestigialization 
is an artifact of the particular tensions incident to the separation between state corporate law and federal 
corporate bankruptcy that are discussed below. See infra subparts III(A)-(C). 
75. By "insolvent corporations" I mean corporations whose liabilities are greater than their assets. 
I am not using the term " insolvent" in the specialized sense employed in the nineteenth-century debates 
over the appropriate scope of the Bankruptcy Clause. See supra note 23. 
76. The principal comparison here is between federal bankruptcy laws and state statutory 
alternatives to federal bankruptcy, such as state assignment-for-the-benefit-of-creditors provisions. (I 
describe these provisions as "collectivized insolvency procedures" below. See infra note 77 .) A recent 
survey by the Fraudulent Transfers Task Force of the Corporate, Banking, and Business Section of the 
Pennsylvania Bar Association contlrms the widespread perception that troubled corporations rarely 
invoke the state law procedures. The Task Force asked members of the Corporate, Banking, and 
Business Section how frequently they used Pennsylvania's statutory insolvency procedures. While 
many of the members regularly dealt with the federal bankruptcy laws, few had any significant 
experience with the state law procedures. Telephone Interview with Joy Conti, Chairperson of the 
Fraudulent Transfers Task Force (Mar. 14, 1994). My own review of Pennsylvania caselaw reinforced 
the impression that the state law procedures are rarely used. The supplement to the annotated version 
of the Pennsylvania provisions contains only 18 different reported decisions for the years 1954-1992 
(excluding six decisions where the provisions were construed in a federal bankruptcy proceeding). See 
39 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-216 (1992 Supp.). See generally James E. McCarty, Federal 
Bankmptcy or State Court Receivership, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 340, 348-49 (1965) (noting that there were 
more insolvencies in federal bankruptcy courts than in Wisconsin state courts). 
77. I use the term "collectivized insolvency procedure" to refer to statutory provisions that are 
designed to provide a global-that is, a multiparty-response to financial distress , in contrast to 
provisions, such as default remedies, that merely provide for adjudication of a dispute between the 
debtor and an individual creditor. Federal bankruptcy law, state assignment-for-the-benefit-of-creditors 
provisions, and state receivership laws are collectivized insolvency procedures. 
States' lack of attention to their collectivized insolvency proceedings arguably is evidenced by 
the rarity with which the procedu res are adjusted in any significant way. For further discussion 
focusing in particular on state regulation of preferential transfers, see infra notes 100-01 and 
accompanying text. 
78. The occasional suggestion by a state court that directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors of 
an insolvent corporation represents one situation where states consider insolvency issues and illustrates 
the primitive state of this inquiry. See infra note 99. 
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An obvious problem with underdeveloped state laws in these areas is 
that not all financially troubled corporations that fail to effect a workout 
privately, and whose financial distress continues, do in fact file for 
bankruptcy. Some liquidate outside of bankruptcy or invoke state coilecti-
vized insolvency procedures, such as the state's receivership or assignment-
for-the-benefit-of-creditors provisions. As a result, for these corporations 
the drama of financial distress is played out against a backdrop of ineffi-
cient and often ineffective corporate governance rules. 
The second phenomenon can be traced to federal bankruptcy courts' 
tendency to incorporate rather than override relevant state law wherever 
possible, an inclination that has been approved both by the Supreme Court 
and by most commentators. 79 Because bankruptcy courts are particularly 
deferential to state law in the corporate governance context,80 we are left 
with a disturbing irony: States spend little time developing insolvency-
specific general corporation law, yet their pronouncements (or lack thereof) 
on these issues may be seen as dispositive not only under state law but also 
in federal bankruptcy courts. 81 
In the subparts that follow, I describe in detail the effects of vestigiali-
zation in three particular areas. The first of these areas, state preference 
law, illustrates the antiquated status of states' collectivized insolvency 
regimes. 82 I argue that states' erratic regulation of preferences results 
79. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Property interests are created and 
defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why 
such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a 
bankruptcy proceeding ."). Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson articulated the most well-known 
normative justification for looking to state law in most bankruptcy contexts: the creditors' bargain 
theory of bankruptcy. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
(1986); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of 
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984). Baird and Jackson are concerned primarily with creditors' property 
rights. See JACKSON, supra, at 5 (stating that a focus of bankruptcy law "is that of bankruptcy as a 
collective debt-collection device, [that] deals with the rights of creditors"); Baird & Jackson, supra, 
at 100 (suggesting that bankruptcy laws and bankruptcy proceedings should not interfere with the 
creditors' rights to use the debtor's assets, even where those rights are less than absolute). Other 
commentators (some of whom are not sympathetic to the creditors' bargain model) have argued that 
bankruptcy courts should incorporate state corporate governance rules into the bankruptcy context. See, 
e.g., Michael A. Gerber, T1ze Election of Directors and Chapter 11: The Second Circuit Tells 
Stockholders to Walk Softly and Carry a Big Lever, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 295, 297 (1987) (arguing that 
shareholders should be permitted to hold a shareholders' meeting to vote on directors while the 
corporation is in bankruptcy). 
80. See, e.g., Lionel Corp. v. Committee of Equity Sec. Holders of the Lionel Corp. (In re Lionei 
Corp.), 30 B.R. 327, 329-30 (Bankr. S.D.N. Y. 1983) (denying a motion for a preliminary injunction, 
thus forcing Lionel to respond in state court to a petition seeking to compel a shareholders' meeting). 
81. The effect might even be characterized as "double vestigialization," because vestigialized state 
law ends up applying not only outside of bankruptcy, but also within. For simplicity, I will refer both 
to state lawmakers' neglect of insolvency-related issues and to the effects of this neglect in the 
bankruptcy context as "vestigialization." 
82. As I suggest below, regulation of preferential transfers is an important component of a 
collectivized insolvency regime. See infra notes 84-86, 95-99 and accompanying text. States' dubious 
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from vestigialization. The second and third areas I discuss-derivative 
suits and corporate voting-exemplify the other aspect of vestigialization 
described above: bankruptcy courts' tendency to incorporate state corporate 
governance law into the bankruptcy context, despite the fact that the state 
laws in question were not developed with insolvent corporations in mind . 
Given states' tendencies to enact generally efficient corporation laws 
in response to market forces, 83 their failure to focus on insolvency 
issues-that is, their susceptibility to the effects of vestigialization-is 
somewhat puzzling. I consider this puzzle and several possible explana-
tions at the end of this Part. 
A. State Prohibition of Preferential Transfers 
The avoidance of eve-of-bankruptcy preferences has long been seen as 
integral to federal bankruptcy, as evidenced by the important role that pref-
erence provisions have played in every federal bankruptcy statute since the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1841.84 The current Bankruptcy Code is not an excep-
tion; Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code regulates preferential transfers 
in great detail. 85 
Not every insolvent corporation is subject to Section 547, however. 
As noted above, some financially troubled corporations liquidate or invoke 
state law receivership or assignment-for-the-benefit-of-creditors provisions 
rather than filing for bankruptcy. 86 For these corporations, state rather 
than federal law governs. Because preference regulation tends to further 
the goals of insolvency regulation, we might expect the states to have en-
acted their own preference provisions to address the preferential transfers 
made by those insolvent corporations whose fate is decided in the state law 
domain. 
Unfortunately, while many states do have preference provisions on the 
books, states regulate preferences in a remarkably haphazard fashion. An 
analysis of state preference law reveals that the majority of states have no 
regulation of preferences in connection with their collectivized insolvency procedures is indicative of 
the neglected state of the collectivized procedures as a whole. 
83. This issue is discussed in detail in Part IV. 
84. See John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 
67 VA. L. REV. 249, 253-59 (1981) (examining the historical development of preference law 
provisions). 
85. 11 U.S .C. § 547 (1988). Section 547 authorizes the tru stee to avoid preferential transfers 
made by the debtor to any of its creditors during the 90 days before bankruptcy unless the transfer 
qualifies for one of the safe harbors set forth in Section 547(c) . /d. § 547(b). For insiders, the 
preference period is a full year. /d. § 547(b)(4)( B). 
I do not intend to suggest that Section 547 is ideal. To the contrary, as the following discussion 
in the text indicates, the existing evidence suggests that the Bankruptcy Code's regulation of preferences 
is deficient in many respects . See infra text accompanying notes 103-13 . 
86. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
I 
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general preference law whatsoever, aside from laws that apply in the spe-
cialized context of bank or insurance company insolvency. 87 In states that 
have no general preference laws, an insolvent corporation can, at least in 
theory, make preferential transfers with impunity. 88 Tnose states that do 
regulate preferences tend to take two different kinds of approaches. 
Roughly half of the states establish a reachback period and provide for the 
avoidance of any preferential transfer that the corporation makes during 
that period, much as the current Bankruptcy Code does. g9 Other state 
statutes require a showing of intent to prefer some creditors at the expense 
of others.~ Yet even within each of these particular approaches, the 
individual statutes often vary significantly in their details. 91 
At first glance, one might object to my characterization of state 
preference law as haphazard. In the corporation law context, commenta-
tors often cite the variability among state laws as a significant advantage 
of state lawmaking. 92 Not only does the competition among states to 
87. A state-by-state summary of the status of state preference law L'lroughout the country is 
provided in Appendix B. I owe special thanks to Dennis McCarthy for his work on this Appendix. 
As the summary reveals, only 22 of the 50 states have a general state preference law (that is, a 
provision other than the special preference provisions some states have enacted for the bank or 
insurance insolvency context, or a preference provision enacted as part of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act) . The remaining 28 states do not have a general state preference law . 
88. Some of the states that lack preference statutes have recently enacted the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (UFf A), which covers some preferential conduct. UN IF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
§ 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 639, 657 (1985). The UFfA, however , only partially fills the gap left by the 
absence of a preference provision. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. Creditors also have 
the option of filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition, thereby insuring the application of federal 
bankruptcy law. See II U.S.C. § 303(b)(l) (1988) (allowing three or more cred itors, with claims 
aggregating $5000, to file a petition in appropriate circumstances). But filing for involuntary 
bankruptcy often will not be a realistic alternative due to factors such as the costs to a small group of 
creditors of filing and defending an involuntary petition, the creditors' limited access to relevant 
information, and the risk to the creditors that the filing will be found to ha ve been inappropriate . 
Moreover, a creditor who is well informed about the debtor' s sta tus often wi ll be better off trying to 
collect her debt outside of bankruptcy than she would be if the debtor were put into bankruptcy. This 
is because an unsecured creditor must share with other creditors on a pro rata basis in bankruptcy, 
whereas she may collect payment in full outside of bankruptcy. 
89. Eleven states provide a specified reachback period. See, e.g., CAL. C IV . PROC. CODE 
§ !800(b)(4) (West Supp. 1991) (creating a 90-day period); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 15-IOI(d) 
(1990) (creating a 90-day period); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 568:27 (1986) (creating a three-month 
period); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:l9-3 (West 1987) (creating a four-month period); N.C. GEN. 
STAT.§ 23-3 (1988) (creating a four-month period); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §!51 (1954) (creating 
a four-month period); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 27-25-20 (1991) (creating a 90-day period); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS ANN. § 54-9-13.2 (1990) (creating a four-month period); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-13-116 (1988) 
(creating a three-month period) ; WASH. REV. CODE§ 23.72.030 (1 974) (creating a four-month period); 
Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 128.07 (West 1989) (creating a four-month period). 
90. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 1313.56 (Baldwin 1988). 
91. Compare id. (requiring that there be a "design to prefer" a ·creditor as a prerequisite to 
avoidance) with OKLA. STAT. tit. 24, § 31 (199!) (providing that a determination of a preferential 
transfer is subject to other state law provisions and including no intent requirement). 
92. See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N . Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the 71zeory 
of the Finn , 28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 191 (1985) (arguing that variant state corporate laws are beneficial 
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attract corporate charters cause states to pass corporation laws that are 
more efficient than they would otherwise be,93 but states also are able to 
tailor their laws to particular kinds of corporations to an extent that would 
not be possible with a uniform federal statute. 94 But a close examination 
of state preference laws reveals that the differences we find lil this context 
are not the result of competition or adaptation. 
Consider, for example, the fact that most states do not have any 
preference provision .95 Could the absence of such provisions be th e result 
of competition rather than neglect? Although most commentators see pref-
erence law as a crucial component of bankruptcy, a few have begun to take 
issue with the traditional consensus on this issue. At least one 
commentator has argued that a debtor's decision to prefer some creditors 
rather than others prior to bankruptcy is likely to reflect consc ious, 
desirable efforts to distribute loss.% From this perspective, federal 
preference law interferes with what otherwise might be a far more efficient 
loss-allocation system .97 Thus, rather than reflecting a failure to effi-
ciently regulate the insolvency process, as I have suggested, it may simply 
be that the twenty-eight states that do not have a preference law in place 
are the ones who have gotten it right, and Congress (as well as the other 
states) are the inefficient ones. 98 
because they create "jurisdictional competition in the market" that "is desirable because it produces a 
va riety of standard-form contracts from which firms can select the appropriate role for lega l rules in 
their governance structure"); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, Tize Market for Corporate Charrers: 
"Unhealthy Competition" vs. Federal Regulation, in EcONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND 
SECURITIES REGULATI ON I 00, 109 (Richard A . Posner & Kenneth G. Scott eds., 1980) (c laiming that 
differing state corporate laws allow firms to "take advantage of the competition among states" and to 
"locate in a state which offers an efficient set of restrictions on the firm, given the firm's anticipated 
p roduction-investment and financing decision"). 
93. Not all commentators ag ree that states do enact relatively efficient laws. See infra subp art 
lV(A) (d iscussing the various positions on the efficiency of state laws) . 
94. See Baysinger & Butler, supra note 92, at 179 (theorizing that because different firms have 
different optimal structures, firms will select their state of incorpor3tion adaptively) ; Dodd & Leftwich , 
supra note 92 , at Ill n.4 ("[l]n recent years, quite a few states have adopted special sta tutes or 
provisions to deal with the special needs of small , closely-held corporations."). 
95. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
96. See James W . Bowers, Whith er What Hits the Fan ?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Tiz eory, and 
the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 50 (1991) ("Debtors will tend to 
prefer those creditors who have specialized in dealing with them and whose losses from nonrepayment 
therefore are likely to be greatest, leaving unpaid those whose losses are relatively less severe ."). 
97. See id. at 51 ("Bankruptcy law's formula, which eliminates (through preference law) th e 
expecta tion of the lender and borrower that the lender will be paid first, tends to discourage investment 
by both parties in assets and measu res that minimize the total costs of their transactions."). 
98 . Barry Ad ler has suggested an alternative argument for eliminating federal preference law. 
Whereas Bowers assumes that the parties would do without preference regulation if Section 547 of the 
Bankruptcy Code were abolished, Adler suggests that they could devise their own preference law by 
contract. Adler, supra note I, at 330 . While this approach might prove effective for some companies, 
contracting and enforcement costs (including the practical impediments to overcoming collective action 
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One obvious problem with this view of preferences, from a normative 
perspective, is that it fails to account for a debtor's less benign reasons for 
preferring some creditors over others. While many prebankruptcy prefer-
ences may reflect a debtor's legitimate efforts to allocate scarce resources 
in the face of financial distress, others stem from insiders' less appropriate 
des ires to help themselves to the firm's assets at the expense of other 
creditors. 99 
The attempt to vindicate the absence of preference law in so many 
states proves even more problematic from a positive perspective. If the 
patterns one observes in state treatment of preferences resulted from a 
careful and efficient state lawmaking process, we might expect the states 
periodically to have amended the provisions in order to fine-tune their 
preference law to reflect changes in the corporate and legal landscape. 11Xl 
Yet the reality is almost precisely the opposite. Rather than having been 
periodically updated and improved, many of the state preference statutes 
that do exist have not been touched for decades. 101 
In short, state preferences laws are a classic example of the phenome-
non I have described as "vestigialization." Because an insolvent corpora-
tion is much more likely to file for bankruptcy than to invoke a state's 
collectivized insolvency procedure, 102 states have little incentive to pay 
much attention to their insolvency provisions. As a consequence, state law 
problems) suggest the need, at the least , for a state-supplied background rule. See Skeel, supra note 
1, at 506 n.l48 (discussing the possible limitations of a private ordering approach). 
99. See, e.g. , In re Philadelphia Light Supply Co., 39 B.R. 51 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) 
(permitting a creditors' committee to commence a preference action against the president and sole 
shareholder of a Chapter II debtor for assets improperly withdrawn from the corporation). That courts 
perceive the need for an effective state preference provision is evidenced by their willingness to create 
judicial remedi es for creditors who have been prejudiced by pre-insolvency preferences in states that 
lack an applicable preference provision. Some courts remedy the situation by declaring that the 
preferential transfer violated a fiduciary duty owed by directors to a firm's cred itors when a firm 
becomes insolvent. See, e.g., In re STN Enterprises, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985) (interpreting 
Vermont law to hold that directors of an insolvent corporation owe a fiduciary duty to creditors); see 
also Laura Lin , Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty 
to Creditors, 46 VAND . L. REV. 1485, 1513-18 (1993) (suggesting that most cases in which courts have 
held that directors owe a fiduciary duty to creditors involved preferences or fraudulent conveyances). 
100. The failure to amend a statute for many years does not necessarily mean that lawmakers have 
neglected it, of course. Some statutes may be so enduring and effective that th ey do not require 
tinkering. But one would expect to see at least minor changes. 
101. For instance, New Hampshire 's preference provision, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 568:27 
(1986), has not been amended since 1885; the Colorado provision, COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-10-104 
(1989), dates to 1897. Appendix B sets forth the dates when each of the extant state provi sions was 
last amended. 
102. The Fraudulent Transfers Task Force of the Corporate , Banking , and Business Section of the 
Pennsylvania Bar Association recently surveyed the members of the section to determine how frequently 
they used the state collectivized insolvency procedures. While many of the members regularly dealt 
with the federal Bankruptcy Code, few had any significant experience with state insolvency procedures . 
Telephone Interview with Joy Conti, Chairperson of the Fraudulent Transfers Task Force (Mar. 14, 
1994). 
496 Texas Law Review [Vol. 72:471 
insolvency procedures are likely to be flawed in significant and troubling 
respects. 103 
In contrast to the generally erratic status of state preference law, one 
does find a more sensible treatment of preferences in two particular areas: 
insurance insolvency and uniform fraudulent conveyance actions. In the 
insurance insolvency context, nearly every state has an insurance prefer-
ence provision, and many have been enacted or meaningfully amended in 
recent years. 104 While this fact may seem at first to conflict with my 
vestigialization account, on inspection, these statutes actually confirm it. 
Rather than extensively regulating insurance insolvencies, as it does with 
other financially troubled companies via the Bankruptcy Code, Congress 
has !eft all aspects of insurance law, including the treatment of insolvent 
insurance corporations, to the states. 105 Thus, insurance law is a context 
where state insolvency procedures matter. As a result, states have much 
more incentive to pay attention to insolvency issues with insurance com-
panies than they do with other kinds of business associations.106 The 
observation that nearly every state has enacted an insurance-related pref-
erence statute is therefore fully consistent with the superior attentiveness 
we would expect to find. 
I 03. This is not to say that the existing federal preference laws are ideal. On the contrary, the 
current federal framework appears to be only partially effective in addressing prebankmptcy preference 
activity. See McCoid, supra note 84, at 262-68 (arguing that preference law is not fully effective 
because individual creditors have incentives to ignore it). In addition to questions about the regulatory 
strategy embodied in Bankmptcy Code§ 547, another problem, at least in small cases, is that debtors-
in-possession often do not attack preferences that are covered by the preference provision. Jerome R. 
Kerkman, 77le Debtor in Full Co!Jtrol: A Case for Adoption of the Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L . REV. 
!59, 196-97 (1987). Yet even a marginally effective federal law is greatly preferable to the current 
status of state preference regulation. 
104. Forty-eight of the fifty states have an insurance-related preference statute on the books and 
seventeen of the provisions have been amended in the past three years. For a state-by-state breakdown 
of these provisions, see infra Appendix B. By contrast, bank preference provisions are less common, 
appearing in only 22 states, and seem to reflect some of the vestigialization effects that have 
undermined states' general preference laws. See infra Appendix B. This is due in part to the fact that 
a federal receiver routinely takes over if a state bank becomes insolvent, despite the fact that states have 
their own bank insolvency law framework. See Jonathan R. Macy & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank 
Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1173 (1988); 
M. Mazen Anbari, Comment, Banking on a Bailout: Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Policy 
Er:clusions in the Context of the Savings and Loan Crisis, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 550-51 (1992). 
105. Congress did so explicitly by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, ch. 20,59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)); see also 
supra note 69 (summarizing the history of the Act). 
106. Because insurance insolvencies historically have been relatively uncommon, state lawmakers 
may arguably be less attentive to this aspect of insolvency than they are in an area such as general 
corporate law. See Spencer L. Kimball et al., Rehabilitation and Liquidation of Insurance Companies: 
Delinquency Proceedings in Insurance, 1967 INS. L.J. 79, 79-80 (noting the relative infrequency of 
insurance insolvencies and the lack of case law interpreting existing statutes). But-as my review of 
the preference provisions appears to bear out-the applicability of state law to any insurance company 
that does in fact fail gives states far more reason to focus on insurance insolvency procedures than they 
would have if insurance insolvency regulation were federalized . 
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Second , in recent years, many states have enacted the Uniform Frau-
dulent Transfer Act (UFTA) or the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
(UFCA). 107 While these statutes focus primarily upon fraudulent con-
veances , Section 5(b) of the UFTA does provide for the avoidance of 
certain preferential transfers. 108 Section 5 (b) only partial! y cures the 
problems of state preference law, however, because it applies only to pref-
erential transfers made to insiders, not to those made to a creditor. 109 
Yet even a partial so lution markedly improves on states' present regul ation 
of preference law. Because these statutes reflect the work of a uniform 
laws process, rather than of the states themselves, they do not undermine 
the vestigial ization thes is. On the contrary, the drafters imp! icit! y 
recognized L~e effects of vestigialization and attempted to prov ide an 
external solution. While this suggests that the uniform laws process might 
help to solve the vestigialization problem-a possibility I discuss in detail 
in subpart IV(A)-the important points for present purposes are: (l ) the 
federalization of bankruptcy has led to a marked vestigialization of state 
preference law; and (2) the uniform fraudulent conveyance acts have at best 
provided only a partial solution, even in those states that have adopted a 
uniform law. 
The analysis thus far has focused exclusively on the perverse effects 
that the vestigialization of state preference laws can have for corporations 
that liquidate or invoke a state law insolvency statute. Ironically, these 
same provisions also can at times come into play in the bankruptcy context . 
The case of In re Rexplore Drilling, Inc. 110 is illustrative. In that case, 
a trustee for a bankrupt company sought to invoke Kentucky's general pref-
erence statute so that he could take advantage of the provision's more 
generous reachback period. 111 Based on the language of Section 544(b) 
of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits creditors to invoke any statute that 
would be available to them under state law, 112 a divided panel of the 
Sixth Circuit held in favor of the trustee , thus enabling the trustee to use 
an antiquated Kentucky statute to circumvent the Bankruptcy Code's nar-
rower preference prov ision .113 
107. See UN!F. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985); UN! F. FRAUD ULENT 
CONVEYANCE ACT, 7 A U .L.A. 427 (1985) . For a li sting of which states have enacted one of th ese 
statutes, see infra Append ix B. 
108. UN!F . FRAUDULENTTRANSFER ACT§ 5( b) , 7A U.L.A . 639, 657 (1985) . 
109. /d . 
II 0. Perkins v. Petro Supply Co. (In re Rexplore Drilling, Inc.), 971 F .2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1992). 
Ill. !d. at 1220-21. 
112. II U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988). 
113. In re Rexplore Drilling, Inc., 971 F .2d at 1225 . The Kentucky statute authorizes the 
avoidance of any "act or device done or resorted to by the debtor, in contemplation of insolvency and 
with the design to prefer one or more creditors ." KY . REV . STAT. ANN.§ 378.060 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1972) . The chief advantage of the Kentucky statute is that it appears to provide a preference 
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A case such as In re Rexplore Drilling, Inc. can only arise where the 
state has a general preference law on the books, and the law can be con-
strued more expansively than Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. To the 
extent this condition exists, 114 the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Section 
544 can exacerbate the problems that vestigial ization already causes in the 
state law context. In short, the vestigializing effect of the Bankruptcy Code 
on state preference law should be seen as a malignant consequence of the 
separation between corporate law and corporate bankruptcy-one that can 
affect not only those insolvencies that take place outside of bankruptcy, but 
also a few that take place within. 
B. Bankruptcy and Shareholders' Derivative Suits 
While the derivative litigation procedures in most states are decidedly 
imperfect, the derivative mechanism is, in many respects, far worse in 
bankruptcy. Why is this so? Once again, the problem seems to stem in 
important part from the vestigialization caused by the separation between 
corporate law and corporate bankruptcy. The vestigialization at issue in 
this context results from bankruptcy courts' attempts to incorporate into the 
bankruptcy context state law procedures that were never designed with in-
solvent corporations in mind. 
1be derivative suit mechanism serves, at least in theory, as a solution 
to an intractable corporate governance problem: the absence of sufficient 
incentives for widely scattered shareholders to participate in monitoring 
managers. 115 Derivative litigation addresses this dilemma by obviating 
an individual shareholder's need to contribute directly to the monitoring 
effort. In the event of managerial misconduct, derivative lawyers file a 
lawsuit on behalf of the firm's shareholders; the lawyers take their fees 
from any recovery, 116 and every shareholder benefits from the derivative 
attorneys' vigorous prosecution of meritorious litigation. 
Unfortunately, as numerous commentators have noted, the incentives 
of derivative suit attorneys, who turn out to be the real parties in interest 
in these cases, diverge in significant respects from those of the share-
holders they purportedly represent. 117 Rather than maximizing the size 
period of potentially unlimited duration, whereas Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code sets the 
preference period for transfers to a non-insider at 90 days. II U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988). 
114. Six states currently have general preference laws that set preference periods longer than 
ninety days. See supra note 89. Other states, such as Kentucky, do not set specific periods for 
avoidance of preferential transfers. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
115. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW§ !5 . 1, at 639 (1986) (noting that the derivative 
suit is "one of the most interesting and ingenious of accountability mechanisms for large formal 
organizations"). 
116. /d. § 15.8, at 659-60 . 
117. John Coffee and others have addressed this problem in detail. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr . , 
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic TI1eory for Private Enforcement 
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of recovery for plaintiffs, the attorneys have an incentive to maximize the 
size of their own fee award. For several reasons, the attorneys' concern 
for their fees will cause them to accept settlement offers that, from the 
perspective of the plaintiffs themselves, are inadequate. First, plaintiffs' 
attorneys have an incentive to settle whenever possible, rather than taking 
a chance on litigation, because they litigate on a contingency basis and thus 
will receive nothing if they take the case to trial and lose. 118 Second, 
settlement not only assures the attorneys a recovery, but it also gives them 
significant control over the size of their fee award. 119 As a result, a 
plaintiffs' attorney may implicitly collude with defendants to maximize the 
attorney 's recovery at the expense of the class. 120 
In addition to their incentive to enter into inefficient settlements, 
plaintiffs' attorneys also have an interest in diversifying their litigation 
portfo lio so as to minimize their overall risk. The primary diversification 
strategy of most plaintiffs' firms is to file numerous lawsuits and invest a 
small amount of resources in each one, rather than aggressively pursuing 
a few potentially meritorious lawsuits. 121 As a result, the attorneys will 
systematically underinvest in the lawsuits they file. The advent of special 
litigation committees122 has exacerbated this tendency. Because special 
of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions , 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, 
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff 
as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. , Summer 1985, at 5 [hereinafter 
Coffee, Unfaithful Champion]; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. I (1991) (extending Coffee's insights). 
1 18. If the defendants are directors of the corporation, as usually is the case, they too have an 
incentive to settle because their costs will not be reimbursed by the firm if the case goes to trial and 
the defendants lose. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 117, at 715. Thus, by 
settling the case, both parties effectively shift their costs to the corporation. /d. at 716. 
119 . Derivative attorneys have a particularly high degree of control over their fees if the court 
calculates fees under the commonly used lodestar approach, which bases the fee determination on the 
number of hours worked at a given hourly rate. /d. at 717 & n.l30 . Because they know that a court 
is likely to approve a fee request for 20% to 30% of the proceeds of a settlement, the attorneys can 
delay settlement until they have generated fees in roughly that amount. /d. at 717-18. As a result, 
some courts have begun to move away from the lodestar approach and instead base the fee award on 
a specified percentage of the recovery or on a combination of the two approaches. See, e.g., fn re 
Avon Prods., Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 197,061 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1992) 
(approving a fee award of 30% of the total settlement value); In re Warner Communications Sec . 
Litig., 618 F. Supp . 735 (S.D.N. Y . 1985) (holding that in addition to the lodestar approach, the court 
must also consider, among other things, the requested fee in relation to the settlement), affd, 798 F .2d 
35 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Richard A. Spehr, Attorney's Fees Update: Awarding Attorneys' Fees in 
Secun"ties Class Actions, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 22, 1993, at 5 (describing recent cases and the criticism both 
methods of calculating fees have received). 
120. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney, supra note 117, at 714-16 . 
121 . /d. at 711; Coffee, Unjailhful Champion, supra note 117 , at 22-23. 
122 . Special litigation committees, which became increasingly popular in the 1970s and 1980s, 
are committees of the board of directors composed of directors who are not implicated in the particular 
derivative action and who are given authority to investigate the action and decide on behalf of the board 
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litigation committees have enhanced the ability of managers to eliminate 
even meritorious litigation, plaintiffs' attorneys cannot afford to fully invest 
in even the most promising suits in their litigation portfolio. 123 
Curiously, while commentators have fully documented each of the 
shortcomings of the derivative suit device, none has considered the impact 
of b<mkruptcy on the incentives of plaintiffs' attorneys. Yet, because many 
firms whose managers have committed egregious breaches of their fiducia-
ry duties also may be candidates for bankruptcy, bankruptcy is an impor-
tant piece in the derivative suit puzzle . 
What is the effect of bankruptcy? Even more than the appointment of 
a special litigation committee outside of bankruptcy, the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition spells doom for most derivative suits filed against the 
corporation's managers. Because of the frequent death of a derivative suit 
in the event a firm files for bankruptcy-a phenomenon I refer to as bank-
ruptcy's "black hole effect" -plaintiffs' attorneys are likely to discount the 
value of any given case, that is, diminish their initial investment to reflect 
the possibility of bankruptcy. Thus, bankruptcy exacerbates the incentives 
for plaintiffs' attorneys to underinvest in the individual lawsuits in their 
portfolio. 
The obvious question raised by the current status of derivative suits in 
bankruptcy is what causes this black hole effect? Why is it that derivative 
suits almost invariably disappear in bankruptcy? The ineffectiveness of 
derivative litigation in bankruptcy arguably can be traced to the assumption 
that procedures employed outside of bankruptcy can simply be imported 
into bankruptcy unchanged. Yet, for several reasons, the shareholder 
derivative mechanism in place outside of bankruptcy will, by itself, be 
particularly ill-suited to the Chapter 11 context. First, while the share-
holders of a healthy firm are its true residual owners and, as a result, are 
the appropriate plaintiffs of a derivative suit outside of bankruptcy, most 
corporations have become insolvent by the time they file for bankrupt-
cy.124 Because they have little financial interest in an insolvent firm, and 
as a whole whether it should be pursued. Coffee, Understanding the PlainP.jJ's Auomey, supra note 
117, at 721. One of the apparent attractions of special litigation committees to a corporation's directors 
is that they enable a board to retain control of even those suits with respect to which directorial 
conflicts of interest are sufficiently serious that demand would otherwise be excused-that is, in the 
absence of such committees, shareholders would be entitled to sue directly rather than be required first 
to obtain the imprimatur of directors who are themselves the subject of u'le suit. See Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785-89 (Del. 1981) (indicating that, even where a demand is excused, a 
committee composed of independent and disinterested directors can properly act for the corporation to 
dismiss derivative litigation after concluding a reasonable investigation); Coffee, Understa11di11g the 
Plailltijf's Attomey, supra note 117, at 720-21 (noting recent judicial accept<mce of special litigation 
committees "as a means by which a corporation's board of directors can effect the dismissal of a 
derivative action without substantive judicial review"). 
123 . Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attomey, supra note 117, at 723. 
124. See supra note 23. 
.. 
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because most or all of any recovery would go to higher priority claimants, 
shareholders lose much of their incentive to promote and participate in 
derivative iitigation.125 To the extent shareholders do play at least a 
minor role in a given suit, they are therefore likely to be indifferent (and 
perh aps even resistant) in the bankruptcy context. 126 
Second , and more importantly, the plaintiffs' attorneys who often are 
the real parties in interest also find bankruptcy to be an inhospitable climate 
fo r pursuing derivative litigation. The most obvious problem from tbe 
attorneys' perspective is their significant loss of control over the suit in 
bankruptcy. Because the corporation is a nomina! defendant in the ac-
tion127 (and usually an indemnitor of the defendant directors), and be-
cause derivative litigation is seen as a potential disruption to the directors' 
management of the corporation, bankruptcy courts sometimes subject an 
ongoing suit to the automatic stay, even if the defendant directors have not 
themselves filed for bankruptcy. 128 Derivative attorneys must then justify 
both the litigation and their fee arrangements to a potentially skeptical 
bankruptcy judge. 129 If a trustee has been appointed, derivative attorneys 
also run the risk of losing control of the suit to the trustee.130 
125. The analysis in the text focuses on state law derivative litigation. One might expect 
shareholders to have a greater incentive to pursue federal securities actions if their interest in such an 
action were characterized as a claim against the debtor, thus giving each shareholder a higher priority, 
creditor status to the extent of her interest in the action. Bankruptcy Code § 51 O(b) precludes this, 
however, by providing that securities claims must be given the same priority as the shareholder's stock. 
II U .S.C. § 510(b) (1988). 
126 . Shareholders might use their control of a derivative su it strategically in an effort to extract 
concessions in connection with a reorga nization plan. Cf. David A. Skeel, Jr. , 17ze Nature and Effect 
of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 508 (1992) (observing 
that shareholders use their right to compel a shareholders' meeting opportunistically as a bargaining 
tool). Because of the likelihood that a derivative suit will fail in bankruptcy, however, the threat is of 
limited value to shareholders. 
127. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS§ 369, at 1080 (3d 
ed. !983) (noting that the corporation "is brought into the litigation as a nominal party defendant 
because of its failure to enforce the claim in its own right") . 
128. Compare Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Sinay (/11 re Zenith Labs., Inc.), !04 B.R. 659,664 (Bankr. 
D.N .J. 1989) (arguing that shareholder class action proceedings should be permitted because they are 
"consistent with the broader goals of bankruptcy in facilitating creditor compensation and ensuring 
equitab le distribution of the debtor's assets) with American Imaging Serv., Inc. v . Eagle-Picher Indus. 
(In re Eagle-Picher Indus .), 963 F .2d 855, 858-62 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming the automatic stay of 
actions aga inst non-debtor officers) and Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K Corp.), 121 B.R. 257, 
26! -62 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990) (holding that the debtor corporation was entitled to a stay of securities 
fraud litigation against it and its former officers). 
129. Bankruptcy Code § 327 requires bankruptcy court approval of any attorney who will be 
rendering services on behalf of the estate. II U.S.C. § 327(e) (1988). Bankruptcy Code § 330 
conditions payment of the attorney on court approval after notice and a hearing. !d. § 330(a). 
!30. Because all of a corporation's assets become part of the bankruptcy estate when it files for 
bankruptcy , id. § 541 (1988 & Supp . rv 1992), and because the trustee is charged with overseeing the 
estate, id. § 1106, the trustee arguably has the right to take charge of any existi ng derivative litigation 
on behalf of the estate. See In re Penn Cent. Sec . Litig., 335 F. Supp. 1026 (E. D. Pa. 1971) (allowing 
the trustee to take exclusive control of the securities litigation) . 
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Finally, a debtor's managers can stall and in many cases ensure L~e 
eventual death of any pending or potential derivative action against them. 
To delay an existing action, managers not only can engage in ordinary 
stonewalling tactics such as thwarting requests for information, but, as 
noted above, they also may persuade a bankruptcy court to enjoin the ac-
tion in order to prevent it from interfering with the reorganization pro-
cess.131 Far more dramatically, an action can be killed by making it a 
condition of any overall reorganization plan. While dismissal of a deriva-
tive or similar action in connection with the confirmation of a reorganiza-
tion plan is somewhat problematic as a statutory matter, 132 bankruptcy 
courts have upheld releases of a debtor's officers and directors in several 
major Chapter 11 cases. 133 
The status of derivative litigation in bankruptcy stems at least in part 
from vestigialization. State courts and lawmakers have little reason to 
focus on insolvency-related issues and, as a result, have not considered 
how the mechanism should be adjusted for application in the context of a 
collectivized insolvency proceeding. Yet bankruptcy, as the discussion 
above suggests, by its very nature tends to stymie derivative suits. So long 
as bankruptcy courts simply incorporate the derivative procedures of state 
law into bankruptcy, the procedures will continue to prove ineffective. 
Interestingly, some bankruptcy courts have partially adjusted their 
procedures in derivative actions to account for the bankruptcy context. As 
noted above, shareholders make poor derivative plaintiffs when a firm is 
in bankruptcy because insolvency seriously undermines their decision-
making incentives. An obvious solution to this problem would be to give 
control of derivative suits to the unsecured creditors' committee after a 
firm files for bankruptcy relief. 134 Because unsecured creditors, unlike 
131. Set? supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
132. Su II U.S .C . § 524(e) (1988) (providing that "discharge of a debt of the debtor does not 
affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt"). 
133. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins, Inc.) , 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that § 524(e) does not limit the equitable power of the bankruptcy court to enj oin a suit against 
another entity); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc . (In re Texaco , Inc.), 92 B.R. 38 (S.D.N. Y. 
1988) (dismissing appeal to sever the release of certain claims in the settlement agreement as moot); 
see also RiCHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 
275 (1991) (describing the release of A.H. Robins's insiders in connection with the corporation's plan 
of reorganization). 
134. An interesting question raised in several cases is whether an individual creditor should be 
permitted to bring a derivati ve action on behalf of all creditors, just as an individual shareholder may 
sue .outside of bankruptcy. For various reasons, such suits have not been allowed to go forward. See, 
e.g., Larsen v. Munoz (In re Munoz), Ill B.R. 928, 931 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding that the creditor 
had no standing in a suit to avoid a fraudulent conveyance by the debtor because the creditor failed to 
seek permission to pursue the claim from either the trustee or the bankruptcy court); In re V. Savino 
Oil & Heating Co. , 91 B.R. 655, 657 (Bankr. E .D.N.Y. 1988) (ruling that an individual creditor 
would not be granted authority to pursue a fraudulent conveyance action because the creditor had not 
demonstrated that the trustee or creditors' committee would fail to zealously prosecute the action). 
• 
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shareholders, are likeiy to receive most or all of the benefit of each 
additional dollar brought into the estate, 135 the unsecured creditors' 
committee has much better incentives with respect to the decision whether 
or not to pursue a given derivative suit. 136 
A few courts have taken precisely this approach and have permitted 
a creditors' committee to initiate derivative litigation on behalf of the 
debtor during the course of a bankruptcy case. 137 In the most important 
and most frequently cited of the cases, the Fifth Circuit permitted the 
unsecured creditors' committee of a nonprofit corporation to bring a deriv-
ative action against the firm's directors. 138 The court's analysis, as 
construed and applied in subsequent decisions, has given rise to a four-part 
test for determining whether the creditors' committee has standing in a 
given case. 139 
Arguably, this is the appropriate result, so long as a creditors' committee has been appointed, because 
the creditors' committee better ret1ects the interests of creditors as a whole. Yet the effectiveness of 
creditor committee representation is in many respects suspect. See Skeel, supra note 126, at 525-30. 
135. Skeel, supra note 126, at 511. 
136. This is not to say that the incentives of unsecured creditors' committees are perfect. If a firm 
is solvent or only marginally insolvent, for instance, creditors may be excessively conservative decision 
makers. See George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 901, 910- 12 (1993); Lin, supra note 99, at 1489-91. But because most Chapter II 
debtors are insolvent, as between shareholders and unsecured creditors, creditors are a significantly 
better choice as decisionmakers. 
Another means of increasing the effectiveness of the derivative suit mechanism in bankruptcy 
might be to hold an auction for the litigation, at least in some circumstances. An auction offers benefits 
outside of bankruptcy, such as eliminating the conflict between attorneys and the derivative plaintiffs. 
Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 117, at 78; Macey & Miller, supra note 117, at 109; Randall 
S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 
87 Nw. U. L. REV. 423, 423-24 (1993). There are benefits inside of bankruptcy as well: The winning 
bidder would not have the same mixed motives as the debtor-in-possession or a creditors' committee. 
For example, the winning bidder would not have an incentive to accept a compromise settlement in 
return for concessions on otl1er reorganization issues. On the other hand, adding another constituency 
to the negotiation process would further complicate the already cumbersome process of developing a 
reorganization plan. See Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy Cases, 67 AM. BANKR . L.J. 287, 294 (describing the reorganization process as 
"complex"). 
137. See, e.g., Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 
1988); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Mellon Bank (In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), 93 B.R. 
903, 905 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (both permitting a creditors' committee to bring a derivative suit 
when the shareholders had no incentive to bring one). 
138 . Louisiana World Exposition, 858 F .2d at 252-53. The court made clear that creditors would 
be deemed to have standing only if they would have had standing under state law; it then constructed 
an elaborate explanation of how creditors could meet this requirement. /d. at 237-44. Interestingly, 
subsequent courts have tended to ignore the peculiar facts of the case-in particular, the fact that 
because the corporation did not have any shareholders, its directors arguably would have been immune 
from suit if the creditors' committee were found to lack standing. !d. at 241. 
139. The requirements, which largely track the prerequisites shareholders must satisfy in order to 
pursue derivative litigation outside of bankruptcy, are as follows: I) a colorable claim exists; 2) demand 
was made on the debtor; 3) the debtor unjustifiably refused to bring suit; and 4) the committee obtains 
leave of the court. See Craig H. Averch, The Ability to Assert Claims on Behalf of the Debtor: Does 
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On first inspection, the willingness of the courts to authorize creditors' 
committees to pursue derivative litigation in some cases seems to suggest 
that bankruptcy courts are likely to solve the vestigialization problem on 
their own. Unfortunately, however, the promising judicial developments 
in this area appear to be largely an accident of the particular context of 
many of the suits, rather than the beginning of a solution. Most of the 
creditors' committee standing cases are preference and fraudulent convey-
ance actions-actions that already belong to creditors both within and 
outside of bankruptcy. 140 In the most common case, a creditors' commit-
tee seeks to avoid a preference or fraudulent conveyance after the debtor 
has failed to do so, often because the beneficiary of the transfer was an 
insider. 141 In such a case, there is I ittle question as to the interest of the 
creditors in the cause of action. It is largely because of the association 
with these "true" creditors' actions that some courts have authorized a 
creditors' committee to pursue derivative litigation that would be brought 
by shareholders outside of bankruptcy. 
Moreover, the willingness of the bankruptcy courts to authorize 
creditors' committee standing in cases filed after the commencement of 
bankruptcy addresses only a small part of the derivative suit problem. 142 
The more difficult and arguably more important issue is what should hap-
pen to derivative suits filed prior to bankruptcy. These suits are the ones 
that are most likely to die in bankruptcy. 
How might these cases be integrated into bankruptcy if the effects of 
vestigialization did not thwart the development of a coherent framework for 
their resolution in this context? The analysis above suggests that the courts 
a Creditor Have a Leg to Stand On ?, 96 COMM. L.J. 115 (199 1) (summarizing cases that address when 
a creditor or a statutory creditors' committee may bring a derivative action); see also In re First Capital 
Holding Corp ., 146 B.R. 7, 12-13 (Bankr. C.D . Cal. 1992) (concluding that the credito rs' committee 
need not make a demand if it would be futile). 
140. See, e.g. , Coral Petroleum, Inc . v . Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1363 (5th Cir. 
1986) (granting standing to the creditors' committee in a preference claim); Unsecured Creditors 
Comm. v. Farmers Sav. Bank (In re Toled o Equip. Co.), 35 B.R. 315, 320 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) 
(denying standing to the creditors' committee in a preference claim); In re V. Savino Oil & Heating 
Co., 91 B.R . 655, 656 (Bankr. E .D.N .Y. 1988) (denying standing in a fraudulent transfer claim). 
Courts that find standing in these contexts often look to Bankruptcy Code§ ll09(b), which gives a 
creditors' committee broad authority to act as a party in interest in the bankruptcy case . See, e.g., 
Coral Petroleum, 797 F.2d at 1363 (citing ll U .S.C . § ll09(b) (1988)). 
141 . See, e.g., Coral Petroleum, 797 F.2d at 1354 (describing the challenged preferential transfer 
us one made by the debtor to a single creditor). 
142. Even the Louisiana World Exposition framework is subject to questi on in some respects. 
Most importantly, it gives the bankruptcy court the final say regarding whether creditors' committee 
litigation should go forward. In this respect, it resembles Delaware's much-maligned standard for 
deciding whether to uphold a special litigation committee's recommendation that derivative litigation 
be terminated outside of bankruptcy . See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado , 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del . 1981) 
(holding that the second prong of the two-prong standard authorizes a court to substitute its own 
business judgment for that of the committee). 
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should continue to substitute creditors for shareholders as plaintiffs. 143 
One possible concern with this conclusion warrants attention, however. 
While substituting creditors as the plaintiffs is an attractive solution once 
the corporation has filed for bankruptcy, we must also cons ider the effects 
of such a rule outside of the bankruptcy context. In particular, might 
shareholders be less likely to file and pursue a derivative suit outside of 
bankruptcy if they would lose control of the suit in the event a bankruptcy 
petition were filed? Arguab ly not, at least in the context of publicly held 
corporations, given that the attorneys, rather th an the sharehoiders them-
selves, are the ones who tend to have the most at sta.lce. 144 
Yet what about the attorneys? Unless th e derivative sui t procedures 
either compensate the atto rneys for their efforts at searching for and bring-
ing a derivative suit outside of bankruptcy, 145 o r allow the atto rneys to 
retain control of the su it even after a substitution of plaintiffs , the specter 
of bankruptcy will continue to chill-as it currently does-the efforts of the 
constituency whose activities ultimately are most essential to the success of 
the derivative suit mechanism. It is important to allow the attorneys to 
retain control, or otherwise to compensate them, even in those cases where 
a trustee has been appointed. While a trustee's incentives to pursue litiga-
tion in an appropriate case are far superior to those of the defendant 
directors, the chilling effect of wresting the case from the attorneys who 
filed it must be taken into account. 146 
To be sure, some commentators are sufficiently skeptical about the 
efficacy of derivative litigation that they might question-as a normative 
matter-whether lawmakers should undertake to adjust the derivative proce-
dures to better account for the effects of bankruptcy.147 However 
143. See supra notes 124-39 and accompanying text. 
144. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 117 , at 683-84 (noting the 
limited role and stake of shareholders in derivative suits); see also supra text accompanying note 117 . 
145. Coffee points to the difficulty of compensating the first attorney to bring a derivative suit fo r 
her search costs ns one of the major impediments to the auction proposal. Coffee, Understanding the 
Plaintiff's Attorney , supra note I 17, at 691-93 . Bw see Macey & Miller, supra note 117, at 114- 15 
(suggesting that courts could develop ways of compensating the atto rney who initiates the derivative 
litigation, such as allowing the attorney to seek compensation in quantum meruit) . 
146. One obvious solution would be to substitute the trustee for sharehold ers as the plaintiffs but 
to permit the existing attorneys to pursue the case. While a creditors' committee arguab ly has better 
incentives as a plaintiff than the trustee does, the trustee also ha s a direct fin ancia l interest in the 
outcome of the case. See II U.S .C. § 326 (1988) (providing that a trustee's compensation is based 
on the amount of distributions made in the case). 
147 . One could argue that the costs of derivative suits exceed their value to a firm , and thus, the 
ineffectiveness of the derivative su it mechani sm in bankruptcy is laudable, rather than problematic . 
See Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, 17Je Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit ill 
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 277-83 (I 986) 
(questioning whether shareholder litigation has any significant effect on stock value); Roberta Romano, 
The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation ?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991) (interpreting 
an empirical study as showing that shareholder litigation is largely ineffectual). This normative 
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persuasive this perspective may be, the important point for present 
purposes is that skepticism about derivative litigation clearly does not 
explain the failure of state and federal lawmakers to develop procedures 
that are effective in the bankruptcy context. 148 
Once again, the vestigializing effects of the artificial separation of 
corporate law and bankruptcy provide a far more convincing expl anation 
of the confused status of derivative suit doctrine in the bankruptcy context. 
State lawmakers have had little reason to focus on the issues described 
above because the issues almost always arise in the context of a federal 
bankruptcy case, rather than under state !aw.149 Yet, because of their 
tendency to look to state law for guidance, federal lawmakers also have ne-
glected these tricky questions . In consequence, the derivative suit mech-
anism not only fails to work effectively in bankruptcy, but its failure also 
exacerbates the underinvestment problem that plagues derivative litigat ion 
outside of bankruptcy. 
C. Corporate Voting Rights in Bankruptcy 
Vestigialization also helps to explain the courts ' treatment of the 
question whether shareholders should be permitted to call a shareholders' 
meeting for the purpose of ousting corporate directors. Bankruptcy courts 
have relied even more heavily on state law in addressing this issue than 
they have in dealing with derivative suits, perhaps in part because of the 
absence of complicating factors like those present in the derivative suit 
context, such as the existence of related causes of action that provide for 
creditor rather than shareholder standing and the involvement of additional 
parties (including initiating attorneys). 150 
Outside of bankruptcy, the shareholders' right to hold a meeting for 
the election of directors is seen as integral to shareholder suffrage and, as 
a result, is nearly absolute. Under Delaware law, for instance, sharehold-
ers may petition the chancery court to summarily compel a shareholders' 
meeting if none has been held for a period of thirteen months after the last 
meeting. 151 Delaware courts typically grant the shareholders' request 
unless extraordinary circumstances militate against allowing shareholders 
to hold their annual meeting. 152 
argument is comparable in some respects to Bowers's article suggesting that preference laws in 
bankruptcy are inefficient. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
148 . Cf. 8 SEC REPORT, supra note 62, at 3!-32 (criticizing an analogous situation in th e equity 
receivership context, where receivers, who often were friendly with management, frequently fa iled to 
bring lawsuits against former directors). 
149 . See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
!50. Much of the analysis that follows is drawn from Skeel, supra note 126. 
!51. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (c) (1991). 
152. See , e.g., Coaxial Communications, Inc . v. CNA Fin. Corp ., 367 A.2d 994,997-98 (Del. 
1976) (holding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the pendency of a 
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Bankruptcy courts have developed a test that closely parallels state 
courts' treatments of shareholder voting outside of bankruptcy. In In re 
Johns-Manville Corp., 153 the most recent circuit court decision on this 
issue, the court held that requests for a shareholders' meeting should be 
honored unless holding a meeting would constitute "clear abuse" and 
would cause "irreparable harm" to the corporation. 154 The apparent rea-
soning is that because state courts authorize shareholders' meetings except 
in unusual circumstances, bankruptcy courts should do the same. 155 
The problem with simply incorporating states' treatment of this issue 
into the bankruptcy context is , once again , that the state law on thi s issue 
has not been developed with insolvent corporations in mind. States have 
not adequately grappled with the question of who should vote (and under 
what conditions) in the context of a collectivized insolvency procedure 
because most insolvent corporations ultimately fil e for bankruptcy. 156 
Moreover, the vestigialized state insolvency procedures that do exist con-
template a timely sale or other disposition of the corporation rather than 
continued operation of the company in an insolvency mode for several 
years, as has become common in Chapter 11. 157 As a result, the question 
whether shareholders can hold an annual meeting is unlikely to arise, even 
for those few corporations that invoke state collectivized insolvency 
procedures. 
If the artificial separation between corporate law and bankruptcy did 
not prevent state lawmakers and courts from focusing on corporate voting 
in the insolvency context, one suspects that state law would provide for the 
application of a significantly different rule in the event a collectivized 
insolvency procedure is invoked. While the shareholders of a healthy 
proceeding in another jurisdiction was not a basis to stay the shareholders ' meeting) ; Algeran , Inc. v. 
Connolly , No. CfV .A.6557, 1981 WL 15073 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 1981) (holding that the unavailability 
of financi al information needed for proxy solicitation does not j ustifY the failure to hold a meeting) . 
Th e few occasions where Delaware courts have enj oined a meeting have tended to involve actions by 
shareholders to enjoin a meeting due to fraud or other improprieties in the election process . See, e.g., 
Campbell v . Loew 's Inc ., 134 A.2d 565 (Del. Ch . 1957) (staying a shareholders' meeting until th e 
court could resolve allegations of improper spending by some directors) . 
153 . Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm., 801 F .2d 60 (2d Cir . 1986) . 
154 . /d. at 68; see also infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
!55. Other courts have gone much further than In re Johns-Manville Corp. in their solicitude for 
the state law perspective on this issue. In Lionel Corp. v . Committee of Equity Sec . Holders (In re 
Lionel Co rp .), 30 B.R . 327 (Bankr . S .D .N .Y. 1983), for instance, the court-applying the state law 
preliminary injunction standard instead of the In re Johns-Manville Corp. standard-allowed the equity 
committee' s requ est for a meeting to go forward in the Delaware chancery court , after first making 
clea r that there wa s " nothing in the record that demonstrates how the reorganization is going to be 
impeded here by the holding of an annual meeting ." !d. at 330 . The chancery court granted the 
meeting request. Committee of Equity Sec . Holders v. Lionel Corp., N .Y. L.J . , June 28, 1983, at 6 . 
!56. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
!57. See JAMES 1. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 23-24 (1985) (describing state 
receivership and assignment-for-the-benefit-of-creditors procedures). 
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corporation are its residual claimants and, as a result, have better decision-
making incentives than any other constituency, shareholders are far less 
depend able after the firm has encountered financi al difficulties. The 
sharehoiders of an insolvent corporation have little to lose if they gamble 
wit.i-} the firm's assets, and much to gain. 158 In view of this , shareholders 
arguably should not be permitted to continue to choose the firm's directors 
and to vote on other important decisions once the corporation has entered 
bankruptcy. 159 
At first glance, a "clear abuse" or other similar standard might appear 
to he ftex ibie enough to account for the skew ing effect that bankruptcy has 
on shareholders' dec isionmaking incentives . Given shareholders' question-
able motives, for instance, bankruptcy courts could be sensitive to the fact 
that a shareho lders' request for a meeting is more likely to be abusive in 
bankruptcy th an it would if the corporation were fully so lvent. in fact, 
courts do ap pear to appreciate the possibility of abuse in some cases, as 
evidenced by several courts' decisions to deny a meeting request .160 
The problem with this approach is that it seems to imply that although 
their incentives are somewhat skewed in bankruptcy, shareholders are still 
better decisionmakers than any other constituency. Yet, once a corporation 
becomes significantly insolvent, the reality is different. In light of this, 
!58. Skeel, supra note 126, at 485-86 . 
!59 . In the absence of bankruptcy, the argument for shifting authority to unsecured creditors is 
more tenuous, both because insolvency may be difficult to determine and because creditors arguably 
can contract for voting rights if they desire such rights . q. Lin, supra note 99, at 1504 (d iscussing 
creditors' abi lity to contract for voting rights). By contrast, Chapter II debto rs usua lly are insolvent, 
and it i.; not clea r wheth er credito rs' contractual voting rights would be respected in bankruptcy. Cf 
II U.S.C. § 362 (1988) (p roviding for an automatic stay of cred itors ' efforts to seek repayment). 
160. See, e.g., In re Potter Instrument Co., 593 F.2d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that a 
shareholders' meeting would sound a "death knell" for the corporation); In re Heck's, Inc., 11 2 B.R. 
775, 801 (Ba nkr. S.D . W.Va. 1990) (refusing to permit a shareholders' meeting during confirmation 
process) , affd in part , rev'd in part on other grounds , 15 1 B.R. 739 (Bankr. S. D. W. Va . 1992); 
Manvi lle Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manv ille Corp.) , 66 B.R. 517 , 534 (Bankr. 
S. D .N .Y. 1986) (stat ing that permitting a shareholders ' meeting poses "a serious threat and reB.! 
jeopardy " to the reorganization); see also Lynn M. LoPucki & William C . Whitford , Corpora te 
Govemance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
669, 696-99 (1993) (find ing tha t requests for shareholders' meeti ngs were denied in two of the fo ur 
cases stud ied). Although the Second Circuit decision in In re Johns-Manville Corp. reversed the lower 
court's initial denial of the equity committee's request to pursue a meet ing, the court suggested in a 
footnote tJ1at, had Johns-M anville been insolvent, shareholders would have los t their interest in electing 
directo rs. Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. , 801 F .2d 60, 65 n.6 (2d Cir. i 986). While 
commentators have criticized the In re Johns-Manville Corp. dicta, my ana lysis suggests that it be 
adop ted, and in fact, expanded to a blanket rule in all cases. For examples of the cri tic isms of the In 
re Johns-Manville Corp. dicta, see Gerb er, supra note 79, at 353-54 (noting that in Chapter II , 
insolvency does not bar sha reholders from voting on a plan o r retaining an interest in 3 reorganized 
company and arguing that shareholders thus retain an interest in the governance of the company); 
Thomas G. Kelch , Shareholder Control Rights in Bankruptcy: Disassembling the Wilhering t..firag e of 
C01porate Democracy, 52 MD . L. REV . 264, 295 & n . l75 (1993) (noting that the court's opi nio!l in 
footnote six "is by no means a universa l view" and contrasting the competing uguments). 
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unsecured creditors should replace shareholders as the voters in the event 
that a corporation has filed for bankruptcy. 161 Because bankruptcy courts 
have looked to state voting rules for guidance as to the appropriate con-
tours of corporate voting in bankruptcy, and the state provisions have only 
solvent corporations in mind, bankruptcy courts have not even considered 
the possibility of adopting such a rule. Instead, bankruptcy courts have 
attempted to maneuver within the confines of a state voting framework that 
makes sense for a healthy corporation but is far more problematic in bank-
ruptcy. 
D. Summary and Implications 
Recognition of the vestigialization caused by the separation betv,reen 
corporate law and corporate bankruptcy has important implications for our 
assessment of the proper relationship between bankruptcy and state law. 
As noted earlier, courts and commentators have long taken as an article of 
faith that bankruptcy courts should incorporate state law wherever pos-
sible. 162 While this principle is perhaps most familiar as the central tenet 
of the first comprehensive theory of bankruptcy law, the creditors' bargain 
model, 163 it has informed the analyses of many other courts and commen-
tators as well. 164 
At the least, the perverse effects of vestigialization suggest that 
bankruptcy courts should scrutinize state law more carefully before simply 
transplanting it to the bankruptcy context. In many areas, such as fore-
closure provisions and the priority scheme set forth in Article Nine of the 
161 . Skeel, supra note 126, at 511. Another approach might be to eliminate directorial voting 
altogether in Chapter 11 and to require any constituency that is dissatisfied with the directors' 
performance to seek the appointment of a trustee pursuant to Bankruptcy Code§ 1104. ll U.S.C. 
§ 1104 (1988). Because appointing a trustee is a dramatic step and is undesirable in many contexts 
where a change in management might make sense, this approach seems less attractive than vesting 
voting authority in unsecured creditors, but it would improve on the current regime by removing the 
vote from shareholders . 
162 . See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
! 63. See David G. Carlson, Bankruptcy and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. C!N. L. REV. 453, 460 
(1992). Bankruptcy theorists have recently criticized the creditors' bargain theory on various grounds, 
arguing, for instance, that the parties themselves could solve the collective action problems that the 
theory cites as evidence of the need for a bankruptcy regime. See, e.g. , Adler, supra note 1, at 313-15 
(challenging the assumption that there is a collective action problem); Randal C. Picker, Security 
Interests, Misbehavior and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645, 647-48 (1992) (criticizing recent 
scholars for ignoring creditor misbehavior); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 600-02 (arguing that the holdout 
problem is not unavoidable). But however problematic Chapter 11 itself appears to be, the existence 
of some sort of collectivized proceeding clearly is necessary. See Skeel, supra note 1, at 492-93 
(arguing that the threat of strategic behavior by creditors and the risk of undesirable and unnecessary 
dismemberment of corporations that are more valuable as going concerns make eliminating bankruptcy 
an unattractive alternative). In consequence, many of the insights of the creditors' bargain theory 
remain fully valid , at least as a starting point. 
164. See supra note 79. 
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UCC, 165 states have clearly legislated with default and insolvency in 
mind. As a result, it is perfectly appropriate to replicate the effects of 
these provisions in bankruptcy. In contrast, state law is a poor source of 
guidance in areas such as those discussed above, in which state lawmakers 
have paid little or no attention to the ramifications of insolvency for laws 
developed with solvent corporations in mind . 
The analysis of this Part raises an intriguing question: If charter 
competition encourages states to regulate corporate law in a rel atively 
efficient fashion, as appears to be the case, 166 and if a corporation and its 
various constituencies have an incentive to contract around inefficient rules , 
why have state lawmakers or the parties themselves not eliminated the ef-
fects of vestig ialization? With respect to state legislation in an area like 
state preference law, the answer is simply that federal law has occupied the 
field. 167 So long as a substantial majority of insolvent corporations wind 
up in bankruptcy, rather than invoking state collectivized insolvency proce-
dures, states do not have sufficient incentive to focus on their preference 
provisions. Only if states were to develop collectivized insolvency provi-
sions that were effective enough to persuade an appreciable number of cor-
porations to forego Chapter 11 would they have reason to focus upon their 
preference laws. 168 
165. See, e.g., U.C.C . §§ 9-301,-312,-501 to -507 (1991). 
166. SeeinfraPartiV. 
167. In contrast to state lawmakers, Congress has relatively few structural incentives to pass 
efficient laws because it has a relative monopoly over the laws it administers. While th e possibility that 
corporations might move overseas if Congress regulates them poorly could create competitive pressures 
somewhat like those faced by the states in thei r competition with one another, the effects are far more 
attenuated. For a more detailed consideration of this issue , see infra Part IV. 
168. Given states' incentives to make their corporate law as attractive to corporations as possible, 
it is somewhat surprising that none has developed an effective state corporate bankruptcy regime as an 
alternative to Chapter II. Perhaps states have stayed out of this area because of a perception either 
that Chapter 11 preempts any effort by the states to cover analogous ground or that other legal obstacles 
preclude the enactment of an effective state insolvency regime. Yet the Supreme Court has been 
extremely hesitant to strike down state regulation on preemption grounds. See DavidS. Welkowitz, 
Preemption , Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State Antidilution Laws, 67 TUL. L. REV . I , 9-11 
(1992). Other legal barriers may be more problematic, at least in the absence of enactment by 
Congress of enabling legislation that clears some of the hurdles, but most do not appear to be 
completely prohibitive. See infra Part V. Another possible disincentive is the administrative costs of 
handling corporate insolvency issues in state court, although these costs would be at lea st partially offset 
by the increased attractiveness of the state to corporations and by the legal fees that would be generated 
for local lawyers . 
One recent exception to states' continued neg lect of insolvency issues is Delaware's enactment 
of a new insolvency provision designed to enable an insolvent corporation to better deal with future 
liability problems. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 280-282 (1991) (prescribing procedures that permit a 
corporation facing unknown future claims to formulate a court-approved plan to satisfy these potential 
future claimants in connection with a statuwry dissolution); see also In re RegO Co ., 623 A.2d 92, 
105-JJ (Del. Ch. 1992) (requiring that a statutory dissolution plan not discriminate against unknown 
future claimants in favor of known claimants). Even if the states fail to overhaul fully their insolvency 
regimes, they might increasingly follow Delaware's lead and adopt partial alternatives to Chapter II. 
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In other contexts, the enduring effects of vestigialization are more 
puzzling. Because bankmptcy courts look to state law in corporate gover-
nance areas such as derivative suits and corporate voting, we might expect 
that states would have greater reason to develop insolvency-sensitive rules 
for these contexts. There are several possible explanations for their failure 
to do so. First, as with state preference law, the most obvious occasion for 
enacting such rules would be in connection with an overhaul of state insol-
vency regulation. Yet, as just noted, states have not taken this step. 
Second , the explanation may lie in interest-group politics .169 The appli-
cation of interest-group theory to the case at hand begins with the recogni-
tion that managers may prefer the existing, inefficient laws and therefore 
have no incentive to seek reform. 170 So long as the existence of a federal 
bankmptcy system ensures relatively uniform laws on the issues in ques-
tion , no state is penalized by the markets for failing to leg islate. While 
other constituencies, who are harmed by the inefficiencies, might prefer 
that states adjust their corporation statutes to account for the effects of 
insolvency, none is likely to have enough at stake to warrant sustained 
lobbying for a special set of insolvency rules. 171 
Some of the inefficiencies that state lawmaking fails to curb could be 
addressed contractually by the parties themselves, but private ordering also 
appears to be only a partial solution. The parties might try to devise their 
own preference regulation or provide for shareholders to replace creditors 
as voters under specified conditions, but collective action problems would 
limit the efficacy of these approaches in some contexts, as would the 
169. In its simplest form, interest group, or public choice analysis posits that concentrated , well-
organized groups frequently benefit in the legislative process at the expense of more diffuse ones, even 
if the diffu se group has more at stake overall. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among 
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 48 Q.J. ECON. 371, 380 ( 1983) (asserting that the effectiveness 
of any g roup in the political process will be determined by its efficiency in relation to other g roups); 
Sam Peltzman , Toward a More General TI1 eory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & EcON . 211, 211-12 (1976) 
(noting that a small group with a large per capita stake may dominate over a large group with more 
diffuse interests); Richard A. Posner, TI1eories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J . EcoN. & MGMT. 
Scr. 335 , 349 (1974) (noting that "the geographic concentration of the people who would benefit from 
favorable regu lation is an important element because a legislator will exert greater efforts on behalf of 
a voter bloc large enough to" have a material effect on the outcome of an election). 
170. See Adler, supra note I, at 344-45 (arguing that managers would oppose any reform that 
might threaten their discretion). 
171. Shareholders are the most obvious beneficiaries of any provision that improves the efficiency 
of corporate law. While the increasing concentration of ownership by institutional shareholders has 
made this g roup less diffuse than traditionally has been the case, the financial impact of the provisions 
affected by vestig ia lization may not be great enough to capture institutional shareholders' attention 
(especially when, as with the corporate voting issue, a rule that is inefficient ex ante appears to benefit 
shareholders ex post). These shareholders would be more likely to become involved if all of 
bankruptcy were being reformed. Cf. Skeel, supra note I, at 496-97 (noting that institutional investors 
own significant percentages of publicly held corporations and have taken an active role in opposing 
antitakeover provisions and other measures that they see as inconsistent with their interests) . 
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awkwardness of bargaining for insolvency procedures at a time when insol-
vency is likely to be seen as a remote risk. 172 Perhaps more importantly, 
it is questionable whether any of these contractual approaches could be 
implemented in Chapter 11 because a private preference law would conflict 
with the mandatory strictures of Chapter 11 173 and private voting or deri-
vative suit rules might be neutralized by bankruptcy's automatic stay. 174 
While each of these explanations is a plausible account of the persis-
tence of the inefficiencies created by the separation between corporate law 
and corporate bankruptcy, none offers a complete explanation. In many 
respects, vestigialization remains a puzzle. What seems clear, however, 
is that these inefficiencies do exist, and that each is a legacy of the decision 
to federalize corporate bankruptcy. 
IV. The Case for a Unitary Law of Corporations 
As Part III pointed out, the artificial separation between state corporate 
law and federal corporate bankruptcy has created inefficiencies in both 
domains. These inefficiencies are not likely to be confined to the specific 
doctrines we have considered. Rather, each of the doctrines reflects a 
problem that is more pervasive in scope. 
Having described the vestigialization caused by the separation between 
corporate law and corporate bankruptcy, I turn in this Part to the question 
of what we might do to address these problems. I begin in subpart IV(A) 
by considering several possible responses to vestigialization. I argue that 
responses preserving the existing order-such as relying on the uniform 
laws process-probably would not eliminate the problem and that the most 
effective solution would be to shift authority over corporate bankruptcy to 
the states. It is doubtful whether the effects of vestigialization are 
themselves sufficiently debilitating to warrant so sweeping a reform. Yet, 
in addition to addressing vestigialization concerns, shifting authority over 
corporate bankruptcy to the states would have more far-reaching beneficial 
172. See Skeel, supra note 1, at 481-82. 
173. The power of the trustee to reject executory contracts entered into prior to the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition would be one impediment to a contractual approach . See 11 U.S.C . § 365(a) 
(1988); cf Adler , supra note 1, at 322-23 (describing nonstatutory impediments to parties ' ability to 
adopt an alternative to the Chapter 11 bankruptcy regime). It is interesting to note in this regard that 
tl1e stakeholders wh o have sought to bargain for directorial representation and other governance 
protections in recent years have typically been constituencies, such as unions and major lenders, that 
have overcome their collective action problems . See, e.g., John C . Coffee, Jr. , Unstable Coalitions: 
Corporate Governance as a .Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1523-28 (1990) (describing 
proposals in bargaining with unions to provide employee representation on !he board of a major 
airline) . 
174. See 11 U .S.C. § 362(a) (1988) (halting any effort to assess or collect on a claim against the 
debtor). 
1994] Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy 513 
effects. In particular, this Part suggests that such a reform would improve 
both existing corporate bankruptcy law and state regulation of general cor-
poration law. 
After describing the advantages of expanding state authority over 
corporate law to include corporate bankruptcy, I discuss some of the poten-
tial objections to state regulation of corporate bankruptcy, including the 
administrative burden this reform would impose on states (and its implica-
tions for state lawmaking), the danger of arbitrary and inconsistent laws, 
and the possibility of systematic inefficiencies in state lawmaking in some 
contexts . The last of these objections, in particular, may be a basis for 
concern. Rather than undermining the case for state lawmaking authority, 
however, my analysis suggests, at most, that Congress should retain con-
trol over a few bankruptcy issues. 
A. "Why the States Would Do It Better 
1. The Superior Responsiveness of State Lawmaking.-The historical 
analysis in Part II suggests tl)at the most obvious solution to the problems 
created by the separation between corporate law and corporate bankruptcy 
would be to shift authority over corporate bankruptcy back to the states. 
I argue in this subpart that state regulation of corporate bankruptcy is in 
fact the most promising response to the inefficiencies of the current regime. 
Yet it is important to keep in mind that shifting corporate bankruptcy to the 
states would require a significant change from the current federally regu-
lated and administered bankruptcy system. I therefore begin by consider-
ing two alternative approaches. 
a. Supplementing the current regime with uniform laws. -One 
way to address the vestigial ization problem might be for an independent 
organization such as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws to propose specific provisions that close the gap between 
state corporation law and the federal Bankruptcy Code. 175 The uniform 
laws process has proven extremely effective in contexts such as child 
175 . Other organizations such as the American Law Institute o r the Ame rican Bar Association 
might also be candidates for undertaking a project of this sort. Th e American Law Institute recently 
published a proposed framework for corporate law. See AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992). See generally Larry E. 
Rib stein, 71•e Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO. \V ASH. L. REV. 984 (1993) (criticizing the 
mandatory framework of the ALI' s Principles of Corporate Govemance) . Similarly, the American Bar 
Association, which also is invo lved with the National Conference in the unifonn laws process , 
developed both the Model Business Corporation Act and Revised M odel Business Corporation Act. 
See MODEL BUSiNESS CORP. ACT (1979); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1991) . While these 
organ izatio ns differ in some respects in their approaches, much of the discussion below is applicable 
to each. I focus o n the uniform laws process to simplify the analysis. 
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custody, where the uniform law has helped states to coordinate their 
resolution of choice-of-law issues. 176 As we have seen, uniform fraudu-
lent conveyance laws also have seen significant success, at least as 
measured by the number of states that have adopted them. 177 Perhaps the 
most important attraction of the uniform laws process for present purposes 
is that the commissioners could limit their attention to those provisions with 
respect to which the separation between corporate law and bankruptcy is 
likely to cause problems. In all other respects, the state regulation of 
corporate law and Congress's control of Chapter 11 could be left as it is. 
Desp ite the obvious virtues of the uniform laws process, it is never-
theless subject to several limitations that would significantly undermine its 
usefulness in this context. The first limitation of uniform laws stems from 
the premium placed by the Conference on developing laws that wi II be 
adopted by every state. 178 The need to satisfy the concerns of every state 
not only makes the drafting process cumbersome and time consuming; it 
also may stifle innovation because states are discouraged from altering the 
terms of any uniform provision they adopt. 179 The chilling effect that a 
uniform law has on innovation is particularly problematic in the corpora-
tion law context, given the constantly changing business environment 
against which the laws play out. 
The effort to accommodate the interests of as many states as possible 
also affects the initial content of the provisions proposed by the Confer-
ence. Much of the Uniform Commercial Code, for instance, is vague and 
open-ended, a tendency that can be traced as much to the concern for uni-
formity as to the vision of its principal drafters. 180 The effect of open-
ended standards, in addition to increasing litigation, is to shift the respon-
sibility for further defining the terms to the courts.181 In many contexts, 
courts are well equipped to perform this task-particularly with respect to 
rules that are relatively timeless or that benefit from slow evolution. 
176. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, A Theory of Uniform Laws 29 (1993) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) (observing that the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act has been adopted by 52 states and territories). See generally UNIF. CHILD 
CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 123 (1968). 
177. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text ; see also infra Appendix B (listing those states 
that have adop ted these uniform laws). 
178. See Allison Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Unifomz 
State Laws, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 249 (1965) (noting that the commissioners are 
completely committed to uniformity). Because neither the ALI nor the ABA is as focused on achieving 
blanket adoption as the Conference is , this critique is less applicable to these institutions . But the need 
to reach global consensus within each of these groups may have comparable effects. 
179. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 176, at 13. 
180. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures: With 
Application to Commercial Law (1994) (unpublished manuscript) . 
181. See John A. Sebert, Jr. , Remedies Under Article Two of the Unijom1 Commercial Code: An 
Agendafor Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 360, 362-63 (1981). 
1994] Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy 515 
Courts are Jess effective in areas that require frequent innovation, 
however. 182 Further, the uncertainty costs created by the need for judi-
cial clarification are likely to increase the expense of implementing the 
rule. 183 
A second problem with the uniform laws process is that it suffers from 
an inevitable incompleteness. Because this approach would not eliminate 
the separation between state corporate law and federal corporate bankrupt-
cy, the tensions that gave rise to vestigialization in the first instance would 
remain. In other words, the uniform laws process might patch over the ef-
fects of vestigialization, but it would not fully cure the problem. 
b. Federalizing all of corporate law.-Another so lution might be 
to federalize general corporation law. Assertion by Congress of control 
over general corporation Jaw would create a uniform federal law of corpo-
rations and thus eliminate the split between corporation law and corporate 
bankruptcy. Moreover, this approach would accord with the calls by some 
commentators to federalize much of corporate law. 184 
Several problems seriously undermine the attractiveness of the feder-
alization solution. One shortcoming of federalizing all of corporation law 
is Congress's general unresponsiveness as a lawmaker in many contexts-
that is, its failure to adjust existing legislation to keep pace with legal and 
economic developments. 185 The likelihood that Congress would fail to 
adapt corporation law to changing conditions stems both from the political 
forces that frequently tie its hands and, more importantly, from the absence 
of competitive pressures of the sort that prod states to pay relatively close 
attention to the contours of their corporation law .186 It is not accidental 
that, prior to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, Congress had never succeeded in 
passing significant bankruptcy legislation except in times of national 
182 . See id. (suggesting that legislation is required to effect substantial innova tions and 
modifications in the UCC). 
183. See Ribstein & Kobayashi , supra note 176, at 13 n.52 (noting that an increase in the courts ' 
role creates uncertainty and reduces clarity, thus undermining the basic function of uniform laws). 
184. This view, at least in its modern conception, is usually seen as having originated with 
Professor William Cary. See Cary, supra note 6. Subsequent articles in this vein include the 
following: Richard W. Jennings, Federalization of Corporate Law: Part Way or All the Way, 3! Bus. 
LAW. 991 (1976); Donald G. Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO . 
L.J . 71 (1972); Joel Seligman, 1he Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. 
REV. 947 (1990). 
185 . In some contexts, such as tax regulation, Congress is particularly active as a l3wmaker. But 
Congress's attentiveness in this context may stem less from an interest in improving the contours of 
existing law than from other motives . See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S . McChesney , On the 
Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform , 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 934-42 (1987) 
(advancing an explanation of recent tax changes based on the politicians ' extractions of personal and 
political benefits) . 
186 . See infra subsection IV(A)(l)(c). 
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financial crisis. 187 While delegation of authority to an agency would 
diminish this problem, the agency would be subject to similar limitations 
as a lawmaker. 188 
A closely analogous problem with federalizing corporation law is that 
it would shift a substantial administrative burden to the federal government. 
As even the most avid advocates of federalizing much of corporation law 
acknowledge, Congress is poorly situated to attend to the myriad of detail s 
that issuing charters for corporations (and regulating them thereafter) 
entails. 189 
Finally, even if federalization of corporation law were more attractive 
from a normative perspective, such a step would be unlikely as a practical 
matter. Because some states derive substantial financial benefits from their 
chartering business, they would fiercely contest any proposal to fully feder-
alize corporation law. 1SXJ Given the deeply embedded tradition of state 
sovereignty over corporation law, the states could probably thwart any 
effort at complete federalization. 191 
c. State control over corporate bankruptcy.-We come now to 
the proposal suggested at the outset of this Part: Control over corporate 
bankruptcy should be shifted from Congress to the states. Why is this 
proposal superior to any of the alternatives discussed above? 
From a historical perspective, vesting control over corporate bankrupt-
cy in the states has the attraction, as compared to federalizing all of corpor-
ate law, of more fully respecting the unique role that the states have played 
in the development of corporations. 192 In addition, like federalizing 
187. See WARREN, supra note 21, at 9. 
188. Congress ' s delegation of securities regulation to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
provides an illustration of these problems. See generally Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38 , tit. I, 48 Stat. 
74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 a-bbbb (1988)). Like Congress itself, for instance, th e 
SEC has a monopoly over the issues it governs and thus does not face the kinds of competitive 
pressures that influence state lawmaking in the corporate area. For similar reasons, the SEC also has 
an incentive to focus more on expanding its role than on optimal regulation . See Jo nathan Macey, T7z e 
SEC Dinosaur Expands Irs Turf, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1992, at A12 (opining that advances in 
securities markets that have eliminated the need for the SEC have led that agency to seek new 
jurisdiction in order to justifY its own continued existence). 
189. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG , CORPORATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 99 (6th ed. unabr. 1988) (noting that a proposal for a federal incorporation law was 
rejected because, inter alia, "statutory corporation law contains an enormous amount of minor detail s 
... which are unlikely to capture the interest of Congress"). 
190. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
191. Notice that this observation might also prove true with respect to a move (which I propose 
in the text that follows) to shift corporate bankruptcy to the states. Although federal lawmakers have 
less of a vested interest in retaining authority in this area than state lawmakers have with respect to 
corporate law, other interest groups-particularly federal bankruptcy judges-might fight strenuously 
against reform. 
192. See supra Part II . 
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corporate law, and unlike tinkering with the current regime, de-federalizing 
corporate bankruptcy would eliminate the source of the vestigialization 
problem. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether vestigialization, by 
itself, is sufficiently debilitating to justify so dramatic a reform as shifting 
control over corporate bankruptcy to the states. If only vestigialization 
were at issue, a patchwork solution such as the uniform laws process might 
prove adequate. But state regulation of corporate bankruptcy offers other, 
ultimately more important, advantages in addition to the elimination of 
vestigialization. 
The most important advantage of shifting authority to the states, as 
compared to the current federal bankruptcy regime, is that state lawmakers 
are far more responsive than Congress and, as a result, will amend and 
update their laws in a more timely fashion. This is not so much because 
state lawmakers do not face the same political or legislative volume pres-
sures that Congress does;'93 rather, states are responsive in the corporate 
law context because, unlike Congress, they must compete to attract corpo-
rations to their jurisdiction. Because a corporation ordinarily can 
incorporate wherever it chooses, and because the internal affairs doctrine 
ensures that the law of the state of incorporation will govern the rela-
tionship between shareholders and management, 194 corporations have an 
incentive (both when they first incorporate and thereafter as they consider 
whether to change their state of incorporation) to shop for the state with the 
most attractive laws. 195 For their part, states care deeply about the 
choice that a corporation makes because a state derives substantial financial 
benefits from the corporations it charters. 196 One way that states can , 
193. While the state legislative workload may frequently be less onerous than Congress's, many 
state legislators serve in the legislature on a part-time basis. Roberta Romano, The Political Economy 
of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 1 1 1, 133 (1 987). Thus, they too are under significant time 
pressures . Moreover, the states may in some contexts be subject to more troubling pressures t11an 
federal lawmakers. For instance, the relative absence of consumer and other interest group activity at 
the state level may make it easier for the managers of an important local corporation to obtain special 
treatment. See Ui . at 134-36 (discussing the absence of political interest from nonbusiness groups in 
Connecticut's takeover legislation and the support shown by Aetna and other local business interests). 
194. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 302 & cmt. a (1988). 
195 . In a recent article, Bill Carney provides a more precise typology of the conditions that make 
charter competition possible. In addition to adherence to the internal affairs doctrine, these conditions 
include: the ability to cross borders and to conduct business in foreign jurisdictions (that is, jurisdictions 
other than the place of incorporation); absence of adverse consequences when a corporation does 
business elsewhere; and universal access to the laws of competing jurisdictions. William J. Carney, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Conditions for Optimal Development 16-17, 25-26 (1993) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review). As Carney points out, the absence of several of these 
requirements in Europe diminishes the likelihood that comparable charter competition will develop in 
the European Community. See Ui. at 20-21 (discussing the European conflict-of-laws rule that "the 
governing law of the corporation is that of the jurisdiction where the corporation has its principal 
offices"). 
196 . The most direct benefit to states is the yearly franchise tax that they charge corporations 
incorporated within their borders; in addition, states also receive indirect benefits such as the legal fees 
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and do, attempt to attract new and foreign corporations, as well as to 
discourage existing corporations from relocating, is to demonstrate a 
responsiveness to corporate concerns as they arise. 
Delaware serves as the most prominent example of this phenomenon. 
In addition to the other advantages Delaware offers-such as the expertise 
of specialized courts197 and a constitutional system that discourages 
adverse changes in its corporation law198-the responsiveness of Dela-
ware's legislature to emerging corporate issues has played a significant role 
in its success in the competition for charters. 199 In a study of the relative 
responsiveness of the states, Roberta Romano found not only that Delaware 
was more responsive than any other state legislature, but also that there 
tended to be a strong correlation between a state's responsiveness and its 
success in attracting corporate charters. 200 
To be sure, state lawmakers' superior responsiveness is a virtue only 
if states respond by improving, rather than undermining, existing law. One 
group of commentators, the so-called race-for-the-bottom theorists, has 
argued that because managers choose a firm's state of incorporation, states 
compete for corporate charters by passing laws that favor managers at the 
expense of shareholders. 201 These theorists view charter competition as 
malignant and have called for greater federalization to counteract what they 
see as its troubling effects. 202 
Yet, as a succession of race-for-the-top theorists have pointed out, 
market pressures are likely to counteract any tendency states might other-
wise have to underappreciate shareholders' interests.Z03 If a corporation 
earned by local attorneys as a result of a corporation's presence in the state. Roberta Romano, Law 
as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. ECON. & ORO. 225,240-41 (1985). 
197. Delaware's Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction over tort and criminal cases. DEL. CONST. 
art. JV, § I. Thus, corporate cases will not be held up by the usual backlog of criminal and tort cases 
and will be heard by a court that focuses on business issues. 
198. See id. art. IX, § I (requiring any revision of corporate law be supported by a two-thirds 
supennajority vote). 
199 . Because of the significant revenue Delaware derives from corporate franchise fees, Delaware 
is effectively committed to remaining responsive-and not to acting opportunistically-in the future. 
See Romano, supra note 196, at 242. This commitment to responsiveness further increases Delaware's 
attractiveness as a state of incorporation. !d. at 240-42. 
200. !d. at 238-40. 
201. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 6, at 685 ("Delaware, ... seeking revenue and proud of its 
leadership in the race for incorporation, must please management .... "); Donald E. Schwartz, 
Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 557 (I 984) ("A state legislature that 
attempts to restrict in any significant way the power of managers ... soon finds that corporations will 
... ' flee' to another state .... "). 
202. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 6, at 665, 700-01 (characterizing charter competition as 
"contagious" and calling for federal standards to ensure minimum levels of corporate responsibility); 
Schwartz, supra note 201, at 586 (calling for federalization to end negative charter competition). 
203. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 416-17 (1983) (noting that many institutional investors have voted against management-
proposed charter amendments "designed to deter potential bidders from making a tender offer" because 
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incorporates in a state whose laws diminish shareholder wealth, the corpo-
ration will be forced to pay a greater price to raise capital and will be 
similarly disadvantaged in the product market, as compared to corporations 
that choose a state with superior laws. The corporation's diminished ability 
to compete also brings the market for corporate control into play, because 
new managers could improve the fortunes of the firm simply by taking the 
firm over and reincorporating it in another state.204 The reality of these 
market pressures strongly suggests that corporations will seek, and states 
therefore have at! incentive to provide, laws that maximize the value of the 
firm .205 
It is important to emphasize that the claim here is not that charter 
competition has led to completely efficient state laws. On the contrary, 
various factors will prevent state lawmakers from developing fully efficient 
laws. To the extent reincorporation is costly,206 legislators in a state such 
as Delaware may be able, at least to a limited extent, to satisfy interest 
group pressures at the expense of developing a more fully efficient legal 
regime. 207 Yet the strong tendency is for states to enact more, rather 
of the tendency of such amendments to reduce shareholder welfare); Winter, supra note 6, at 276-77 
(citing the "satisfied or nonexistent" demand by shareholders for the inclusion of specific "reforms" 
in individual corporate charters as evidence that such reforms in the form of state legislation may not 
be necessary). 
204. See Winter, supra note 6, at 264-66 (describing the market for management control as an 
important economic constraint on corporate management). The disappearance of the takeover market 
in recent years has reduced its effectiveness as a disciplining device. Yet other market forces remain 
fully in effect, and the takeover market is likely to be compensated, at least in part, by other market 
mechanisms. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Columbian Cartel Launches Bid f or Japan ese Fim1s, I 02 YALE 
L.J. 2005, 2018-20 (1993) (pointing out the importance of market and organizational incentives other 
than the market for management control, such as the labor and capital markets and the markets for 
products and services). 
205. While many commentators, including myself, agree that efficiency should be the primary goal 
of a corporate law framework (and that state lawmaking tends in this direction), there is some debate 
as to what characteristics an efficient law is likely to have. Compare FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991) (suggesting that 
efficient law consists of default provisions consistent with the terms most parties would choose through 
their own bargaining) with Jeffrey N . Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1549, 1554-55 (1989) (arguing that some mandatory rules that prevent bargaining may be 
efficient) and Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: 77ze Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1397-1400 (1992) (reviewing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra) 
(contending that states should enact penalty defaults to encourage more bargaining). 
206. See Roberta Romano, 77ze State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 
709, 724 (1987) (postulating that reincorporation is costly enough to hamper the effectiveness of charter 
competition). Not all commentators agree that reincorporation is costly. Bernie Black contends that 
corporations can change states at a co mparatively low cost. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law 
Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 586-88 (1990). While Black 
offers persuasive evidence as to the relatively low direct costs of reincorporation, at least for large , 
publicly held tirms, he does not account for the indirect costs of such a move-such as its adverse 
signalling effects. 
207. Macey and Miller suggest, for example, that Delaware may enact litigation-increasing rules , 
which benefit the local bar. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an /merest-Group 
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 504-05 (1987). 
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than less, efficient laws.208 As discussed earlier, Congress has far less 
of an incentive to enact similarly efficient laws due to the absence of the 
sort of competitive pressures that shape state corporate law. 209 
The analysis thus far relies upon state lawmakers' effectiveness in 
regulating corporate law as evidence that states would also be better regula-
tors of corporate bankruptcy than Congress. This reliance obviously rests 
on an important assumption: The competitive pressures that ensure general-
ly efficient corporation iaws will have a similarly desirabie impact on a 
state corporate bankruptcy regime. Is this assumption warranted? Some 
might contend that it is not for either of two reasons. First, one could 
argue that the same incentives that encourage efficiency in states' enact-
ments of general corporation law would have perverse effects in the bank-
ruptcy context. In particular, given the competitive pressure to satisfy 
managers and to maximize shareholders' wealth, states might enact bank-
ruptcy provisions that inefficiently divert wealth from a firm's creditors to 
its shareholders. 210 
At least for consensual creditors, however, this argument seems mis-
placed. The same kinds of market pressures that force states to enact 
efficient general corporation laws should prevent them from diverting 
wealth to shareholders in bankruptcy. If a state enacted a shareholder-
oriented bankruptcy law of this sort, the windfall to shareholders would be 
short-lived. Creditors would simply charge more for credit so that, ex 
ante, a corporation and its shareholders would not benefit at all from its 
inefficient law. In fact, such a law almost certainly would diminish share-
holder wealth, given the other perverse effects (such as managerial miscon-
duct) it would generate. As a result, a state's incentive to maximize 
shareholder wealth is likely to lead to a bankruptcy regime that respects 
creditors' interests, rather than one that inefficiently diverts wealth to 
shareholders. 211 
208. Another important caveat is in order. The analysis in the text does not suggest that states will 
tend to enact efficient laws in all areas. State lawmaking is likely be efficient only when, as in 
corporate law, states are subject to competitive pressures. 
209. See supra notes 193-205 and accompanying text. 
210. See Lucian A. Bebchuk , Federalism and the Corporation: TI1e Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1489, 1489-90 (1992) (u[I]fa corporate law 
rule can be designed to transfer value from creditors to shareholders, then shareholders may well find 
the rule attractive even if it is inefficient .... "). 
211 . Because nonconsensual creditors such as tort claimants cannot protect themselves by contract, 
states could and arguably do pass laws that favor other constituencies at the tort creditors' expense. 
The general rule that shareholders are given limited liability with respect to all claims against a 
corporation, including tort claims, is one example of this . See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
Toward Unlimited Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1916-19 (1991) (criticizing the 
justification of limited liability for tort claims as a means of ensuring efficient capital investments in 
corporations). But see Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital 
Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J . 387, 392-405 (1992) (questioning the efficacy of an unlimited 
1994] Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy 521 
A second concern with respect to state enactment of corporate bank-
ruptcy laws is that such laws would not fall within the internal affairs 
doctrine and thus courts might not look to the bankruptcy law provided by 
a corporation's state of incorporation. As described above, the internal 
affairs doctrine ensures that the law of the state of incorporation will 
regu late issues relating to the internal governance of a corporation.212 If 
choice of law were based not on the state of incorporation, but on some 
other factor such as the firm's principal place of business, corporate 
managers would lose much of their incentive to shop for the optimal corpo-
ration law regime, and the competition for charters would break down. 213 
As a resuit, states would have far less pressure to enact efficient corporate 
law legislation. 214 Thus, the internal affairs doctrine is a crucial compo-
nent of the competitive process I have described. 
Even with respect to issues relating directly to relationships among the 
shareholders and managers of a firm, the internal affairs doctrine is not 
absolute. Courts sometimes apply law other than that of the state of incor-
poration with respect to issues sufficiently far removed from the structure 
and governance procedures of the firm as to implicate considerations such 
as agency or tort doctrine. 215 Yet the internal affairs doctrine is suffi-
ciently broad and applies to enough of the core issues involving a corpo-
ration216 that managers have an enormous incentive to choose the firm's 
state of incorporation carefully. 
liability approach in light of arbitrage effects on stock prices). Yet Congress has not proven any more 
solicitous of tort creditors' interests than the states, as evidenced by the low priority tort creditors are 
given in bankruptcy. See II U.S.C. § 507(a) (1988) (giving no special priority to tort claims). 
212. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. 
213. 1l1e applicability in much of Europe of the "real seat" doctrine-a rule that bases choice of 
!aw on the jurisdiction where a corporation has its principal place of business-appears to be a major 
impediment to the development of effective charter competition in the European Community. Carney, 
supra note 195, at 20-21. 
214. States stili might use their corporation laws as a way to attract corporations to the state. The 
state's law would apply, however, only if the state was also a corporation's principal place of business. 
Because numerous other factors such as location and access to necessary raw materials contribute to 
a corporation's decision where to locate its principal place of business, the role of charter competition 
would be much more attenuated. See generally ROBERT W. HAIGH, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES AND THE 
PLL\NT-LOCATION DECISION: FOREIGN COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES 32-68 (1987) (detailing the 
key factors companies use in determining plant location). 
215. See, e.g., Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F .2d 357, 363-64 (2d Cir.) (applying the law of the state 
where the promise allegedly was made rather than the law of the state of incorporation to determine 
whether the director had apparent aut.~ority to bind the corporation), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959); 
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 820 (N.J. 1981) (applying New Jersey law rather than 
the law of t.~e state of incorporation in holding a corporate director personally liable for 
misappropriation of funds because all significant relationships of the parties were with New Jersey). 
216. The Restatement (Second) suggests that the law of the state of incorporation should apply to 
any issue involving relations among shareholders, directors, and officers. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 302 cmt. a., 303..07, 309 (1988). Moreover, the law of another state should 
not be applied except in rare circumstances. !d. § 302 cmt. g. 
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Whether this incentive and the effects of charter competition would 
continue to operate in the bankruptcy context is doubtful, however. The 
internal affairs doctrine applies only to relationships among the share-
holders and managers of a corporation. 217 It does not extend to the cor-
poration's transactions with third parties such as creditors. 218 Because 
much of bankruptcy addresses third-party issues of this sort, the internal 
affairs doctrine would not ensure the application of the bankruptcy laws of 
the state of incorporation. Instead, a court would apply ordinary conflict-
of-laws principles to determine which state's law to apply. 219 If courts 
frequently looked to the bankruptcy laws of a state other than the state of 
incorporation, charter competition might prove far less effective in the 
bankruptcy context than it is for states' general corporation laws. 
Despite the uncertainty as to which bankruptcy laws a court would 
apply, the likelihood that courts regularly would spurn the bankruptcy 
regime of the state of incorporation in favor of another state's law is 
smaller than might initially seem to be the case. Under ordinary conflict-
of-laws principles, courts are directed to consider factors such as the 
relative interests of the states whose laws could apply, protection of the 
justified expectations of the parties, the policies underlying the law in 
question, the certainty and uniformity of the choice made, and the ease of 
determining which law a court should apply. 220 To be sure, if a Dela-
ware corporation is headquartered in Illinois and does most of its business 
there, Illinois has a substantial interest in having its laws govern any 
bankruptcy involving the corporation. Yet several other, equally relevant 
factors favor the use of Delaware law. Applying Delaware law might bet-
ter accord with the expectations of the parties, would enhance the certainty 
and uniformity of the choice made, and would minimize the difficulty of 
determining the appropriate law. 221 Thus, even aside from the theoretical 
advantages of extending the internal affairs doctrine to corporate bank-
ruptcy, courts might well look to the law of the state of incorporation 
under ordinary conflict-of-laws principles. 
Notice, in this regard, that the factors favoring the law of the state of 
incorporation would prove most compelling in precisely the cases where 
choice of law is most likely to be at issue. Small and closely held 
217. !d. § 302 cmt. a . 
218. /d. 
219. See id. 
220. /d. § 6(2). 
221. European Community law requires corporations to designate their country of registration on 
all correspondence and order forms. Alfred F. Conard, The European Altemative to Unifonnity in 
Corporation Laws, 89 MICH. L. REV . 2150, 2171 (1991). If a state were to impose an analogous 
requirement in its corporate law or if corporations took such a step voluntarily, ease of discovery would 
weigh even more in favor of applying the law of the firm's state of incorporation. 
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corporations almost always incorporate in the same state in which they do 
all (or most) of their business .222 Consequently, choice of law is not a 
serious issue if such a corporation files for bankruptcy. On the other hand , 
for a pub! icly held corporation, which may be incorporated in one state, 
headquartered in another, and do substantial business in a var iety of 
locations , the choice becomes far less obvious . In these cases , the interests 
in uniformity and giving the parties notice of which law is likely to apply 
become especially important. The best way to achieve these goals-and the 
approach that many courts might adopt-is to apply the law of the state of 
incorporation. 
The possibility that some courts would apply a di fferent state's law 
cannot be dismissed. Yet the residual uncertainty as to a court ' s li kely 
approach to choice of law could be reduced in either of two ways. F irst, 
the corporation could insert a choice-of-law clause in its contracts, pro-
viding that the law of the state of incorporation will apply in the event that 
bankruptcy is filed .223 Second, and more simply, Congress could elimi-
nate the problem altogether by passing a choice-of-law statute requir ing 
state courts to apply the bankruptcy laws of the state of incorporation. As 
long as any legislation aimed at shifting corporate bankruptcy authority to 
the states included such a provision, charter competition would shape state 
bankruptcy law in much the same fashion as it currently shapes general 
corporation law. 
A final issue concerning charter competition in the bankruptcy context 
also warrants mention. In view of the low probability of bankruptcy for 
any given corporation , it might appear that differences in states' bankruptcy 
laws might not have enough significance for any given corporation to influ-
ence its choice of state of incorporation. Yet even if the corporation itself 
does not anticipate bankruptcy, creditors (such as banks) that deal with 
many debtors know that a certain number will wind up in bankruptcy. 
Creditors therefore have good reason to care which bankruptcy regime will 
apply in the event of insolvency and should adjust their credit prices 
accordingly. As a result, a debtor that is interested in minimizing its credit 
costs must take states' bankruptcy laws into account. 
222 . Incorporating out of state can be costly to a closely held corpora tion because a firm may be 
required to pay both a franchise tax to the state of incorporation and a ta x for do ing business in the 
local state . CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 189, at 98. A local co rporation' s atto rney may also prefer 
to operate under local law. !d. 
223 . Moreover, such a clause could , if the parties wished , not only provide fo r application of the 
law of the state of incorporation, but could also require that any bankruptcy case be brought in th at 
forum . Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v . Shute, 499 U.S. 585 , 590-97 (199 1) (enforcing a forum-
selection clause despite its small print and the inconvenience of the forum to the plaintiffs). Th ere are 
two limitations on this solution: It would only work in the event the corporation made sure that all of 
its contracts included such a clause, and it might not be effective for corporations that have a significant 
number of nonconsensual creditors . 
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d. Implications for current bankruptcy theory.-The analysis 
above demonstrates how shifting control over corporate bankruptcy to the 
states would address the vestigializing effects of current law more effec-
tively than any alternative solution. While a concern about elimination of 
the vestigialization problem that exists under current law would not by 
itself justify shifting authority over all of corporate law to the states, this 
is only one of the benefits of such a reform. The same qualities that make 
state law a better response to vestigialization also suggest that state 
lawmakers would do a better job in regulating corporate bankruptcy as a 
whole than Congress has done. Given the states' responsiveness in the 
corporate law area, for example, they almost certainly would adjust and 
update existing corporate bankruptcy laws more regularly and efficiently 
tha\1 Congress does. 
Notice that this analysis has important implications for the debate 
whether Chapter 11 should be abolished. The current disaffection with 
Chapter 11 stems from a widespread belief that the bankruptcy process is 
inordinately time-consuming, costly, and ineffective. 224 In view of these 
problems, commentators have speculated whether Chapter 11 should be 
replaced by a mandatory auction regime225 and have suggested that the 
parties should at least have the option of implementing a different regime, 
such as one that provides for automatic cancellation of a firm's stock on 
default, 226 or of choosing from among a menu of bankruptcy options. 227 
If states were responsible for bankruptcy, their interest in maximizing 
their overall corporation-related revenues quite possibly would cause them 
to develop a bankruptcy regime that obviated many or all of the problems 
of Chapter 11. We might therefore expect to see some states experiment 
with different approaches to insolvency, including perhaps variations on 
those approaches that have recently been proposed by commentators. One 
of the central themes of the proposed alternatives to Chapter 11 is that 
corporations should be given far more flexibility to alter existing bank-
ruptcy rules by contract if they so choose.228 Given the states' track 
records in the context of general incorporation statutes, we would expect 
to see at least a move in this direction: toward bankruptcy regimes that 
replace the mandatory rules of the existing federal bankruptcy framework 
with statutes that leave significant room for private ordering. 229 
224. Skeel, supra note 1, at 472-73. 
225. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 1, at 641-47 (suggesting that it is unclear whether losses from 
such a switch would approximate any gains). 
226. See, e.g., Adler, supra note l, at 323-33 (describing a "Chameleon Equity" regime). 
227. E.g., Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 55-68. 
228. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 2, at 1786 ("[T]he best solution is to permit firms to choose 
which [bankruptcy] regime they feel is least costly."). 
229. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 205, at 34-36 (noting that state corporation law 
consists largely of default rules that can be varied by contract). The question whether the 
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2. Eliminating the Bankruptcy Externality in State Lawmaking.-In 
addition to addressing the vestigialization problem and improving the 
quality of corporate bankruptcy laws as a whole, shifting authority over 
corporate bankruptcy arguably has yet another attraction. Much as it 
addresses the vestigialization effect on state lawmaking, shifting bankruptcy 
authority to the states might also cause the states to improve the efficiency 
of those provisions that apply to healthy, solvent corporations. 
To appreciate how this might be so, recall the race-for-the-top theory 
concerning the effects of state charter competition and its contention that 
market pressures will cause managers to search for, and states to provide, 
laws that are far more efficient than might otherwise be the case. 230 
Despite nearly two decades of debate, neither these theorists nor the race-
for-the-bottom theorists (nor commentators subscribing to intermediate 
positions) have considered the effect of the federalization of corporate 
bankruptcy on the state chartering process. Most importantly, Chapter 11 
acts as a substantial federal subsidy to the states. Congress not only has 
assumed lawmaking responsibility in the bankruptcy context; it also has 
established federal bankruptcy courts for bankruptcy cases. In fiscal year 
1992, Congress allocated nearly $389 million to cover the costs of running 
the bankruptcy system. 231 Because the federal government currently 
shoulders all of these costs, states need not take the portion that relates to 
corporate bankruptcy into account in their corporation law statutes.232 As 
a result of this externality, state lawmakers are likely to develop laws that, 
at least on the margin, create too great a likelihood that bankruptcy will in 
fact occur. 233 
predominantly enabling nature of state corporate law is, or should be, supplemented by mandatory rules 
was the subject of a widely cited symposium. Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989). 
230. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. 
231. Telephone Interview with Evan Tausch, Supervisory Budget Policy Analyst, Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts (June 21, 1993). Of the tota l allocation of $388,632,000, 
$40,419,000 consisted of salaries and benefits paid to bankruptcy judges, and $219,013 ,OOOcomprised 
salaries and benefits paid to the administrative staff. /d. 
232. If the cost in each state were identical (which obviously is not the case), the administrative 
costs of bankruptcy would be $7,772,640 per state. To give a rough assessment of the impact on state 
corporate lawmaking, one would need to reduce this number to reflect the amount that is incurred in 
connection with individual bankruptcy cases, given that the proposal in the text would shift authority 
over only corporate (and municipal) bankruptcy to the states. A substantial majority of the bankruptcy 
cases filed involve individuals rather than corporations, but on the other hand, personal bankruptcy 
cases are likely to be less complicated and thus less costly from an administrative standpoint than those 
involving corporations. In 1992, for instance, 265,577 Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases were filed by 
individuals, as compared to 22,634 Chapter II reorganization cases and 681,663 Chapter 7 liquidations . 
The Chapter 7 liquidations include filings by both individuals and corporations. ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY STATISTICAL INFORMATION 2 (rev. ed. 1993). 
233. This is not to say that state law will completely fail to account for the possibility of 
bankruptcy, because a state will lose the franchise tax revenue it receives from a corporation if the 
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The effects of the bankruptcy externality on current state corporate I aw 
should not be overstated. To appreciate this, consider the erosion of capi-
tal requirements and state law restrictions on the circumstances under 
which a corporation may make dividends. 234 By themselves, these devel-
opments could make bankruptcy more likely because they eliminate one of 
the checks on the ability of managers to run a firm in an excessively risky 
fashion. Creditors, however, have compensated for the loss of these pro-
tections by imposing dividend limitations by contract.235 To the extent 
creditors can also address the limitations of state regulation in other areas 
by contract, and in doing so counteract the inefficiencies of the background 
regime, the practical effect of any flaws in state corporation laws is I ikely 
to be less significant than might initially appear to be the case. In these 
contexts, the true costs of the externality may therefore consist of the costs 
to firms of devising a better protection by contract, together with the risk 
that some parties will fail to protect themselves in this fashion. 
In sum, while shifting authority over corporate bankruptcy to the states 
would not completely eliminate the bankruptcy externality, it would impel 
states to pay more attention to the consequences of bankruptcy in devel-
oping the provisions that apply to currently healthy corporations. 
B. Possible Problems with State Control over Corporate Bankruptcy 
In the previous subpart, I attempted to demonstrate the extent to which 
state authorship of both corporate law and corporate bankruptcy could 
improve the current regime. The proposal is subject to several possible 
objections, however. First, in addition to changing the locus of regulation, 
transferring authority over corporate bankruptcy to the states also means 
shifting the expense of running the bankruptcy system to the states. A 
second concern is that the states might replace the present uniform frame-
work with a maze of arbitrary and inconsistent laws. Third, despite the 
virtues of state regulation of corporate law discussed above, state 
corporation files for bankruptcy and eventually liquidates. But in general, states have far less reason 
to take bankruptcy into account than they would if they bore its full costs. Another caveat is that even 
if states regulated corporate bankruptcy, they would internalize the costs of bankruptcy only if 
corporations filed their bankruptcy petitions in the state of incorporation rather than in another state. 
This seems likely to be the case . In addition to the likelihood that local corporations will file for 
bankruptcy in their state of incorporation, see supra note 222 and accompanying text, the applicability 
of a charter state's law might give multistate corporations further incentive to file in that state, much 
as parties often bring actions relating to Delaware corporations in Delaware. 
234. See generally BAYLESS MANNING& JAMES J. HANKS, JR., A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL 
CAPITAL (3d ed. 1990) (discussing the decreases in regulation of corporate capital requirements and 
its effect on creditors). 
235. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr . & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Comracting: An Analysis of 
Bond Covenants, 7 J . FIN. ECON. 117, 122-23 (1979) (describing typical contractual covenants imposed 
in bonds to limit risky behavior). 
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lawmakers appear to have questionable decisionmaking incentives in severaJ 
areas of corporate law. The presence of these same poor incentives in 
bankruptcy law may raise doubts concerning how effectively the states 
would regulate corporate bankruptcy. I address these objections in the 
following sections. 
1. The Impact of Rejonn on State Judicial Systems.-The shifting of 
authority over corporate bankruptcy to the states would add numerous new 
cases to a state's judicial system. Some might therefore object that , 
however attractive this proposal appears in theory, it would impose too 
great a burden on states. 236 Removing the subsidy currently provided by 
the federal bankruptcy system obviously would prove costly to the states, 
but this ultimately is not an appropriate basis for abando ning it. 
First, forcing states to bear the judicial costs of bankruptcy is the only 
obvious means of obtaining the benefits of state lawmaking discussed 
above. 237 Second, it is important to keep in mind that the proposal calls 
for state control over only corporate bankruptcy. Congress need not also 
cede its authority over personal bankruptcy to the states; as discussed in 
Part I, one can argue that the special cognitive problems that individuals 
face, which help to explain the "fresh start" policy underlying Chapter 13, 
are sufficiently universal to justify the enactment of a single national 
framework for bankruptcies involving individuals.238 Thus, a state's 
share of the total bankruptcy cost would not be crippling, 239 and retention 
by Congress of its authority over personal bankruptcy would significantly 
lower this cost. 
This is not to say that the increased costs shouldered by the states 
would be trivial. The states clearly would be required to bear significant 
additional administrative costs if they assumed control over corporate bank-
ruptcy. 240 The aJready clogged courthouses in many states also are 
236. As noted earlier, the cost of administering the entire bankruptcy system in t!scal year 1992, 
including both corporate and personal bankruptcy cases, was roughly $389 million. See supra note 
231. 
237. See supra sections IV(A)(3)-(4). 
238. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 1437-38 Uustifying federal bankruptcy guidelines for 
individuals). 
239. Much of the cost of the bankruptcy system is financed with the filing fees paid by bankruptcy 
debtors. Luize E. Zubrow, Creditors with Unclean Hands at the Bar of the Bankruptcy Court: A 
Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 58 N.Y.U . L. REV. 1383, 1397 n.SS (1983). Absent these fees, the 
burden of running a bankruptcy system would be far greater than it currently is. 
240. As a result, the states most likely to oppose the reform would be those states that do not tend 
to attract many corporations-because assuming control over corporate bankruptcy would generate 
relatively few identifiable revenues to offset the costs to these states. On the other hand, the costs to 
these states might be lower because they would have a smaller caseload and because their citizens 
already subsidize a share of the federal bankruptcy expense. 
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grounds for concern. 241 If states did not appoint sufficient new judges 
and staff to accommodate the additional caseload, the bankruptcy process 
could suffer as a result. Yet the increased caseload might actually have a 
salutary effect. If state courts dealt both with general corporation law 
issues and with corporate bankruptcy, states that handle a high volume of 
corporate issues might follow Delaware's lead in developing specialized 
business courts. Judges in such states would become particularly expert in 
corporate matters , as Delaware's judiciary has , and thus would improve the 
overall quality of judicial decisionmaking in the corporate context.242 
2. The Danger of Arbitrary and Inconsistent Laws.-As discussed in 
Part II, opponents of state bankruptcy laws traditi onal ly have insisted Ll-tat 
state lawmaking would produce a morass of arb itrary and inconsistent 
bankruptcy laws. 243 As a result , state laws would appear to impose huge 
deadweight costs such as the costs to creditors of familiarizing themselves 
with multiple bankruptcy laws .244 While scattered and inconsistent state 
laws may well have posed problems in the late eighteenth century when the 
Constitution was enacted, erratic variations seem far less likely today. 
Vast changes in interstate commerce have greatly reduced the importance 
of regional differences and the parochial concerns that accounted for much 
of the inconsistency. 245 As noted earlier, states' performance in the 
corporate law context reinforces the suggestion that problems of this sort 
have largely disappeared. Rather than varying wildly from state to state, 
state corporation law statutes are remarkably uniform in most important 
respects .246 Nor would we wish for complete uniformity ; the states' 
241. To give a single example, many cases take as long as five to six years to come to trial in 
Chicago and other major cities. Milo Geyelin & Vindu P . Goel, Lawyers Push for Special Business 
Courts, WALL ST. J ., Oct. 31, 1990, at B4 (quoting Thomas D. Allen, partner at Wildman , Harrold , 
Allen & Dixon in Chicago , Illinois). 
242 . For instance , Pennsylvania and several other states have considered establishing specia l 
business courts in recent years. See id. at B4. Assumption of authority over corporate bankruptcy 
might induce states to go forward with such plans. 
243. See supra note 60. 
244. From this perspective, a uniformly applicable law is a public good, the value of which will 
be lost if the states are permitted to adop t differing approaches. Jeffrey Gordon has used a simi lar 
argument to justify mandatory state laws. Gordon , supra note 205, at 1564-67 (explaining the 
Uncertainty Hypothesis, which argues that allowing parties to contract around a given rule would 
introduce uncertainty as to the parameters of the rule). Contra Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong 
Quesrion: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1603 -04 
(1989) (questioning whether such blurring does occur and suggesting that frequent deviation from a 
given rule indicates that the parties prefer a different standard). 
245 . See Roma no, supra note 196, at 235, 233-35 (analogizing desi rab le state bankruptcy laws to 
technological innovation in commerce in order to point out that individual states must "follow the 
leader" or else "lose incorporations at the margin") . 
246 . See id . at 233-42 (noting that many states enact similar statutes within very short time periods 
when corporations deem such laws desirab le) . 
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ability to adjust their corporate codes is a crucial virtue of state authority 
in this area. 247 
Notice that the states' inconsistent treatment of state preference laws 
does not undermine this argument. As discussed at length above, the in-
consistencies in areas such as preference law stem from the states' lack of 
sufficient incentive to focus on these issues-a direct result of the feder-
ai ization of corporate bankruptcy. 248 Were states the ones regulating ail 
aspects of corporation law, neglect and arbitrary variation would disappear 
in this context. 
3. The Inefficiencies Lurking Within State Lawmaking.-The third 
objection to state regulation of corporate bankruptcy argues that although 
the competition for corporate charters seems to cause states to enact general 
corporation laws superior to those of Congress, the tendency of the states 
toward efficiency breaks down in some contexts. In the analysis that 
fo llows, I consider why, and under what conditions, states may systemati-
cally enact inefficient general corporation law provisions. After the 
identification of these problem areas in the following subsections, I will 
explore their bankruptcy implications in some detail in subpart IV(C). 
a. Management entrenchment and widespread enactment of state 
anti takeover statutes.-The near-universal recognition that state lawmaking 
in the corporate law context may sometimes favor management entrench-
ment over efficient lawmaking can be traced, in large part, to the recent 
experience with state antitakeover statutes. Despite the negative impact 
these statutes have on shareholder wealth, 249 state after state enacted some 
247. See Baysinger & Butler, supra note 92, at 191 (concluding that competition among the states 
with respect to corporate governance law produces a variety of rules from which firms can select in 
order to maximize their returns). 
248. See supra subpart III(A). 
249. The empirical research to date has tended to find either significant negative effects as a result 
of takeover legislation or the absence of a statistically significant effect. See, e.g., Jonathan M . K11rpoff 
& Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation State Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. 
ECON. 291 (1989) (observing a small but statistically significant decrease in stock prices of corporations 
incorporated or headquartered in states that passed second-generation takeover laws); Donald G. 
Margotta et ai., An Analysis of the Stock Price Effect of the 1986 Ohio Takeover Legislation , 6 J .L. 
EcON. & ORG. 235 (1990) (finding no statistically significant effect of the Ohio antitakeover law on 
stock prices); Michael Ryngaert & Jeffry M . Nutter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio 
Antitakeover Law, 4 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 373 (1988) (finding that share prices at Ohio firms dropped 
2% after passage of Ohio's anti takeover law in 1986). Studies finding that the Delaware provision did 
not have a statistically significant impact on stock price are fully consistent with the view that Delaware 
enacted a relatively lax provision because market pressures discouraged it from adopting a stringent 
antitakeover law. Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters ar:d the Lesson of Takeover 
Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 857-58 (1993) (citing JohnS. Jahera & William N. Pugh, State 
Takeover Legislation: The Case ofDelaware, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 410 (1991)). 
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fo rm of antitakeover provision in the 1980s.250 Now that the dust has 
settled , even the most outspoken proponents of the race-for-the-top theory 
have been forced to acknowledge that states do not always enact optimal 
corporate laws. 251 
Why were these inefficient antitakeover provisions passed by so many 
states , and what are the implications for the contention that charter 
competition will lead to efficient bankruptcy law? The obvious starting 
point in this assessment is the one, not surprising, empirical clue th at we 
have: The constituency that plays the greatest role in lobbying for ant itake-
over laws is managers-often the managers of a single, locally prominent 
corporation. 252 How could these managers have succeeded in obtaining 
favorable, but inefficient, protection from takeovers in the face of charter 
competition's theoretical constraints? 
One possible explanation holds that while charter competition general-
ly prods states toward efficiency, states can pass an inefficient, excessively 
management-friendly law with impunity if the law itself has the effect of 
impairing the market's ability to discipline managers. 253 In this view, 
market pressures failed to prevent states from enacting antitakeover laws 
because such laws neutralized the market for corporate control. It may 
therefore have been the chilling effect on takeovers-the most dramatic 
and, in some respects, the most effective market corrective-that ensured 
the legislative success of these laws. In its broadest incarnation , the 
market-impairment thesis seems to suggest that market forces are helpless 
to prevent any law that reduces the influence of market discipline. Yet the 
passage of antitakeover laws appears to have been a relatively extraordinary 
occurrence. The question this raises is: When is the market impairment 
problem likely to come into play? Or, from a slightly different perspec-
tive: Why did states prove especially susceptible to value-decreasing 
antitakeover laws? 
The aspect of takeovers that made them special may well have been 
the remarkable end-game dynamic254 they created. Managers of a firm 
that incorporates in a state that has enacted one or more market-impairing 
250. For a discussion of these provisions, see Henry N . Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover 
Sta llltes and the Marketjor Corporate Charters, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 365, 373-77. 
251. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 205, at 218-22 (discussi ng the states ' adoption of 
various antitakeover statutes and analyzing the theories that explain why states are willing to hamper 
tender offers). 
252 . Romano, supra note 193, at 120-25. 
253. Bebchuk , supra note 210, at 1467-70; Gordon , supra note 205, at 1572 n.74. 
254 . Marleen A . O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptua lizing Corporate Law to 
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV . 899, 927-28 (1993) (defining the 
concept of an "end-game dynamic" as a situation where one party to a cooperative effort shifts its focus 
to self-preservation or self-interested actions because such a shift cannot produce a worse outcome for 
that party than the cooperative effort would have produced). 
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provisions will eventually be penalized. In the long run, managers who are 
protected by a particularly strict antitak:eover provision will pay more for 
any capital they subsequently seek to raise. 255 But the managers have 
little incentive to focus on long-term pressures of this sort in the face of a 
realistic takeover threat, given that a takeover would inevitably lead to their 
ouster. 256 
Moreover, the end-game mentality not only seems to have altered 
managers' perspectives, but also may have influenced the state lawmakers 
who subsequently enacted the antitak:eover statutes . First, state legislators 
ran the risk that their failure to protect an important local corporation 
would prompt the firm to reincorporate in another state. 257 A second, 
and more subtle, reason is that legislators may have feared that in the event 
that local corporations stayed put and were in fact acquired , the acquirer 
would move the company to another state. 258 
In sum, the dramatic success of antitakeover legislation has made clear 
that charter competition does not always prevent states from adopting inef-
fici ent corporate laws. In the antitak:eover context, the market-impairing 
nature of the provisions and the end-game environment in which they 
emerged provide possible explanations of why market restraints broke 
down. 
b. Self-dealing that fails to trigger market correction.-A second 
concern with state lawmaking stems from the perceived imprecision of the 
market discipline that encourages states to enact efficient laws. In this 
view, while the markets for capital, products, labor, and corporate control 
have a constraining influence, these forces are only effective if the provi-
sion in question has a significant adverse effect on the value of a corpo-
ration's stock. 259 Unhappily, in this view, many kinds of serious misbe-
havior by managers and controlling shareholders do not have a readily 
255. See Romano , supra note 249, at 858-59. If the antitakeover law is particularly draconian, 
the firm may suffer even more immediate consequences . See Leslie Wayne, Many Companies in 
Pennsylvania Reject State 's Takeover Protection, N .Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at AI (noting that such 
consequences include the mass sell-off of stock by major stockholders, a falling stock price, and a 
tarnished reputation). 
256. Stated differently, if the probability that a manager's firm will be taken over and the manager 
disp laced exceeds the probability that the firm's incorporation in a state that insulates managers from 
takeover will so impair the firm's performance as to lead to the manager's ouster, managers are likely 
to lobby for anti takeover legislation. This will be true despite the adverse effect anti takeover legislation 
has on the firm's value. 
257. See Carney, supra note 195 , at 53-55. The consequences of Virginia's enactment of the first 
antitakeover statute support this analysis , as several corporations reincorporated in Virginia to take 
advantage of the new law . Romano, supra note 196, at 246. 
258. See Carney, supra note 195, at 53 (noting that Georgia's statute was passed out of concern 
that a major bank would be acquired by an out-of-state suitor and concluding that legislators might pass 
such laws in response to promise of future political support). 
259. Bebchuk, supra note 210, at 1461. 
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measurable impact on stock value and, thus, may not be restrained by the 
market. 2(:() 
Consider a simple example. If a manager of a corporation with net 
assets of $250,000,000 diverts $100,000 to herself through a self-dealing 
transaction, she benefits greatly at the expense of the firm; from the firm's 
perspective, on the other hand, the diversion may be far too small to have 
any real impact on the value of its stock.261 As a result, managers will 
seek laws that leave room for diversions of tl-Jis sort-lax laws in areas 
such as managerial self-dealing, usurpation of corporate opportunities, and 
freeze-out transactions by controlling shareholders262-and market fo rces 
will fail to constrain state lawmakers from satisfying managers ' value-
decreas ing wishes. 
While market discipline will inevitably be imprecise, for at least two 
reasons state lawmaking may be appreciably less suspect in the sel f-deai ing 
context than in the antitakeover context. First, the suggestion that a 
manager's diversion of $100,000 has too trivial an impact on stock value 
to trigger market correction ignores the potentially significant indirect costs 
of such a diversion: Managers who divert corporate assets may also be 
paying more attention to covering their own footsteps than to the firm's 
fortunes. 263 As a result, the market is likely to react unfavorably to self-
dealing even though the actual amounts diverted are insignificant. 
Second, it is far less obvious (as a descriptive matter) in the self-
dealing context than with antitakeover legislation that existing state law is 
inappropriately lax. Delaware, for instance, has authorized corporations 
to all but eliminate the managers' duty of care, yet it refuses to provide the 
same flexibility in the duty-of-loyalty context. 264 Similarly, most states 
require that self-interested transactions be approved by a majority of direc-
tors or shareholders or be shown to have been fair. 265 State courts fre-
quently have required more. 266 
260. !d. at 1461-67. 
261. To better appreciate this point, suppose that the corporation has 5 million shares of stock, 
each of which sells for $50. (Assume for simplicity that stock value is exactly equal to the firm's net 
value.) The direct effect of the manager's defalcation would be to lower the value of each share of 
stock by $.02-an amount that seems far too low to trigger market discipline of any sort unless 
ownership of the corporation is highly concentrated. 
262. Bebchuk, supra note 210, at 1461-67. 
263. From a different perspective, if managerial misbehavior really did not impair the value of a 
firm to an appreciable extent, it is not clear how much reason shareholders have to be concerned about 
it. 
264. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991) (excluding the duty of loyalty from a 
corporation's right to insulate directors from attack on breach of fiduciary duty grounds). 
265. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 8.61-.63 (1991). This model act has been 
adopted in substance in more than 35 states and followed substantially in still others. introduction to 
id. at xvii. 
266 . See, e.g., Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F . Supp . 44, 67 (D.N.J. 1974) (suggesting that 
interested director transactions will be upheld only if approved by directors and shareholders and if the 
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c. The existence of externalities in state lawmaking. -State 
lawmaking is suspect, and much more obviously so, in still another res-
pect: Charter competition can be fully effective, and states will enact fully 
efficient laws, only if state lawmakers take into account all of the costs of 
the provisions they enact. Because the costs of state lawmaking fall else-
where in several contexts, the state legislative process appears to be subject 
to s ignificant externalities. 
Externality effects, like market impairment, often are seen as an 
explanation of state enactment of antitakeover statutes. In Lf-Jis vi ew, the 
managers of a corporation are a concentrated group th at frequently reside 
in the state of incorporation, whereas shareholders are scattered throughout 
the country. 267 Thus, in enacting an antitakeover statute, state lawmakers 
favor local managers at the expense of out-of-state interests. 26 g 
A second area in which a state law might not fully reflect its costs is 
corporate disclosure requirements. 269 States may employ disclosure rules 
that impose higher costs on the issuance of debt and equity securities by 
large out-of-state companies to protect smaller in-state interests .270 
transaction is fair). Delaware's position on this issue is less clear, but also appears to require more 
than the apparent statutory minimum. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987) 
(recognizing that the statutory test is not exclusive and holding that the continued viability of the 
intrinsic fairness test is "mandated . . . where shareholder deadlock prevents ratification [and] also 
where shareholder control by interested directors precludes" the independent review called for by 
statute); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 , 221-22 (Del. 1976) (holding that the statutory va lidation 
of interested director transactions is not exclusive and applying a two-tiered analysis: application of the 
statutory test coupled with an intrinsic fairness test) . 
267. For a brief account of the view that concentrated groups have a competitive advantage over 
diffuse ones in the legislative process, see supra note 169. The description in the text does not fit all 
sta tes, of course. The managers of a Delaware corporation may not be much more likely to res id e 
within th e state than the corporation ' s shareholders. The differences between Delaware and other states 
in this and related respects is consistent with Delaware's tardiness in passing an anti takeover provision 
and with the watered-down nature of the provision that finally was passed. See Romano, supra note 
249, at 855-56 (attributing Delaware's weak antitakeover law to a large and diverse corporate 
constituency that ensured no si ngle firm's management had the clout to get a stronger law passed). 
268 . Romano, supra note 249 , at 855. As noted earlier, corporations located in states with 
restrictive antitakeover laws will be penalized by the market, but managers appea r to have deemed the 
benefits of protection against takeovers to have been worth the cost. See supra note 256 . 
One concentrated group that often does reside within a given state is potential acquirers. 
Acquirers have less incentive to oppose antitakeover legislation than managers have to support it , 
however, because acquirers can always bid for companies in other states- that is, the state in question 
is only one of fifty possible locations for potential takeover targets . Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics , 
in THE DEAL DECADE 321, 333 (Marga ret M. Blair ed., 1993). Moreover, managers often have 
nonmonetary reasons to stymie takeover attempts. For them , control of the corporation may be th e 
cu lmination of a long career. See i£1. at 350 (noting that managers resist takeovers because of thei r 
des ire for authority , power, and prestige). 
269 . Reca ll that I previously discussed a third externality, the federa l subsidizat ion of corporate 
bankruptcy. See supra section TV(A)(2) . 
270. See, e.g .. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. 
L. REV. 347 , 367-70 (1991) (noting that farmers and small businessmen supported stringent state 
securities regulation 2s a means of undermining out-of-state competition for capital and thereby 
enhancing their access to credit). 
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Another externality in state disclosure regulation stems from the likelihood 
that in the absence of legally mandated disclosure, corporations would inef-
ficiently limit the information they disclose to prevent competitors from 
having access to this information. 271 Mandated disclosure regulates the 
level of information that every corporation must provide and thus can el im-
inate the underdisclosure problem. While states in theory could provide 
appropriate mandatory rules , their incentive to protect local interests and 
their ability to export the costs of inefficient laws make state lawmaking 
suspect. These externalities in state regulation of disclosure are one 
justification for Congress's significant regulatory role under the securit ies 
acts. They also raise questions about the legislating that state lawmakers 
continue to do. 272 
In each of the areas di scussed above-management entrenchment, self-
deal ing, and externalities-the products of state lawmaking raise doubts as 
to the desirability of increased state lawmaking . 
C. The Implications of Charter Competition Inefficiency for State 
Regulation of Corporate Bankruptcy 
As the discussion above has shown, state charter competition breaks 
down in several areas and thus undermines state regulation of general cor-
poration law in sometimes significant ways. An obvious question is raised 
by these flaws in state lawmaking: What implications do these shortcom-
ings have for state regulation of corporate bankruptcy? 
In this subpart, I begin by briefly considering how each of the ineffi-
ciencies discussed above might also be manifested in the bankruptcy con-
text. In the sections that follow, I examine these inefficiencies in more 
detail and ask, with respect to each, whether federal control would be 
appropriate. My analysis suggests that the "dark side" of state regulation 
of corporate bankruptcy is likely to be much less threatening than might at 
first appear to be the case and that Congress could retain control of those 
areas where state lawmaking genuinely is suspect. After discussing the 
areas that could be candidates for congressional regulation, I briefly 
consider the possibility of eve-of-bankruptcy forum shopping and how this 
might be prevented. 
271. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 205, at 291. Corporations may suffer from a 
collective action problem in this context: Each might agree to disclose if other firms were required to 
be equally forthcoming, but none will do so in the absence of a similar commitment by other firm s. 
See generally Thomas C. Schelling , Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, a/Ul Daylight Sa ving: A 
Swdy of Binary Choices v,irh Externalities, 17 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 381 (1973) (discussing prisoners ' 
dilemmas in the context of multiperson decisions involving externalities). 
272 . See Macey & Miller , supra note 270, at 395-97 (recounting the effects of local paternalism 
on state Blue Sky Laws) . As discussed earlier, another context where externalities may come into play 
involves state treatment of nonconsensual creditor's. See supra note 211. 
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To appreciate how each of the issues discussed above would play out 
in the bankruptcy context, consider first the potential for inefficient, 
management-entrenching legislation by assessing the similarities between 
bankruptcy and antitakeover protection. Like an antitakeover device, 
bankruptcy can impair the market's ability to discipline managers because 
it may substitute reorganization procedures for market mechanisms that 
would otherwise lead to the ouster of managers outside of bankruptcy.273 
To be sure, bankruptcy is hardly a bonanza for managers because most 
managers are d isplaced before the firm finally emerges from bankrupt-
cy.274 But several aspects of the bankruptcy process may enable a firm's 
managers to forestall a change in control. 275 Given the states' desire to 
attract charters and the political influence of the managers in many states, 
we might expect states to give managers far more control than they current-
ly have in bankruptcy-at the expense of the firm's residual owners. Thus, 
for example, the market-impairment thesis might predict that states would 
give a firm's managers the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan 
for an unlimited duration . 276 
Just as various aspects of bankruptcy may act in a market-impairing 
fashion, the second area of concern-self-dealing that fails to trigger 
market correction-is as relevant in bankruptcy as it is before a petition is 
filed. In the bankruptcy context, managerial self-dealing most frequently 
manifests itself in the preferential transfers insiders make to themselves 
shortly before bankruptcy is filed. 277 Whatever doubts there may be con-
cerning state treatment of self-dealing transactions outside of bankruptcy 
would be equally applicable to state regulation of preferences. 
State lawmaking in bankruptcy would also be subject to externalities 
comparable to those that affect general corporation Jaw. The transfer of 
273. The "soft landing" Chapter II offers managers may have positive benefits, including 
managerial incentive to resort to Chapter ll at an appropriate time. ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. 
SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 887 (2d ed. 1991). However, its 
rules are problematic if their primary effect is to insulate managers from market discipline. 
274. Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in 
Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 356 (1990); LoPucki 
& Whitford, supra note 160, at 723-27. 
275. Several obvious limitations on changes in control in bankruptcy are Bankruptcy Code§ 1107, 
which contemplates that a debtor's existing managers will continue to run the firm in bankruptcy, 11 
U .S .C. § 1107 (1988); Bankruptcy Code§ 1121, which gives the debtor-in-possession the exclusive 
right to propose a reorganization plan for at least 120 days, id. § 112l(b); and the uncertainties 
surrounding voting rights. See supra notes 153"60 and accompanying text. 
276. Unlimited exclusivity would imp ose a cost on the states because of its tendency to extend the 
duration of a bankruptcy case (thus requiring additional judicial and staff time), but the market-
impairment thesis might predict that these costs would only temper-without eliminating-states' 
incentives to give managers control over the reorganization process. 
277. Concerns about self-dealing might also be relevant to fraudulent conveyances, although the 
frequent absence of uncertainty as to whether a fraudulent conveyance is in fact malignant makes a 
failure by states to regulate them effectively less likely . 
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bankruptcy authority to the states would eliminate the bankruptcy external-
ity that exists under current law. 278 But other externalities would prove 
equally problematic in the bankruptcy context. The disproportionate effects 
of state disclosure rules on out-of-state interests, for instance, raise the 
same concerns about bankruptcy disclosure that they raise outside of bank-
ruptcy. 279 
I. Federal Lawmaking: Its Virtues and Vices.-Before addressing the 
specific concerns about state lawmaking, it is useful to consider the nature 
of federal lawmaking in the corporate law context in more detail than we 
have done thus far. The most obvious characteristic of federal lawmaking 
is that a federal provision applies to every corporation, regardless of where 
the corporation is chartered or where it does business. One virtue of uni-
versal application is that Congress is not subject to the externality effects 
that undermine state lawmaking in some contexts. 28° Federal law's uni-
versality also ensures that a mandatory rule-in the event that such a rule 
is in order-will in fact prove to be mandatory. Because every corporation 
is subject to a federal provision, firms cannot evade the rule by moving to 
a state that has adopted a different one. 281 
On the other hand, as discussed earlier, Congress tends to be less 
responsive to changes in the corporate milieu and slower to refine the 
corporate laws it enacts-both because of its limitations as an institution 
and the absence of competitive pressures of the sort that charter competi-
tion gives the states. 282 Federal lawmakers also face many of the same 
interest-group pressures that help to explain states' enactments of inefficient 
laws in those contexts where charter competition appears to break down. 
As in the states, managers are sufficiently concentrated that they may out-
compete other constituencies-most of which are likely to be more 
dispersed-in the legislative domain. 283 
The hope that Congress may adopt better laws, at least in a few con-
texts, rests on two (partially) distinguishing factors. First, in those areas 
where state lawmaking is suspect, charter competition gives states a par-
ticularly strong incentive to succumb to interest-group pressures and to 
278. See supra section IV(A)(2). 
279. While externality effects might also appear to increase the likelihood that states would enact 
management-entrenching rules, as they did in the antitakeover context outside of bank1uptcy, the 
externality effects arguably are less problematic in bankruptcy, as I discuss in section IV(C)(4). 
280. q Frank H . Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON . 23, 
45-46 (1983) (arguing for state authority over antitrust law to promote state competition, except where 
state regulation has out-of-state taxing effects). 
281. See Bebchuk, supra note 210, at 1496-99 (suggesting that federal law is an appropriate 
method for ensuring that certain corporate laws are mandated regardless of the state of incorporation). 
282. See supra text accompanying notes 193-209. 
283. Romano , supra note 249, at 860. 
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enact wealth-decreasing laws. In other words, the very forces that make 
state law appreciably better than federal law in most contexts may make it 
worse if the competition breaks down. 284 
Second, managers' advantage as lobbyists may be marginally less pro-
nounced at the federal level than at the state level. The notion here is that 
relatively dispersed groups such as shareholders and affected third parties 
(including potential acquirers) can wield more influence if they can focus 
their efforts on a single forum. 285 
Each of these distinctions is at most a difference in degree more than 
in kind. But in contexts where state lawmaking is particularly suspect, or 
where the attributes of federal law are desirable, the differences may be 
sufficiently important to justify a recommendation that Congress retain 
control. 
2. Manager (and Shareholder) Entrenching Rules.-States arguably 
have an incentive to enact value-decreasing corporation laws-in particular, 
laws that favor managers at the expense of shareholders-if the provision 
itself tends to neutralize market discipline. Bankruptcy rules that could 
entrench managers, like antitakeover devices, are suspect on these grounds. 
As noted earlier, the exclusive right of managers to propose a reorgan-
ization plan is an obvious example of this. 286 As with an antitakeover 
statute, long-term exclusivity appears to benefit managers at the expense 
of the firm as a whole. Despite the significant similarities, one distinction 
between the agency-cost problems reflected in the antitakeover context and 
those implicated by managers' exclusive right to propose a reorganization 
plan should be mentioned. While shareholders are the losers if a state 
enacts an antitakeover statute, the most obvious victims (at least in the 
short run) in the exclusivity context are creditors. Creditors suffer due to 
284. In discussing the analogous possibility that federal officials might act with insufficient 
information, Bebchuk remarks: "[W]e may well be better off with officials who would shoot relatively 
inaccurately at the right target than with officials who would shoot with somewhat greater accuracy but 
at another, wrong target." Bebchuk, supra note 210, at 1502. 
285. See Romano, supra note 193, at 138-39 (discussing the way in which one political group can 
force legislation through once they concentrate their efforts on that goal). The antitakeover experience 
can be seen as evidence that Congress is less susceptible to interest-group pressures in certain contexts. 
In contrast to the states, Congress considered, but never actually enacted, antitakeover legislation of 
the sort passed by most states. While Romano points out that the same pressures that induced state 
lawmakers to pass such laws at the expense of corporate shareholders also drove federal lawmakers' 
deliberations, and that the provisions under discussion often were particularly stringent, the fact remains 
that none of the provisions ever became law. See Romano, supra note 249, at 860-61. The only 
actions Congress did in fact take were minor and peripheral, such as its amendment of § 163 of the 
Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S .C. § 163 (1988) (providing for the disallowance of the interest 
deduction for particularly risky debt). This suggests that the prospects for opportunistic lawmaking 
may be muted at the federal level, at least in some contexts. 
286. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text. 
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the value-decreasing effect of long-term exclusivity. Shareholders, on the 
other hand, may benefit, both because existing managers continue to identi-
fy with shareholders' interests in some cases287 and because shareholders 
can use the threat of a lengthy case to extract concessions from other 
constituencies. 288 
Do these kinds of agency costs necessitate federal intervention? The 
most obvious argument for federal regulation in this context is one we have 
already seen: Because charter competition prods states to maximize share-
holder value, states have a systematic incentive to provide bankruptcy rules 
that (like long-term exclusivity) divert value from creditors to shareholders. 
The problem with this reasoning is that creditors will charge more for 
credit if the state's bankruptcy rules impair their interests. Because both 
shareholders and managers will be worse off if states enact bankruptcy laws 
that inefficiently divert wealth from creditors to shareholders in bank-
ruptcy, states have a disincentive to do so?89 
Of course, market discipline may break down. Just as managers per-
suaded states to enact antitakeover statutes in response to the takeover 
boom, managers might persuade state lawmakers to enact value-decreasing 
bankruptcy rules if an end-game dynamic of comparable proportions arose 
in the bankruptcy context. If an extraordinary crisis forced an unusual 
number of corporations (or even a single prominent corporation) into 
bankruptcy, state lawmakers might opportunistically amend their bank-
ruptcy regime to help local corporations.2~ 
On the other hand, the externality effects that may have contributed 
to the willingness of state lawmakers to enact antitakeover legislation may 
be appreciably less pronounced in the bankruptcy context. In contrast to 
28 7. Existing managers do not always favor shareholders. On the contrary, LoPucki and Whitford 
conclude in their empirical study of Chapter II that existing managers varied in the extent to which 
they favored shareholders (as opposed to creditors, or maximization of the estate generally). LoPucki 
& Whitford, supra note 160, at 742-47. 
288. See Skeel, supra note 126, at 485-86 (noting that shareholders have an incentive to prolong 
the proceeding because they would be least likely to receive anything upon immediate liquidation); see 
also Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy 
Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. !55, 158-59 (1989) (arguing that equity interests 
and general creditors prefer that the business be continued due to their poor prospects in the event of 
a liquidation). 
289. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text. Simply put, the capital (and product) 
markets will constrain state lawmaking in this context, much as they do in general corporation law. 
290. Several states' enactment of stay laws in response to the economic crises of the nineteenth 
century arguably can be seen as an example of state lawmakers' protection of in-state residents. 
WARREN, supra note 21, at 51, 87-90, 146-53. Yet it is important to keep in mind that the stay laws 
were designed primarily to protect individual debtors, rather than corporations, and that it was not 
entirely clear whether the laws were in fact value-decreasing as a whole. See id. at 146-53 (suggesting 
that the laws, many of which were eventually struck down by the Supreme Court, slowed the effects 
of economic crisis). 
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the shareholders that have been victimized by antitakeover law, the credi-
tors who would bear much of the cost of management-entrenching bank-
ruptcy rules seem more likely to reside within the forum state.Z91 In 
consequence, managers might have more difficulty persuading a state to 
adopt management-entrenching bankruptcy provisions. But the specter of 
opportunistic amendment by the states is a real one and suggests , at the 
least, that federal control merits consideration. 
The inflexibility of federal rules would be both an advantage and a 
disadvantage of Congress's retaining control of provisions susceptible to 
opportunistic amendment. Federal control is attractive because Congress 
is less likely to alter the provisions under pressure from managers and 
shareholders in the face of a perceived crisis. On the other hand, con-
gressional inertia also means that an inappropriate federal rule is more 
li kely to endure than ill-advised state legislation.292 
Ideally, Congress might resolve this tension by permitting the states 
to regulate issues such as exclusivity, but imposing a federal safeguard such 
as a requirement that shareholders opt in to any change in the background 
rule. 293 Unfortunately, while a shareholder opt-in requirement might 
solve the opportunistic amendment problem for most corporate issues, such 
an approach offers less promise in the bankruptcy context because share-
holders' incentives are perverse in insolvency. Because value-decreasing 
291 . Further, creditors such as banks tend to be less dispersed than shareholders and have been 
particularly effective as lobbyists at both the national and the state level. See Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 417 (1990) (arguing that creditors got what 
they wanted under the current Bankruptcy Code). 
To the historically minded , these observations might at first seem counterintuitive. In the 
nineteenth century, state lawmaking often appeared to reflect local concerns. See, e.g., WARREN , 
supra note 21, at 32-33 (discussing Virginia's extremely loose bankruptcy laws, which were designed 
to protect Virginia's freehold system). Northeastern states, which were already the nation's primar; 
money center, tended to have a pro-c redi tor bias , whereas the laws of the Southern states protected 
land-holding debtors (for example, with generous exemption laws). /d. at 33-37. One might argue that 
these kinds of regional differences, which were consistently reflected in the states' positions on nationa l 
bankruptcy legislation , would continue to shape state lawmaking if the states were given control over 
corporate bankruptcy. See WARREN , supra note 21, at 30-33 (noting that Southern lawmakers opposed 
national bankruptcy legislation , fearing it would jeopardize farmers' homestead exemptions). For 
example, agricultural or industrial states might favor debtors at the expense of out-of-state, money-
center creditors. The development of robust interstate markets, however, has diminished the likelihood 
of significant parochialism, and even states without significant money centers are likely to have a potent 
creditor lobby. 
292. Black, supra note 206, at 581. 
293. Black has made this argument in more general terms, suggesting that federal lawmaking 
should be limited to "change-governing" rules, such as a requirement that any charter amendment or 
other major corporate action be approved by a majority of the firm's shareholders. /d. at 581-83. An 
opt-in requirement is not a foolproof solution to opportunism, however, even under the best of 
circumstances because of the collective action problems that often prevent shareholders from wielding 
thei r vote effectively. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem 
of S!zare!zofder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV . I, 43-44 (1988). 
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bankruptcy rules may benefit them ex post, shareholders may favor an op-
portunistic amendment that is undesirable for the firm as a whole. 294 An 
alternative approach would be to condition amendment on creditor approv-
al, but creditor voting is also problematic outside of bankruptcy. 295 
Nonetheless, a creditor opt-in requirement is more promising L'lan a provi-
sion that gives decisionmaking authority to shareholders. 2% 
In sum, the most obvious means of eliminating the possibility of 
opportunistic amendment would be either to impose substantive federal 
standards in this context or to require creditor approval of any change in 
a bankruptcy rule that, like the exclusivity period , could increase entrench-
ment. Given the uncertainty whether states would in fact succumb to 
manager and shareholder pressures on exclusivity and related issues, how-
ever, and given the shortcomings of federal lawmaking, it is questionable 
whether federal regulation would be desirabl e, at least until problems 
actually do arise. 
3. Failure to Trigger Market Correction: Preferences.-The second 
concern with state regulation of bankruptcy is that managers might oppor-
tunistically demand legislation that allows self-dealing in areas that do not 
trigger market correction. The most obvious context where such manager 
opportunism might occur involves preferential transfers. Because managers 
benefit from lenient preference rules and because the market effect of a 
preferential transfer may at times be relatively small/97 managers could 
seek and states provide increasingly lax preference laws. 
294. Shareholders ' incentives will depend in large part up on the financial health of the corporation. 
If the corporation is fully solvent, shareholders are less likely to prefer a bankruptcy regime that would 
divert wealth to them from creditors because a firm subject to inefficient rules of this sort would be 
penalized by the market. See Lin, supra note 99, at 1503 ("If a company has the reputation of 
engaging in opportunistic behavior at its creditors' expense, new investors either will refuse to do 
business ... or will adjust the terms of their loans to reflect the perceived increase in default ri sk."). 
Market constraints will be decreasingly effective, however, as the financial health of the tirm 
deteriorates. See id . at 1489-91 (noting that stockholders have little to lose when a firm enters financia l 
distress and, consequently, will be willing to undertake riskier proj ects). 
295. Unless the corporation is deeply insolvent, creditors will be inefficiently ri sk averse in their 
decisionmaking. See Lin, supra note99, at 1489-93. Further, outside of bankruptcy, creditors would 
suffer from the same kinds of collective action problems that impair shareholder voting . See Gordon, 
supra note 293, at 39-55 (discussing the collective-action prob lems associated with shareholder voting, 
including voter apathy and lack of sufficient incentive to organize opposition to particular proposals). 
296. The collective-action problem, for instance, could be at least partially addressed by the 
appointment of a committee to represent creditors' interests . 
297. This assertion will hold true in the publicly held corporation context. In closely held 
corporations, managers' preferences seem more likely to involve a significant portion of the firm's 
assets. In this context, any market failure that occurs has less to do with the size of the transfer than 
with other factors, such as managers' perverse end-game incentives and the possibility that collective 
action and information problems will prevent creditors from challenging preferential transfers . See 
supra note 88 and accompanying text. Notice that the problem here is more an enforcement problem 
than a problem with the preference law itself (and that it exists under current federal law). 
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The problem with this analysis is that it is not at all clear that state 
lawmaking truly is suspect in the preference context. As discussed earlier, 
if a preference law did in fact excessively favor managers, the law almost 
certainly would have sufficient indirect costs to trigger market correc-
tion. 298 Moreover, none of the other concerns about state lawmaking 
appear to apply to preference regulation. The end-gaine dynamic that pres-
sured states to enact anti takeover statutes is unlikely to have the same effect 
in the preference context, even in the face of a crisis. Nor could states 
export the costs of a value-decreasing approach to preferences because (as 
with the manager-entrenching rules discussed in the preceding section) the 
creditors who are likely to be most affected will often reside in the 
state. 299 
In short, the case for federal control is even more debatable in the 
preference context than it is with respect to management-entrenching de-
vices such as long-term exclusivity. 
4. Disclosure and Other Injonnation-Forcing Rules.-Because the dis-
closure rules in bankruptcy may have disproportionate effects on out-of-
state interests, states arguably might ignore these externalities and thus 
enact inefficient regulations. Indeed, it was the perception that state 
regulation of general corporate disclosure law was ineffective that led 
Congress to federalize much of this area with the Securities Acts of 1933 
and 1934.300 I have already considered how the potential spillover effect 
of state disclosure regulation helps to justify the use of mandatory federal 
rules. 301 To appreciate the applicability in the bankruptcy context of this 
and each of the other standard justifications for federalization of disclosure, 
I begin by looking at the effects of mandatory disclosure in more detail. 
Consider first the effect of mandatory disclosure of financial informa-
tion on investment analysts' search efforts. In the absence of disclosure, 
298. See supra text accompanying note 263. 
299. To the extent a case for federal regulation of preferences can be made, it probably rests not 
on a perceived failure to trigger market correction, but on a contention that preference problems are 
most severe in the context of closely held corporations, see supra note 297, and that states tend to 
neglect closely held corporation issues. Black, supra note 206, at 582 (commenting that the best, 
though uncertain, case for substantive federal rules is in closely held corporations). The suggestion that 
states focus only on publicly held corporations is debatable, however, as evidenced by Delaware's early 
adoption of a special set of provisions designed specifically for closely held corporations. Act of July 
3, 1967, ch. 50, 56 Del. Laws 242 (1967) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN . tit. 8, §§ 341-356 
(1991)). Moreover, even if a state did consider only publicly held corporations, preferences are a 
significant enough issue in that context that they almost certainly would attract the attention of 
lawmakers. 
300. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C . §§ 77 
a-bbbb (!988)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 
U .S.C. §§ 78 a-kk (1988)). 
30 I . See supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text. 
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much of the investigation done by a securities analyst would be duplicative, 
because other analysts must cover precisely the same ground in their effort 
to assess the prospects of a particular corporation.302 To be sure, the 
corporation itself might help to alleviate this problem through voluntary 
disclosure because firms have an incentive to prov ide information-and 
t.~us, to obviate the need for duplicative searches-in order to keep the 
market apprised of their status. 303 Yet, if firms were left to their own 
devices , many would underdisclose or distort disclosure in various con-
texts. In the face of a hostile takeover, for instance, managers might 
attempt to exaggerate the value of a corporation; if managers wished to 
effectuate a management buyout, on the other hand, they would distort 
their disclosure in the opposite direction.}('4 1l1e existence of perverse 
incentives of this sort suggests that mandatory disclosure rules are nec-
essary to ensure both that a corporation provides an adequate amount of 
disclosure and that the information provided is accurate. 
These same perverse incentives are present when a bankrupt corpo-
ration is reorganizing under Chapter 11.305 Managers have a tremendous 
incentive to distort information as they attempt to achieve consensus on a 
reorganization plan because they must convince each creditor class that the 
liquidation value of the corporation's assets is less than the value as a going 
concern. 306 Because it is unlikely that an effective market for corporate 
control will exist to keep management in check, the case for mandatory dis-
closure rules is, if anything, even stronger in the bankruptcy context.307 
The analysis thus far helps to explain mandatory disclosure but does 
not explain the need for federal involvement. In theory, the states them-
302. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case f or a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA . L. REV. 717 , 723-33 (1984) (arguing that without the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
there would be less market research because the cost of research would be higher). 
303. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 205 , at 288. 
304. Coffee , supra note 302, at 740-43. 
305. Notice that a reorganization plan proposed by the firm's managers is similar to a management 
buyout- a context where managers' disclosure incentives obviously are suspect. /d. The primary 
differences between reorganization and a management buyout are that managers' ownership interest 
tends to be far smaller after a confirmation of a reorganization plan and that managers frequently do 
not contribute new value to a bankruptcy reorganization. 
306. See II U.S.C. § 1129 (1988) (mandating that each creditor class approve the reorganization 
plan). 
307. Under current bankruptcy law , a corporation that files for Chapter II relief is subject to a 
series of bankruptcy-imposed disclosure requirements. See, e. g., id. § 521 (requiring a debtor to file 
a schedule of assets and liabilities); id. § 704(8) (requiring periodic di sclosure in Chapter 7 cases); id. 
§ 1125 (requiring a plan proponent to file a disclosure statement in connection with a reorganization 
plan). A corporation may also be required to continue making disclosure under the federal securities 
Jaws , unless the SEC agrees to permit the corporation's bankruptcy filings to satisfy its secarities Jaw 
responsibilities . See, e.g., Angeles Corp ., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 282758 (S .E.C.), FSEC-
NAL Database (July 23, 1993); Zale Corp ., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 227960 (S.E.C.), FSEC-
NAL Database (Sept. II, 1992) (both allowing the substitution of bankruptcy reports for ft!ings 
required under the Securities Act of 1934). 
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selves could establish appropriate disclosure requirements . But the same 
externality concerns that make state regulation of disclosure suspect outside 
of bankruptcy are equally applicable in the bankruptcy context. 308 As 
d iscussed above, states might use their disclosure requirements to impose 
costs on out-of-state firms and fail to account for the benefits to investors 
in similarly situated (and therefore competing) corporations .309 The uni-
versality of federal disclosure requirements elim inates each of these 
probl ems. 
The case for federal regulation of disclosure in bankruptcy may also 
apply in other contexts involving the production of information , such as the 
process of filing a claim in bankruptcy. The current regime provides both 
a standard format for claimants to use in filing their cl aim and a framework 
for determining the val idity and amount of the cl aim .310 Because states 
could use the claims process to impose costs on out-of-state cl aimants , 
feder al regulation may also be in order in this context.3Il 
In addition to ensuring adequate prov ision of informatio n and 
eliminating the externalities that undermine state lawmaking , standardizing 
disclosure and the format for filing a claim also could minimize analysts' 
and claimants' investigation costs. From this perspective , standardized 
requirements can be seen as a collective good that reduces the costs of 
participating in bankmptcy cases in different states. 312 
5. Forum Shopping.-As the discussion thus far indicates, the need 
fo r federal involvement in a state bankruptcy regime appears to be quite 
limited . Congress clearly should regulate bankruptcy's disclosure require-
ments. The case for federal control is more questionable in other areas, 
such as exclusivity and other management-entrenching rul es, and is even 
more problematic with respect to preferenti al transfers. 
In addition to these concerns with state lawmaking, we must also con-
s ider a final concern: the possibility that , even if state regulation were 
otherwise unproblematic, corporations might evade state lawmaking 
308 . Cj. EASTERBROO K & FISCHEL, supra note 205 , at 300, 300-02 (" Competition among th e 
sta tes cannot produce all benefits [of disclosure] because of the interstate nature of some of these 
effects ; if being a holdou t is in the interest of some firms, it should pay states to be havens to the 
holdouts ."). 
309. See supra notes 269-72 and accomp anying text. 
310 . See II U.S. C. app. form 19 (1988) (setting forth the standa rd proof of claim) ; id . § 502 
(requiri ng the court to determine the validity and amount of a claim after notice and a hea ring if the 
claim is objected to and allowing the claim in th e absence of an obj ecti on) . 
311. The argument here is an argument for possible fede ral regulation of the framework for filing 
and determining the amount of a claim, not for the substa ntive standards to be used by a state cou rt in 
making the ac tual assessment. 
3 12. Cj. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Jmeractions Be!:'Neen Erpress and Implied Contract Tem1s, 73 CAL. L. REV. 26 1, 286-88 (1985) 
(d iscussing the benefits of state-sponsored sta nda rdization in terms of contract formulation). 
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through forum shopping. 313 In the face of financial distress, the manag-
ers of some firms might reincorporate in another state to take advantage of 
the state's more manager-friendly bankruptcy laws, just as a few 
corporations did in the antitakeover context.314 But managers cannot 
simply reincorporate at will. Not only is reincorporation costly, but the 
managers ordinarily must obtain shareholder approval of any proposal to 
move the firm . Yet, as discussed earlier, shareholder approval may not 
prove to be an effective check, especially given that the new state's 
manager-friendly bankruptcy regime may also be more shareholder-
friendly. 315 
Perhaps the most effective way to curb forum shopping would be for 
Congress to neutralize the effects of reincorporations made immediately 
before bankruptcy. As part of a choice-of-law provis ion requiring state 
courts to apply the bankruptcy laws of a firm's state of incorporation,3 16 
for instance, Congress might mandate the application of the bankruptcy 
laws of a firm's former state of incorporation, rather than those of its new 
one, if the firm switches states within the two years prior to bankruptcy . 
To be sure, an anti-forum-shopping provision of this sort raises several 
concerns . First, the provision inevitably would have an overinclusive ef-
fect, invalidating at least a few appropriate jurisdictional changes in addi-
tion to those it was designed to counteract. Second, and somewhat similar-
ly, because charter competition is the mechanism that prods state law-
makers to adopt more efficient laws, any law that chills competition should 
be viewed with suspicion. Because a firm's unfettered ability to reincor-
porate if it so chooses is a key component of charter competition, a forum-
shopping prohibition would, at least in a limited way, have such an effect. 
Yet, despite these question marks, managers' incentives seem sufficiently 
313. The forum shopping I have in mind here is forum shopping with respect to choice of law. 
A similar concern is the possibility that corporations will engage in venue shopping. Fo r instance , a 
Delaware corporation that conducts significant business in Illinois might file its bankruptcy petition in 
Illinois in the hope of particularly sympathetic treatment by an Illinois bankruptcy judge. While venue 
shopping may be a concern in some cases, it is important to keep in mind that analogous venue 
shopping already occurs under the current federal system. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. 
Whitford , Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganizarion of Large, Publicly Held 
Companies , 1991 WIS. L. REV . II , 13 (noting that bankruptcy petitioners consciously choose the 
district where the case proceeds and that they sometimes choose a district where the tirm has virtually 
no physical presence). Moreover, venue shopping could even decrease if states regulated corporate 
bankruptcy, since the applicability of the bankruptcy law of the state of incorporation might make it 
more difficult to justify a corporation's tiling in a state with which it has only a tenuous connection than 
currently is true in Chapter II, where the same federal bankruptcy regime applies regardless of where 
the case is tiled. 
314 . See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
315. See supra notes 293-95 and accompanying text. 
316. See supra text accompanying note 223. 
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perverse on the eve of bankruptcy, given the end-game characteristics of 
their decisionmaking at that point, to warrant a limited antiforum-shopping 
rule. Thus, in addition to requiring disclosure, the analysis suggests that 
Congress should include an anti-forum-shopping component to ar1y choice-
of-law provision it enacts in order to minimize corporations' ability 
opportunistically to change jurisdictions on the eve of bankruptcy. 
V. Legal Impediments to State Regulation of Corporate Bankruptcy 
The discussion in the previous Part took place almost entirely at a 
normative level. I argued that many of the problems created by a system 
that artific ial ly separates general corporation law and corporate bankruptcy 
could be eliminated, and both corporate law and bankruptcy law improved, 
if authority over corporate bankn1ptcy were, with a few exceptions, shifted 
from Congress to the states. 
To this point, I have assumed that such a proposal could be imple-
mented under current law in the event it proved persuasive. In this Part, 
I relCL-x that assumption and focus explicitly on the question whether the 
states could in fact regulate corporate bankruptcy if Congress gave them 
authority to do so. I briefly consider several possible constitutional 
obstacles in the subparts that follow. 317 
A. Constitutional Limitations on State Impairment of Contracts 
Perhaps the most obvious obstacle to state regulation of corporate 
bankruptcy is a constitutional one. Article I, Section 10 expressly prohibits 
any state from enacting "a Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts. "318 The current federal bankruptcy laws, like any bankruptcy 
system, impair contracts in various respects, perhaps most obviously by 
imposing an automatic stay on creditors' efforts to collect their debf19 
and by discharging a debtor corporation on payment of less than the full 
amount owed. 320 Because federal lawmakers are not subject to its stric-
tures, the Contracts Clause does not itself prohibit Congress from enacting 
317. In addition to the constitutional questions I discuss below, the other obvious practical 
impediment to shifting authority to the states is the question of whet.'Jer such a proposa l could ever be 
passed. I briefly consider thi s last-and in some respects most important-barrier in the conclusion that 
foll ows this Part . 
318. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10. 
319. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). In the nineteenth century , efforts by the states to impose stays on 
existing debts were often (a lthough not always) struck down in the courts. WARREN, supra note 21, 
at 150-51. The Supreme Court invalidated the use of stays on impairment of contr8.cts grounds in 
1877. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S . 595, 60!-02 (1877). 
320. Under Bankruptcy Code§ 1141 (a), a reorganization plan is binding on all creditors and other 
interested parties, and under Bankruptcy Code§ 114l(d), confirmation of a plan discharges ali of a 
debtor's debts . See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141(a), (d) (1988). 
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provisions of this sort.m By contrast, the Contracts Clause appears on 
its face to preclude any significant state regulation of corporate bankruptcy. 
The Supreme Court has never construed the Contracts Clause to be 
nearly so broad as the language seems to suggest, however. In addressing 
state bankruptcy authority in the early case of Sturges v. Crownin-
shield,322 the Supreme Court held that while a state could not enforce its 
bankruptcy laws in such a way as to give them retrospective effect, the 
Contracts Clause does not prohibit a prospective state bankruptcy law. 323 
Even a prohibition against prospectively impairing contracts might appear 
to significantly undermine the states' ability to regulate corporate bank-
ru ptcy, at least if it precludes states from applying any provision that is 
amended after the contract in question was executed. Yet a state can easily 
avoid this problem. Just as states have long used "reservation of power" 
clauses to prevent shareholders from challenging the applicability of subse-
quent changes in corporate governance law on impairment of contracts 
grounds, 324 states could enact similar provisions (or expand their existing 
provisions) to protect subsequent changes to their bankruptcy provisions 
from Contracts Clause attacks by creditors whose contracts predated the 
changes. 
Thus, the only class of claimants who could object to a state bank-
ruptcy act on these grounds are creditors whose contracts predate passage 
of the original act. 325 Existing shareholders could not protest the legisla-
tion since their rights are already subject to modification under the 
reservation-of-power provisions described above. Future creditors also 
321. This is not to say that Congress has unlimited authority to impair contracts . Other 
constitutional requirements , such as the Fifth Amendment's due process requirement and prohibition 
of takings, reign in Congress to some extent. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Louisville Joint Stock Land 
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935) (holding the Frazier-Lemke Act unconstitutional on 
due process grounds because it scaled down the indebtedness of a mortgagor of farm property to 
present value). 
322. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
323. !d. at 207; see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 368-69 (1827) (holding 
that bankruptcy laws can be applied o nly prospectively). 
324. See , e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (1991). The Delaware provision states that "any 
amendment or repeal shall not take away or impair any remedy under this chapter against any 
corporation or its officers for any liability which shall have been previously incurred." ld. The 
widespread use of these clauses can be traced, at least in part, to their having received Justice Story ' s 
imprimatur in his concurring opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S . (4 
Wheat.) 518, 693-95 (1819). 
325. Even with respect to existi ng creditors, the prohibition against impairing contracts has not 
been viewed as absolute. The Supreme Court has suggested that the purpose of the Clause is to protect 
parties' reasonab le expectations , not to prevent every retrospective law. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding a Minnesota law granting debtors relief from 
mortgage foreclosures during the economic crisis of the Depression); Ronald D. Rotunda, The 
Jmpaim1enLs of Contracts Clause and the Corporation: A Comment on Professors Butler's and 
Ribstein's 17!esis, 55 BROOK . L. REV. 809, 824-29 (1989) (concluding that the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Contracts Clause as protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties). 
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could not protest, so long as the bankruptcy provisions were in pl ace at the 
time of the contract. 
In short, the limitations imposed by the Contracts Clause on state 
lawmaking would, at most, constitute a transition problem for the proposal 
to shift bankruptcy authority to the states. As soon as a co rporation had 
completed any contracts that predated enactment of a state bankruptcy act, 
the corporation would be fully subject to the provisions of the act. In the 
interim, a state could simply continue to apply Chapter 11 to corporations 
with contracts predating passage of the state's bankruptcy law. Alternat ive-
ly, states could take the position that, so long as the state legisl ation 
provided at least as much protection for creditors as the existing Bankrupt-
cy Code, state legislation should not be seen as impairing an ex isting cred-
itor 's contract. 326 In this view, a creditor whose contract already might 
be subject to impairment under federal bankruptcy law could not leg it i-
mately complain simply because the source of the provisions had changed . 
B. The Limitations on the Ability of the States to Assert Personal 
Jurisdiction over the Parties 
Inability to assert jurisdiction over out-of-state parties would have 
undermined a state corporate bankruptcy statute in the nineteenth century 
and may have played a role in Congress's eventual decision to include cor-
porations in the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.327 Because the Supreme Court 
has dramatically expanded states' jurisdictional reach in recent decades , 
personal jurisdiction requirements do not have so great a constraining effect 
as once was the case. Yet, even under the current view of personal juris-
diction, it is not difficult to imagine how, at least in some circumstances, 
personal jurisdiction over some potential claimants might appear to be m 
doubt. 
326. Such an argument would seem to accord with the Supreme Court's juri spntdence in this .'\rea 
and its suggestion that the Contracts Clause is primarily concerned with protecting parties' reasonabl e 
expectations. See supra note 325. 
327. See Ogden, 25 U.S . (12 Wheat.) at 368 (holding that "discharge under a state Jaw [i s] 
incompetent to discharge a debt due a citizen of another state") . States resolved personal jurisdiction 
and related problems under the equity receiverships that developed in the late nineteenth and ea rly 
twentieth centuries by treating the receivership as an in rem proceeding, see 8 SEC REPORT, supra note 
62, at 30, much as they do today with state receivership and assignment-for-the-benefit-of-credi:ors 
regimes. This option also would be available in the bankntptcy context, although it has two practical 
drawbacks. First, for those corporations with property in multiple jurisdictions , ancillary proceed ings 
would have to be set up in each of the states. /d.; Frank H. Buckley, The American Stay 68 , 72 (Feb. 
25, 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Texas Law Review). Second , thi s approach would 
require in many cases that the proceeding be conducted in the state where a corporation's prir.cipat 
place of business is located, rather than the state of its incorporation, thus sacrificing some of the 
virtues of charter competition. Although neither obstacle is prohibitive, a state regime that is not tied 
to the physical location of a firm's assets obviously would be simpler and more effective. 
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Consider, for instance, a Delaware corporation with its principal place 
of business in Illinois that entered into a contract in California with a Cali-
fornia supplier. If the corporation filed its bankruptcy petition in Dela·-
ware, and the California supplier had no contacts with Delaware other than 
having contracted with a Delaware corporation, the minimum contacts re-
quirement would appear not to have been met. 328 
Viewed from another angle, however, it is less obvious whether diffi-
culties of this sort would in fact limit the reach of a state court bankruptcy 
case. The reasoning goes as follows: The ability to assess and to provide 
for the potentiai scaling down of claims is a necessary component of any 
bankruptcy system. No claimant is required to participate in the claims 
process, but any claimant who wishes to receive a distribution must file a 
proof of claim. 329 Because a claimant who files a proof of claim has ef-
fectively submitted to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, personal 
jurisdiction issues like those posed by the California supplier would in 
practice take care of themselves. Claimants would have a choice whether 
to submit to the state court's jurisdiction or to forfeit their right to 
participate; either way, their interest, like that of every other party, would 
be resolved by the bankruptcy proceeding. 
The principal question evoked by this reasoning is whether it ade-
quately respects a creditor's due process right not to be haled into a forum 
with which it has few or no contacts.330 The claims process in a bank-
ruptcy case has the effect of deciding any cause of action on which a claim 
is based. 331 Yet, in the absence of bankruptcy, the Delaware court could 
328. Even under the broadest reading of the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction cases, a party 
cannot be called into court in a state unless the party has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of 
the forum in some way. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("[I]t is essential in each 
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State."). In one of its more recent personal jurisdiction 
decisions, the Court suggested that the reasonableness of a particular forum can be taken into ac<;ount 
in connection with the minimum contacts analysis. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 
476-77 (1985). Given the need to bring all interested parties within the bankruptcy forum , this 
approach would seem to argue for a particularly expansive view of personal jurisdiction. But the Court 
also stated that "[i]f the question is whether an individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone 
can automatically establish sufficient minimum contracts in the other party's home forum, we believe 
the answer clearly is that it cannot." /d. at 478 (emphasis in original). 
329. The current Bankruptcy Rules have such a requirement. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3021. The 
analysis assumes, of course, that the claimant has been given proper notice of the bankruptcy case and 
of the need to file a claim. See Brown v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Brown), 27 B.R. 
151, 153 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (holding ll'1at creditors must be given notice of the bankruptcy case 
in time to file a proof of claim). 
330. The question of personal jurisdiction is less significant in the event the corporation is 
liquidated rather than reorganized because, as a practical matter, a claimant who declines to file a claim 
has no assets to pursue once the bankrupt's assets have been sold and the proceeds distributed. 
331. See 11 U.S .C. § 502(c)(l) (1988) (authorizing the bankruptcy court to estimate " any 
contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of which ... would unduly delay the 
administration of the case"). 
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not have asserted personal jurisdiction over the California supplier and, 
thus, could not have decided the case. 332 The concern, then, is that 
giving claimants a choice to submit to jurisdiction or waive their claim has 
the effect of undermining the ordinary limitations on a court's ability to 
assert personal jurisdiction. 
Is there any other way a forum state could assert bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion over a claimant that has little contact with the forum state? The easiest 
solution-were it effective-would be for the state to enact a jurisdictional 
provision providing that a firm that entered into a contract with one of its 
corporations would be deemed to have consented to jurisdiction in the state 
of incorporation for bankruptcy purposes. Delaware has enacted an analo-
gous provision providing that acceptance of a directorial position with a 
Delaware corporation constitutes consent to jurisdiction in Delaware if the 
director is sued . 333 Because the relationship between a contract creditor 
and the corporation is much more attenuated than that of a director, how-
ever, a statutory consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction seems less likely to be 
upheld as a constitutional measure. 
Another possible approach would be to argue that because state courts 
would in effect be exercising Congress's Bankruptcy Clause powers if Con-
gress were to shift authority over corporate bankruptcy to the states, they 
should be deemed to have (or Congress could enact legislation giving them) 
the same jurisdictional reach as the federal bankruptcy courts currently 
have. Just as current Bankruptcy Rule 7004 enables bankruptcy courts to 
effect service of process anywhere in the country, 334 a similar provision 
might ensure that a state court could assert jurisdiction over every neces-
sary party. 335 The primary question with respect to this analysis is 
332. Notice that the jurisdictional problem presents an interesting twist in the bankruptcy context. 
The ordinary personal jurisdiction case raises the question whether a court can assert jurisdiction over 
an out-of-state defendant. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). In the 
bankruptcy context, on the other hand, the party in question is in a sense a picintiff, given that the 
jurisc:lictional question is whether a claimant can be compelled to pursue her case in the bankruptcy 
context. See, e.g., In re Brown, 27 B.R. at 151. Jurisdictional questions may also arise where the 
corporate debtor seeks to sue an out-of-state party in state court, but the corporation can simply pursue 
its cause of action in the foreign state if the state where the bankruptcy case was filed lacks jurisdiction. 
See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (finding that domicile coupled with personal service 
is adequate to establish personal jurisdiction). 
333. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(a) (Supp. 1992). Delaware previously had attempted to 
ensure jurisdiction over any internal issue relating to a corporation incorporated within the state by 
enacting a law which stated that Delaware was the locus of every share of stock in any Delaware 
corporation in an effort to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the location of the stock. /d. 
§ 366 (I 991). The Supreme Court held, however, that Delaware cannot exercise quasi in rem 
jurisdiction if the defendant lacks minimum contacts with the state. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186, 208-09 (1977). 
334. See FED. R . BANKR. P. 7004(d). 
335. For examples of cases upholding bankruptcy courts' use of Bankruptcy Rule 7004, even with 
respect to state-based causes of action, see Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F .2d 1233, 1243-44 
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whether it would be seen as an impermissible attempt by Congress to dele-
gate federal power. 336 
In sum, Supreme Court jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction has 
changed dramatically since the nineteenth-century bankruptcy debates. Yet 
uncertainties remain concerning both the Court's likely treatment of person-
al jurisdiction in the bankruptcy context and the efficacy of various possible 
solutions. The alternative is to treat bankruptcy as, in effect, an in rem 
proceeding and to set up ancillary proceedings in additional states if neces-
sary. The states currently employ a similar approach in regulating insur-
ance insolvencies, which suggests that none of the jurisdictional obstacles 
discussed above is insurmountable. 337 
C. The Limitations on the Ability of the States to Control Out-of-State 
Matters 
Other concerns with the plausibility of state regulation of corporate 
bankruptcy stem from limitations on a state court's authority over out-of-
state property and over litigation commenced in a foreign jurisdiction. As 
the following discussion demonstrates, neither of these obstacles is 
insurmountable. 
Because the state where real estate is located has exclusive subject 
matter jurisdiction over it, state courts cannot issue orders that operate 
directly on land in another state.338 Given that many corporations own 
real estate in more than one state, this limitation on a state court's juris-
diction could significantly undermine the effectiveness of a state law 
corporate bankruptcy regime. 339 
(7th Cir. 1 990) (holding that courts may apply Bankruptcy Rule 7004 in allowing nationwide service 
of process in "non-core, related proceedings"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1089 (1991); Teitelbaum v_ 
Choquette& Co. (ln re Outlet Dep't Stores, Inc.), 82 B.R. 694,696-97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(holding that the Supreme Court had the authority through Congress to promulgate Bankn1ptcy Rule 
7004). 
336. The jurisdiction issue also could be addressed by the corporation itself; in particular, a 
corporation could include jurisdictional consent provisions in its contracts_ Provisions of this sort have 
been routinely included in contracts. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CiVIL PROCEDURE§ 2.9, at 71 
(4th ed _ 1992) (noting that such forum stipulation clauses "are an increasingly common feature in 
contracts involving interstate and foreign commerce"). To be sure, the inclusion of a bankruptcy 
jurisdiction provision would not be a complete solution to the personal jurisdiction issue because the 
provision only applies to consensual creditor relationships governed by a written contract. But use of 
such provisions could reduce the likelihood that a state court's jurisdictional reach would he insufficient 
in a given bankruptcy case. 
337. For a discussion of the drawbacks of states' use of a similar approach in the receivership 
context, see supra note 327. These limitations reinforce the notion that the in rem approach is a 
second-best solution to potential jurisdiction problems. 
338. Fitch v. Huntington, 102 N.W. 1066 (Wis. 1905); EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24.10 (2d ed. 1992). 
339. The difficulty of adjudicating interests in out-of-state property was anot.~er potential problem 
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In practice, however, a state's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over 
property in another state is less problematic than initially appears to be the 
case. While a state court judgment could not operate directly on out-of-
state land, the Supreme Court has suggested that so long as the court has 
personal jurisdiction over the parties, it can effectively adjudicate the rights 
of the respective parties .34D Thus, a decision arbitrating the respective 
interests of a debtor and a secured creditor in out-of-state real estate might 
resolve the parties' respective entitlements, even if the judgment could not 
by itself be enforced against the land. 
To actually enforce the judgment, a party must obtain an appropriate 
decree in the jurisdiction where the land is located. So long as the judg-
ment was val idly obtained, this too should not be a problem because the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution requires a state to recog-
nize the judgments issued by a sister state. 341 Moreover, by invoking its 
authority to implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress could 
itself establish a simple registration process, much as it has done to facili-
tate the registration of federal court judgments in different districts. 342 
A second concern with the ability of the states to influence matters 
beyond their borders relates to litigation pending in other fora. In recog-
nition of the sovereignty of other states and the potential for unseemly 
interstate squabbles if each state attempted to protect its jurisdiction in 
connection with related cases initiated in different states, states are reluctant 
to interfere with out-of-state proceedings. 343 States have even less control 
that state equity receiverships solved by establishing ancillary proceedings in all of the states where a 
corporation's property was located. See supra note 327. As with personal jurisdiction. limitations on 
a state court's authority over foreign property could be addressed in an analogous fashion. The 
Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act employs precisely this approach in the insurance context in those 
states that have adopted it. UNJF. INSURERS LiQUIDATION ACT§ 3, 13 U.L.A. 321, 341 (1986) 
(providing for the appointment of an ancillary receiver for insurers domiciled in another state). The 
alternative approach suggested in this subpart is a less cumbersome means of achieving the same effect. 
340. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115-16 (1963); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 338, § 24.10. 
But cj. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, ll-12 (1909) (holding that the law of the situs state detennined the 
applicability of an out-of-state judgment as against a third party). 
341. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 1; see also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,439 
(1943) (explaining that the clear purpose of the Clause is to establish that litigation pursued to judgment 
in one state is given nationwide application). 
342. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 958 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1963 
(1988)); see Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 
SUP. CT. REV. 89 (suggesting that Congress should enact declarations of national policy on recognition 
of sister state judgments to solve implementation problems with the Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
343. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 338, §§ 10.3, 10 .6. Interstate jurisdictional issues frequently 
arise in the domestic relations context, where state courts are faced with t..'1e issue of how to coordinate 
local litigation with similar litigation filed by an estranged or fonner spouse in another state. See, e.g., 
Brown v. Brown, 387 A.2d 1051, 1054-55 (R.I. !978) ("[A] court should not, as a general rule, 
exercise its conceded power to enjoin a foreign divorce proceeding if the spouse sought to be enjoined 
is a bona tide domiciliary of the foreign jurisdiction."). 
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over federal matters since the Supremacy Clause effectively bars a state 
court from interfering with a proceeding initiated in federal court. 344 
Because corporations frequently are embroiled in litigation in a variety 
of locations at the time they file for bankruptcy relief, the question whether 
a state court could influence nonforum litigation is an important one. If a 
state court could not halt or otherwise coordinate out-of-state and federal 
litigation with the corporation's bankruptcy case, its ability to facilitate an 
effective resolution to the problems of a financially troubled debtor would 
be seriously impaired. 
As with the court's abilities to resolve entitlements in out-of-state land , 
the apparent dilemma could be addressed in several ways. The uniform 
laws process could be used, for instance, to coordinate an agreement 
among the states to suspend ongoing litigation in the event that one of the 
parties files a bankruptcy petition in another state. 345 Another approach 
might be for Congress to enact a federal provision on this issue. Congress 
could implement a federal stay provision comparable to the automatic stay 
currently in place under the Bankruptcy Code346-a provision providing 
that the filing of a bankruptcy petition in a state court operates as a stay on 
the commencement or continuation of any litigation against the debtor cor-
poration. 347 
344. U.S. CONST. art. VI; General Atomic Co. v . Felter, 434 U.S . 12, 17 (1977) . Another , 
somewhat related, issue arising from the interaction between a state bankruptcy regime and federal law 
is the possibility that preemption problems might interfere with the ability of the states to regulate 
corporate bankruptcy effectively. In the insurance context, Congress has addressed thi s problem by 
enacting an anti-preemption provision, which gives states free reign to regulate the "business of 
insurance" without interference from potentially conflicting federal laws. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1988); 
see U.S. Dep't of the Treasury v. Fa be, 113 S. Ct. 2202, 2209-10 (1993) (upholding those parts of the 
priority scheme in Ohio's insurance insolvency statute that could be seen as regulating the "business 
of insurance" despite its conflict with a federal priority provision). This approach would be equally 
effective for corporate bankruptcy. 
345. This approach has been employed with striking effectiveness in the domestic relations context. 
Nearly every state has enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in an effort to address an 
analogous difficulty-the tiling of the same child support action in multiple states. See Ribstein & 
Kobayashi, supra note 176, at 29 (finding that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act has been 
enacted by 52 states and territories). This statute requires a state court to postpone its exercise of 
jurisdiction over a child custody matter if the matter is also pending in another state until the court 
coordinates with the other state to determine the most appropriate venue. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION ACT § 6, 9 U.L.A. 123, 219-20 (1968). As Ribstein and Kobayashi point out, 
coordinating the states' approach to an issue is a function that the uniform laws process can perform 
well because a uniform law can serve as an effective focal point for interstate accord. Ribstein & 
Kobayashi, supra note 176, at 29. 
346. See II U.S.C. § 362 (1988). 
347. The concern here, as with a federal law governing the filing of claims, see supra notes 310-
11, is that a federal stay provision might significantly affect the substantive contours of state bankruptcy 
law. From this perspective, an interstate accord might be a better solution than a federal stay law. 
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VI. Conclusion 
I have attempted to show in this Article that the federal corporate 
bankruptcy framework now in place is not at all an inevitable one. For 
most of the nineteenth century, lawmakers vigorously contested th e issue 
whether Congress should or even could pass federai bankruptcy legisl ation 
that extended to corporations. Not until the end of the century was the 
issue sufficiently settled that Congress could include corporate bankruptcy 
in a national bankruptcy act. Nor have the consequences of federali zing 
corporate bankruptcy been entirely happy ones. The creation of an art ifi -
cial separation between state corporation law and federal corporate bank-
ruptcy has led to vestigialization problems that have undermined both areas 
of the law . 
In recent years, it has become apparent to most observers that Chapter 
11 is deeply flawed. This Article suggests that the corporation law/corpo-
rate bankruptcy split is a contributing factor to the problems that commen-
tators have observed. The best way to address this problem and to reform 
corporate bankruptcy in general would be to return control over corporate 
bankruptcy to the states. Not only would such a proposal eliminate the 
vestigializing effects of the current separation, but states almost certainly 
would enact better general corporation laws than they currently have in 
place and a better corporate bankruptcy regime than Congress has 
developed. 
My analysis does not suggest that Congress should get out of the cor-
porate bankruptcy business altogether. Rather, the proposal can be seen 
as calling for two kinds of federal rules. The first are essentially enabling 
rules-federal provisions whose purpose is simply to eliminate some of the 
obstacles to state regulation of corporate bankn1ptcy. Thus, for example, 
Congress should enact a choice-of-law provision requiring that courts loo k 
to the bankruptcy regime of a corporation's state of incorporation. Further-
more, Congress could minimize interstate friction by requiring that states 
recognize property judgments by a sister state's court in a bankruptcy case. 
Second, and more substantively, Congress should regulate those areas 
of corporate bankruptcy in which the incentives of state lawmakers appear 
to be suspect. Given the limitations of federal lawmaking, Congress should 
only intervene to the extent it is particularly clear that Congress will 
regulate more effectively. Of the areas we considered, disclosure require-
ments and a provision counteracting forum shopping (perhaps included in 
the choice-of-law provision mentioned above) were the only contexts where 
the arguments for federal regulation were relatively clear. 
Shifting corporate bankruptcy to the states is an admittedly dramatic 
step, however promising it appears in the abstract. The greatest obstacle 
may, in the end, be a practical one: Could such a proposal ever be passed? 
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Is it plausible that Congress would relinquish much of its control over cor-
porate bankruptcy? From an interest-group perspective, one can easily 
imagine the sources of resistance. Bankruptcy judges and bankruptcy law-
yers, for instance, both comprise concentrated groups, have an enormous 
stake in the existing regime, and would be extremely effective lobbyists. 
By contrast, many of the most obvious beneficiaries of the proposal are 
more diffuse. Moreover, Congress does not often cede authority back to 
the states once it has federalized an area of the law. 
On the other hand, as noted earlier, states already control the 
liquidation and rehabilitation of insurance companies. 348 Given states' 
historical preeminence in regulating corporations, it is at least conceivable 
that the political climate might at some point generate support for shifting 
corporate bankruptcy authority back to the states.349 Even before-or in 
the absence of-congressional action, the analysis has useful implications 
for corporation law and corporate bankruptcy. This Article suggests that 
lawmakers and bankruptcy courts should focus much more closely on the 
vestigialization caused by the federalization of corporate bankruptcy. More 
generally, it also suggests the need to talk once again about the institutional 
issues of why Congress is the primary regulator of corporate bankruptcy 
and to what extent it should retain that role. 
348. See supra notes 69, I 05 and accompanying text. 
349. It is also interesting to note that, while European commentators and lawmakers have debated 
whether uniform, Europe-wide rules are necessary in various corporation law contexts, no one seems 
to have suggested that Europe needs a unified bankruptcy regime of the sort we currently have in the 
United States . See generally David Chamy, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formuklting 
Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bouom" in the European 
Communities, 32 HARV. INT' L L.J. 423 (I 991) (advancing a theory of when uniform, mandatory rules 
are appropriate); Conard, supra note 221 (describing the directives designed to "harmonize" European 
Community corporation law). 
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APPENDIX A: NINETEENTH-CENTURY BANKRUPTCY LAWS 
Bankruptcy Act of: 
I Characteristic 1800 1841 1867 1898 
Scope merchants any natural any natural any natural 
only person person person 
I 
Corporate no no yes• yes II I 
Bankruptcy I I 
Voluntary/ involuntary bothh both bothc 
Involuntary bankruptcy 
only 
Preferences no yes yes yes 
Regulated (must show (presumption (no intent 
intent) of intent) requirement) 
Exemptions federal federal federal, any available 
only only supplemented state 
by state exemptions 
• Composition/reorganization was first added in 1874. 
h Involuntary bankruptcy was limited to merchants only. 
c Voluntary corporate bankruptcy was added in 1910 for all corporations 
except municipal, railroad, banking, and insurance corporations. 
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APPENDIX B: STATE PREFERENCE REGULATION 
General Fraud Bank Insurance I I Preference Law Preference Preference ' 
Law Passed Law Law I 
State Passed Date" Passed Date" Passed Date" 
Alabama no UFTA no yes 1971 
Alaska no yes yes 1951 yes 1990 
Arizona no UFTA yes !99 1 yes 1954 I 
Arkansas no UFTA yes 1921 yes 1959 I 
California yes 1992 UFTA no yes 1935 
Colorado yes 1897 UFTA no yes 1992 
Connecticut no UFTA yes 1991 yes 1991 
Delaware yes 1953 no no yes 1953 
Florida no UFTA yes 1992 yes 1969 
Georgia yesb 1984 no no yes 1992 
Hawaii no UFTA yes 1931 yes 1987 
Idaho no UFTA no yes 1981 
Illinois no UFTA no yes 1992 
Indiana yes 1982 no yes 1933 yes 1993 
Iowa yes 1939 no no yes 1984 
Kansas no no no yes 1991 
Kentucky yes< 1910 no yes 1984 yes 1970 
Louisiana no no yes 1990 yes 1993 
Maine no UFTA no yes 1991 
Maryland yes 1985 UFCA no yes 1963 
Massachusetts no UFCA no no 
Michigan no UFCA yes 1969 yes 1989 
Minnesota no UFTA no yes 1969 
Mississippi no no yes 1969 yes 1991 
Missouri yes 1939 no yes 1939 yes 1991 
Montana yes 1989 UFTA no yes 1979 
• The date listed is the date of the most recent amendment. 
b This statute is primarily a fraudulent conveyance provision. 
c This statute is not limited to assignment or receivership context. 
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
General Fraud Ban.lc Insurance 
I Preference Law Preference Preference 
Law Passed Law Law 
I State Passed Date" Passed Date" Passed Date' 
Nebraska no UFTA yes 1933 yes 1989 
Nevada no UFTA yes 1971 yes 1971 
New Hampshire yes 1885 UFTA no yes 1969 
New Jersey yes 1928 UFTA no yes 1992 
New Mexico no UFTA yes 1991 yes 1993 
New York yes 1950 UFCA no yes 1989 
I 
North Carolina yes 1909 yes no yes 1989 
North Dakota no UFTA no yes 1993 
Ohio yesc 1953 UFTA no yes 1983 
Oklahoma yes 1910 UFTA yes 1993 no 
Oregon no UFTA yes 1973 yes 1967 
Pennsylvania yes 1901 UFCA no yes 1977 
Rhode Island no UFTA no yes 1993 
South Carolina yes 1962 yes no yes 1982 
South Dakota yes 1969 UFTA no yes 1989 
Tennessee yes 1881 no no yes 1991 
Texas no UFTA yes 1943 yes 1955 
Utah no UFTA no yes 1992 
Vermont no no no yes 1991 
Virginia no no no yes 1986 
Washington yes 1959 UFTA yes 1955 yes 1947 
West Virginia no UFTA no yes 1957 
Wisconsin yes 1969 UFTA no yes 1979 
Wyoming no UFCA yes 1977 yes 1983 
TOTALS YES 22 YES 38 YES 20 YES 48 
NO 28 NO 12 NO 30 NO 2 
' The date listed is the date of the most recent amendment. 
b This statute is primarily a fraudulent conveyance provision. 
c This statute is not limited to assignment or receivership context. 
